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Judgment
43 paragraphs · 1,059 wordsIn this case certain persons--five and more in number--were convicted of rioting u/s 147 of the Indian Penal Code, in that they forcibly entered
upon the land of one Kandikkarappan and there committed mischief by destroying some of his young paddy plants. It appears that on the day after
the complaint in the case was filed, the Second-Class Magistrate who tried the case went to make a local inspection of the scene of the alleged
offence, not because he distrusted the truth of the complaint, for he had issued process against the accused, but apparently for the purpose of
seeing what damage was done. The following is the account given by the Magistrate of the result of his inspection: ""As alleged in the complaint the
said two fields were in a very disorderly and pitiable state. The young paddy plants and sprouts in the said fields were lying trodden down. There
were innumerable pits in the field caused by the feet of the people. A greater part of the said fields was dug up with spades and several heaps of
earth were lying promiscuously all over the said fields. The spectacle was truly pitiable."" The Magistrate then proceeds in his judgment to say.
Under the above circumstances the thoughtless attempt made by the defence to prove that no mischief wits committed to the plants and sprouts of
paddy in the fields in question is utterly futile. Nothing has been adduced by the accused or their witnesses to show how the said seedlings and
sprouts in the said fields were damaged. The whole defence therefore falls to the ground."" In the appeal against the conviction to the Court of the
Head Assistant Magistrate, Trichinopoly, objection was taken to this inspection by the Magistrate, on the ground that the Magistrate was making
himself a witness in the case and that his evidence should therefore have been open to cross-examination and also that the Magistrate, after
conducting such a local enquiry, should not have tried the case. The objections were overruled by the Head Assistant Magistrate, because he
found that the Magistrate''s evidence was not the only evidence on the point and because he considered that the Magistrate was perfectly right in
satisfying himself that the complaint was well founded. It is clear from the facts stated that the Magistrate''s view of the locus in quo was what
influenced him in finding that the complaint of actual damage being caused was true and that the defence, that no damage was caused, was false.
The question now before us is whether the Magistrate, having made himself a witness in the case, rendered himself incompetent to try the case. The
Privy Council has observed in Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal L.R. 3 IndAp 259: ""It ought to be known, and their Lordships wish it to be distinctly
understood, that a Judge cannot, without giving evidence as a witness, import into a case his own knowledge of particular facts."" There is no
provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which authorizes a Magistrate to make a local inspection in a case which is being tried by himself, and
therefore there is no provision as to what is to be done in regard to his examination, in case he should make such local inspection by which he
becomes personally acquainted with relevant facts in the case, such as is made in Section 294 of the Code, in the case of a juror or assessor who
his personally acquainted with any relevant fact, that is for his being sworn, examined, cross-examined and re-examined in the same manner as any
other witness. As it is not possible, therefore, for the Magistrate to be so examined in a trial held before himself, it follows that he cannot comply
with the rule of the Privy Council requiring that he should give evidence as a witness. That being so, we agree with the Calcutta High Court in
holding that when a Judge is the sole Judge both of law and fact, he cannot give evidence before himself and that the accused are entitled to have
nothing stated against them in the judgment which was not stated on oath in their presence and which they have no opportunity of testing by cross-
examination and of rebutting. See Girish Chunder Ghose v. Queen-Empress ILR 20 Cal. 857 and Hari Kishore Mitra v. Abdul Baki Miah ILR 21
Cal. 920. A Magistrate by making, himself a witness has a legal interest in the decision of the case which disqualifies him from trying it, no matter
how small that interest may be. See Serjeant v. Dale ILR 2 Q.B.D. 558 . The learned Judges Mellor and Lush, JJ., therein observed that ""the law
in laying down this strict rule has regard not so much perhaps to the motives which might be supposed to bias the Judge as to the susceptibilities of
the litigant parties. One important object, at all events, is to clear away every thing which might engender suspicion and distrust of the tribunal and
so to promote the feeling of confidence in the administration of justice which is so essential to social order and security. Although the law makes no
provision for a local inspection by a Magistrate of the locus in quo in a case being tried by himself, we do not go the length of saying that under no
circumstances may local inspection be made. But we are satisfied that such inspection should only be made for the purpose of enabling the
Magistrate to understand the better the evidence which is laid before him, and it must be strictly confined to that. This is the view taken by the
learned Chief Justice (Petheram, C.J.) of the Calcutta High Court in the case already quoted. Hari Kishore Mitra v. Abdul Baki Miah ILR 21 Cal.
920 . To this we would add that when any inspection is made with the object stated, the Magistrate should invariably be accompanied by both
parties or their representatives.
Holding as we do for the reasons above given that the Second-class Magistrate rendered himself incompetent to try this case, we must set aside
the conviction and sentences of fine and direct that a new trial be held by another Magistrate in the case of those of the accused whose conviction
was confirmed by the Appellate Court.
