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Judgment
53 paragraphs · 1,111 wordsS.J. Mukhopadhaya, J.—Pursuant to a scheme, the appellant applied for purchase of a plot and order of allotment was issued vide letter
No. E3/8669/96 dated 10th April, 1996. The appellant deposited the cost as per order of allotment, executed a lease-cum-sale agreement in
June, 1996. The Tamil Nadu Housing Board (hereinafter referred to as ''Housing Board''), later on, demanded the difference in final cost, but
having failed to deposit the amount, the Housing Board issued impugned order of eviction on 14th Aug., 2002. Having unsuccessfully challenged
the said order, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the order passed by learned single Judge.
The main plea taken by the appellant is that the amount as per regular order of allotment dated 10th April, 1996, having been deposited,
followed by no objection certificate granted by Housing Board and lease-cum-sale agreement made on 19th June, 1996, the Housing Board
cannot demand any further amount from the appellant nor can evict him on the ground of non-payment of such demand, which is illegal. Reliance
was placed on a Bench decision of this Court in V.S. Raghunathan v. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, etc. reported in 1997 WLR 25 in support of his
claim.
In the present case, it will be evident from the order of allotment dated 10th April, 1996, that the appellant (allottee) was informed of certain
conditions. At Clause (2) it was mentioned that the lease-cum-sale agreement to be executed by the allottee and the conditions will have to be
adhered as mentioned in the order of allotment. At Clause (3), while provision was made for payment of earnest money deposit, it was informed
that the said earnest money deposit will not be adjusted under any circumstance towards 25% of tentative cost of the plot or instalment. (Emphasis
added). At Clause (4) the appellant was informed that the issue of sale deed will be governed by the conditions of lease-cum-sale agreement to be
executed by him apart from rules and regulations.
In the lease-cum-sale agreement dated 19th June, 1996, as signed by the appellant, at Clause (5) the following stipulation was made:
The price of the property is tentatively fixed as at present and in the peculiar circumstances of Rs. 2,14,655/= (Rupees Two Lakh Fourteen
Thousand Six Hundred and Fiftyfive Only) and such tentative price is subject to revision as contemplated herein after in these presents.
Such tentative or provisional price of the property shall be paid with interest thereon at % per annum in equated monthly instalment/rent spread
over a period of five years.
The Lessee/Purchaser shall pay towards such tentative price without default a minimum instalment/rent Rs. 3301/= (Rupees Three Thousand Three
Hundred and One only) per month beginning with the month of 4/96 as stipulated in condition No. 2 above.
From the aforesaid conditions as shown in the order of allotment and lease-cum-sale agreement, as signed by the appellant, it will be evident that
the amount as was paid by him was tentative or provisional price of the property, subject to revision as contemplated by the Housing Board.
The Housing Board has explained in their counter affidavit the reason of enhancement of cost. At para-7 it is mentioned that the appellant had
been informed of revision of monthly instalment of Rs. 3301/= per month instead of Rs. 3230/= per month. The revision took place due to 18%
interest per annum paid for the year earlier to the allotment to the plot in question. Plot No. 912 of Mogappair Eri Scheme was allotted to
appellant during the financial year 1996-97 (on 10th April, 1996). Such allotment having been made in the financial year 1996-97, the cost of plot,
which was earlier calculated as per the allotment for the year 1995-96, was subsequently recalculated adding interest therein, which comes to Rs.
1,84,000/= per ground, vide proceeding No. S4/94-96 dated 24th Sept., 1996. On the basis of the said proceeding, the appellant was asked to
pay the difference of cost by letter dated 23rd Dec., 1997.
Apart from the aforesaid fact that the cost was recalculated vide proceeding dated 24th Sept., 1996, and demand was made vide letter dated
23rd Dec., 1997, it appears that subsequent reminder was given by Housing Board to the appellant demanding payment of rest of the amount by
order dated 22nd May, 2001, 31st Aug., 2001 and 18th May, 2002. Inspite of the same, neither the proceeding dated 24th Sept., 1996 nor the
first demand letter dated 23rd Dec., 1997 or the subsequent reminders calling for the demand in the year 2001 and 2002 have been challenged by
the appellant in the writ petition.
Almost similar matter fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Shimla Development Authority Vs. Asha Rani, . In the said case, the
Supreme Court held that allottees were bound to pay the cost of escalation of value of land, in case the court enhances the compensation for the
land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act at various stages.
Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in Preeta Singh, etc., Vs. Haryana Urban Development Authority and others, , where the Supreme
Court noticed that the allottees were making payment on the basis of provisional calculation.
The abovesaid decisions have also been followed by Division Bench of this Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Tv. Colony Welfare
Association vide judgment dated 31st Aug., 2007, in W.A. No. 478 and 479 of 1998.
So far as the case of V.S. Raghunathan v. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, etc. reported in 1997 WLR 25 , as referred by the counsel for the
appellant, is concerned, that was a case where the Court merely observed that if allottees are aggrieved over the enhancement, they could demand
the Housing Board to give details as to the basis on which the final cost is determined. No finding on merit was given on the issue whether such
demand could be made or not.
In the present case, the respondents have already shown reason in their counter affidavit and the appellant has not disputed the same by filing a
rejoinder. Further a satisfactory explanation having been given by the Housing Board, no interference is called for against the order passed by the
Housing Board. However, this order shall not stand in the way of the appellant to deposit the rest of the amount within six weeks from today. If
such amount is deposited with interest, if any, prescribed by the Housing Board, the respondent-Housing Board may not evict the appellant.
Otherwise, there being no merit, the writ appeal is dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs.