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88 paragraphs · 2,090 wordsK.A. Swami, C.J.—When the Writ Appeal No. 1150 of 1995 preferred against an interim order in W.M.P. No. 7923 of 1995 came up
before us for consideration, we considered it necessary to hear the writ petition itself. Subsequently it was brought to our notice that W.P. No.
4586 of 1995 also relates to the same subject-matter. Therefore, we directed to post the said writ petition alongwith the writ appeal. Hence, all the
three matters are posted together. We have heard both sides. The decision in the writ petitions will have a bearing upon the writ appeal. Therefore,
we take up the writ petitions for consideration.
In W.P. No. 4586 of 1995, the petitioner has sought for issue of a writ of quo warranto, calling upon the respondents to show under what
authority, the respondents 3 and 4 are holding the office of the member of Senate/Syndicate in spite of the judgment of the Division Bench in W.P.
Nos. 5025 and 5026 of 1992, dated 1.12.1994. In W.P. No. 4827 of 1995, the petitioner has sought for issue of a writ of mandamus, directing
the respondents 3 and 4 to forbear from participating in the Senate and Syndicate meetings of the Madurai Kamaraj University in view of Sections
15(b)(1) and 19(b)(i) of the Madurai University Act, 1965 as amended by the Tamil Nadu University Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1991.
The facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether R. Jagadeesan and P.T.R. Palanivel Rajan are entitled to continue as
the members of the Syndicate are no longer in dispute and the same are as follows:
The Tamil Nadu University Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1991 came into force on 27.2.1992. On the date when the Act came into force,
both the respondents referred to above had enjoyed the membership of the Senate for more than two terms. The validity of the Tamil Nadu
University Laws (Second Amendment) Act, 1991 was challenged before this Court in W.P. Nos. 5025 and 5026 of 1992. A Division Bench of
this Court decided the said writ petitions, struck down certain provisions as unconstitutional and also issued certain directions. The relevant
portions of the order is as follows:
For the reasons stated above, the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 5-A, Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) of Section 14, Sub-clause (ii) of
Clause (b) of Section 18, Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) of Section 23 of 1923 Act as amended by Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively of 1992 Act
and also the Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) of Section 15, Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) of Section 19, Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b) of Section 24 of
1965 Act as amended by Sections 8, 9 and 10 of 1992 Act and also Section 24-A of 1965 Act as inserted by Section 11 of 1992 Act are held
as unconstitutional, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The provisions contained in Explanations I and II and the provisos thereto of
Sub-section (1) of Section 5-A of 1923 Act as inserted by Section 2 of 1992 Act and the Explanations I and II and the provisos to Sub-section
(1) of Section 24-A and Sub-section (2) of Section 24-A of 1965 Act as inserted by Section 11 of 1992 Act are held to have become otiose,
having regard to the fact that the Sub-section (1) thereto has been held to be unconstitutional.
The writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs. The petitioners and the respondents shall now work out the rights of the
petitioners in the light of this decision. As far as the petitioner in W.P. No. 4575 of 1993 is concerned, his nomination has been rejected on the
basis of the impugned amendments, but, in the meanwhile, the election has taken place and the vacancy has been filled up. The member who has
been elected, is not made a party before us. Therefore, it is not possible to grant any relief to him. However, it is open to him to work out his rights
in the light of this decision.
One of the provisions struck down relates to computation of the period of two terms whether it be Senate membership or Syndicate or Academic
Council together without making any distinction and without treating each body as separate and independent. As a result of the abovesaid decision,
an eligible person would be entitled to hold the office of the membership of the Senate or Academic Council or the Syndicate for a period of two
terms. The fact that one held membership of the Senate for a period of the two terms, would not disqualify him from becoming a member of the
Academic Council or Syndicate. But the question which we are concerned with in the case is as to whether a member of a Syndicate who has
been selected by virtue of his membership in the Senate would continue as member of the Syndicate even after he ceased to be a member of the
Senate. The answer to this question would depend upon the interpretation we place on the provisions contained in Section 19(a) Class I and II
categories and 19(c) of the Madurai Kamaraj University Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''). It may be mentioned here that the
provisions contained in Section 19 of the Madurai Kamaraj University Act, 1965 have not been amended by the Tamil Nadu Universities Laws
(Second Amendment) Act, 1991 (Act 9 of 1992) hereinafter referred to as ''the Act 9 of 1992'').
A Syndicate consists of the following members, in addition to the Vice Chancellor:
Class I-Ex-Officio members
Class II-Other members
Four members are elected by the Senate from among its members. The other clauses contained in Section 19(a) are not relevant for our purpose.
