R. Eswari vs The State of Tamil Nadu

R. Regupathi, J.—Wife of the detenu challenges the impugned order of detention, dated 22/4/2008, detaining her husband as ""Goonda"", as

contemplated under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of dangerous activities of Boot leggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral

Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum-grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982).

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that while passing the order of detention, five adverse cases were relied on apart from the ground

case and that the ground case relates to robbery punishable u/s 392 of the Indian Penal Code while all the five adverse cases pertain to the offence

punishable u/s 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Relying on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Darpan Kumar Sharma @ Dharban

Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, , the learned Counsel contended that on the basis of solitary instance of robbery as

mentioned in the grounds of detention, the order of detention cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed.

The learned Public Prosecutor concedes that all the adverse cases relate to the offence punishable u/s 379 of the Indian Penal Code and the

ground case is the only case pertaining to robbery.

We have heard the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record.

The detaining authority relied on five adverse cases and admittedly, those cases relate to the offence punishable u/s 379 of the Indian Penal

Code, however, the ground case alone pertains to robbery punishable u/s 397 of the Indian Penal Code. In Darpan Kumar Sharma @ Dharban

Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, , the Honourable Apex Court held thus:

In the present case, the three alleged incidents to which the Commissioner of Police has referred to, are thefts arising u/s 379, IPC and, therefore,

there is only a solitary instance wherein the detenu is alleged to have robbed in a public place one Kumar. Therefore, there is no material on record

to show that the reach and potentiality of the single incident of robbery was so great as to disturb the even tempo or normal life of the community in

the locality or disturb general peace and tranquillity or create a sense of alarm and insecurity in the locality. Though in the grounds of detention, the

detaining authority had stated that by committing this offence in public the detenu created a sense of alarm, scare and a feeling of insecurity in the

minds of the public of the area and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which affected even tempo of life of

the community, but citation of these words in the order of detention is more in the nature of a ritual rather than with any significance to the content

of the matter. Thus, a solitary instance of robbery as mentioned in the grounds of detention is not relevant for sustaining the order of detention for

the purpose of preventing the Petitioner from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This ground is enough to quash the

order of detention made by the Respondents.

Applying the ratio laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid case law, we are of the considered view that the order of

detention is liable to be set aside.

In the result, the Habeas Corpus Petition is allowed and the order of detention passed in No. 08/2008 dated 22/4/2008 by the second

Respondent is set aside. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless his detention is required in connection with any other case or

cause.