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Judgment
40 paragraphs · 782 wordsThis petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the order dated 18.03.2020 whereby the petitioner, a General Manager, is
transferred from Jabalpur to PIU-2 Narsingpur in the same capacity.
Criticizing this order Shri Praveen Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that by order dated 13.2.2020 (Annx.P/5), the petitioner was
transferred from headquarter to PIU, Jabalpur. In obedience of this order, petitioner was relieved on 17.2.2020 (AnnexP/6) from headquarter and
joined on 18.2.2020 at Jabalpur which is evident from Annex.P/7). The private respondent was transferred from Jabalpur to Badwani. He was
relieved on 20.2.2020 (Annx.P/8). However, he did not join at the transferred place.
In order to accommodate the private respondent, the impugned order dated 18.2.2020 was passed whereby the transfer order of private respondent
was cancelled and he was now directed to be posted at Jabalpur and in lieu thereof, petitioner is transferred to Narsingpur. He submits that the entire
exercise in transferring the petitioner within 27 days is arbitrary and is being undertaken to accommodate respondent No.5 who remained posted at
Jabalpur since, 2017. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on Rajesh Kumar Shakya Vs. State of M.P.-2010(1) MPLJ-656.
Per contra, Shri Vipin Mishra, learned counsel for the employer supported the impugned order. The same is the stand of Shri Amit Seth, counsel for
respondent No.5.
It is common ground that petitioner is transferred in administrative exigency which is clear from the impugned order dated 18.3.2020. Shri
V.P.Tentwal was the incharge of PIU-2, Narsingpur in duel capacity. In order to post a substantive officer, petitioner is transferred in administrative
capacity. The respondents have denied the other allegations of the petitioner.
Shri Amit Seth, learned counsel for respondent urged that although petitioner's home town is mentioned as Rewa, the fact remains that petitioner
remained posted at Jabalpur since 2019. As per transfer policy such an officer should not be posted in the same town and, therefore, petitioner has
been transferred.
I do not find any merit in this contention for the simple reason that employer has not assigned this reason for transferring the petitioner. The core
issue in this case is whether the transfer of petitioner within 27 days is arbitrary and can be said to be an exercise to accommodate the private
respondent.
This is trite that transfer is a managerial function. It is an incidence of service. The transfer order can be interfered with if it runs contrary to any
statutory provision (not policy guidelines), passed by incompetent authority, changes the service conditions of an employee to his detriment or proved
to be malafide.
In the instant case, no doubt, petitioner is transferred within a short span of 27 days. True it is that respondent No.5 did not implement the transfer
order pursuant to reasons mentioned hereinabove yet the question is whether on the ground of frequent transfer as per the judgment of this court in
Rajesh Kumar Shakya (supra) interference is warranted. The Apex Court inB .Varadha Rao Vs. State of Karnataka-AIR 1986 SC 195 5opined that
frequent transfer of Class-III and Class IV employees uproot their families. Such transfer orders in relation to the said category of low paid
employees were deprecated. Petitioner is admittedly a General Manager and is transferred to a small distance to the adjacent district. Thus, the
ground of frequent transfer cannot be pressed into service in a case of this nature. Hence, the case of Rajesh Kumar Shakya (supra) cannot be
pressed into service.
In Mrs. Shilpi Boase and others Vs. State of Bihar - AIR 1991 SC-53,2 the Apex Court opined that even if a person is transferred on
administrative ground and somebody replaces him on his own request, it cannot be said that it is a malafide exercise to accommodate somebody. Thus,
it cannot be said that the entire exercise was made to accommodate the private respondent.
The petitioner is unable to establish any malafide or prove that his service conditions are altered to his detriment. In this backdrop, there is no
ingredient on the strength of which interference can be made. However, before parting with the matter, I deem it proper to observe that employer
should be sensitive in the matters of this nature where one employee has not executed his transfer order but is transferred back to same place
whereas the other person who has been transferred is shunted within a short span of time. This causes unnecessary heart burning to the employees. I
hope that in future employer will take into account this aspect. In absence of any ingredients on which interference is warranted, interference is
declined. Petition is dismissed.