Section 15(c) provides that when a person ceases to be a member of the Senate, he shall cease to be a member of any of the authorities of the
universities, of which he may happen to be a member, by virtue of his membership of the Senate. Thus a member of a Senate is eligible to be
elected from among its members to the Syndicate. Respondents 3 and 4 in the writ petitions were elected to the Senate for more than two terms
on the date when the Act 9 of 1995 came into force. After the Act 9 of 1992 came into force, though they have ceased to be the members of the
Senate, yet they continued as members of the Syndicate. In the case or respondents 3 and 4 in the Writ petitions, it is stated that in the writ
petitions'', the constitutional validity of the amended provisions of the Act 9 of 1992 were challenged and there was an interim order passed;
therefore they consequently not only continued in the Senate, but also got elected to the Senate for the fresh terms and subsequent thereto, they
were also elected to the Syndicate. Now the writ petitions have been disposed of in the terms as already extracted above. Consequently, the
respondents 3 and 4 in the writ petitions, cannot continue to be the members of the Senate even though they have been elected pursuant, to the
interim order passed by this Court, during the pendency of the writ petitions in W.P. Nos.5025 and 5026 of 1992. On the disposal of the writ
petitions, the aforesaid interim order came to an end. Therefore, the amended provisions of the Act 9 of 1992, excepting those which were struck
down in the aforesaid judgment, became operative. A certain number of members of the Syndicate are to be elected from the Senate by the
members of the Senate. Therefore, the membership of the Senate is the basic requirement, rather a condition of eligibility for being elected to the
Syndicate from the constituency of the Senate. However, it the provisions of the Act stood at that, probably there would not have been any
difficulty for the respondents 3 and 4 to continue as the members of the Syndicate. But, Section 15(c) of the Act specifically provides that when a
person ceases to be a member of the Senate, he shall cease to be a member of any of the authorities of the University of which he may happen to
be a member by virtue of his membership of the Senate. The basis requirement to get elected to the Syndicate from the constituency of the Senate
is that one should be a member of the Senate. Of course, we do find a reference to the ex officio membership in the Act: Proviso 2 to Section
15(b) of the Act enumerates that where an elected or nominated member of the Senate is appointed temporarily to any of the offices by virtue of
which he is entitled to be an ex officio member of the Senate, he shall, by notice in writing signed by him and communicated to the Vice Chancellor
within seven days from the date of his taking charge of his appointment, choose whether he will continue to be a member of the Senate by virtue of
his election or nomination or whether he will vacate office as such member and become a member ex officio by virtue of his appointment and the
choice shall be conclusive. On failure to make such choice, he shall be deemed to have vacated his office as an elected or nominated member. The
aforesaid expression ''ex officio'' relates to the members of the other authorities also, by reason of their office. It also gives a choice to the person
who gets elected to the Senate either to retain membership as an, elected member or an ex officio member. The fact that there is a reference made
to the ex officio membership cannot, in any way, be interpreted to hold that in the case of election from the Senate to the Syndicate, the provisions
contained in Section 19(c) will become inapplicable. Such an interpretation would result in destroying the very object of Section 15. The object of
Section 15 in relation to a member of the Syndicate elected from the Senate is to make his term as a member of the Syndicate co-terminus with
that of the Senate from which he is elected to the syndicate. Further, it is also intended to ensure that he should continue to be a member of the
Senate in order to continue as a member of the Syndicate elected from the Senate. In the event he ceases to be a member of the Senate, he cannot
continue as the member of the Syndicate because, in the absence of the membership of the Senate, the membership of the Syndicate cannot stand.
The member of the Syndicate elected from the Senate cannot continue to be the member of the Syndicate on his ceasing to be a member of the
Senate because the basis for his election to the Syndicate is the Senate membership. Even he ceased to possess that basic requirement, he cannot
continue his Syndicate membership. Thus, a Senate member elected to the Syndicate from the Senate can continue as a member of the Syndicate
only if he continues as a member of the Senate. Once he ceases to be the member of the Senate, automatically he cases to the member of the
Syndicate. So, we are of the view that respondents 3 and 4 in the writ petitions, having ceased to be the members of the Senate by reason of the
provisions contained in Section 15(b)(i) read with explanation thereto as amended by Act 9 of 1992, because they had held the membership of the
Senate for more than two terms in the Senate, they have ceased to be the members of the Syndicate also. Hence, the prayers made in the writ
petitions are entitled to be allowed.
We accordingly allow the writ petitions viz., W.P. Nos. 4586 of 1995 and 4827 of 1995 and restrain the respondents 3 and 4 from acting as
members of the Senate as well as members of the Syndicate. Consequently, we also declare that the respondents 3 and 4 in the writ petitions have
no authority to hold the office of the membership of the Syndicate and function as such. In view of this, the writ appeal stands disposed of, in the
aforesaid terms. The order of the learned single Judge, passed in W.M.P. No. 7923 of 1995 stands modified accordingly. Consequently, no
orders are necessary in C.M.P. No. 14793 of 1995 and W.M.P. No. 7589 of 1995.
