High Courts

Queen-Empress vs Saminatha Pillai

Madras High Court · Decided on 4 December 1890 · Citation: (1896) 6 MLJ 171

ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 213, 214
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Judgment

15 paragraphs · 345 words
1.

We consider that the accused was properly acquit-ted. It is not denied that Kolandavelu Pillai was acquitted of the offences of house-breaking

and theft, and that he was not liable to legal punishment. But it is contended, that it is not necessary that an offence should be actually committed,

or that the person charged should be really, liable to be punished for such offence. We dp not however think, that it was the intention of the

legislature to punish the giving of gratifications, under a delusion that an offence had been committed or that a person was guilty of such offence.

The words ""concealing an offence,"" and ""screening any person from legal punishment for any offence,"" appear to us to presuppose the actual

commission of an offence, and the guilt of the person screened from legal punishment.

2.

The cases cited by Mr. Mayne u/s 213 and 214, Indian Penal Code, B. v. Best 2 Moody C.C. 124 6 C.L.P. 368 R. v. Golby Russ R 184

were decided under 18 Eliz.Ch. V.S. 4, in which the words ""upon colour or pretence of any matter of offence were used. We are of opinion that

the decisions reported in Empress v. Abdul Kadher ILR (1890) A 432 Empress v. Fateh Singh (1867) 8. W.R. 68 (Cr.R.) and Matuki Misser

v.Queen Empress ILR (1885) C. 619 which have reference to the construction to be placed upon similar words in Section 201, apply to this

section also. The public prosecu-tor draws our attention to Queen v. Hurdut Sarma (1876) 20 W.R. 66 Cr. R. wherein the same expression was

differently construed with reference to Section 218 I.P.C. but that section has reference to public servants, who disobey a direction of Law. As

pointed out by Jackson J. in Queen v. Jainarayan we think that the intention was to discourage malpractices, when offences have really been

committed, or when persons really guilty are screened, and not to ensure general veracity on the part of the public, in regard to imaginary offences

or offenders. We therefore decline to interfere.