R. Lakshminarayanan vs V.A. Maruthappa Nainar and Others

Natesan, J.—The short question for consideration by the Full Bench in this batch of writ appeals is, whether a licensee of an existing rice mill

has locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari to quash the grant of a permit for the establishment of a new rice mill in the locality, under the Rice-

Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, Act 21 of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act.) The appeals have been preferred from the dismissal of

petitions for certiorari on the ground that an existing rice mill owner is not a person aggrieved by the grant of permit to another, and has no standing

to apply for certiorari. In Kuppusami Pillai v. State of Madras, W. P. 2332 of 1966 (Mad), Kailasam, J., observed that the mere fact that a

person who has a mill in close proximity to the one to which licence has been granted is likely to suiter financial loss is not sufficient to make him an

aggrieved person entitling to maintain a writ petition challenging an order of the licensing authority granting permit to a new applicant. In taking this

decision, the learned Judge considered that the matter was not res integra but governed by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in

Lakshmiammal v. Vaithilingam W. A. 195 of 1962 (Mad). Proceeding the learned Judge held that the decision of Rajagopalan, J., in P.K.N.

Abdul Mazid Vs. The State of Madras and Others, , taking a contrary view could not, in view of the decision of the Division Bench, be said to be

good law. But the contrary view finds confirmation in the observations by another Division Bench in Thiruvengadam Vs. Muthu Chettiar and

Another, .

The Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act 1958, is an Act to regulate the rice milling industry in the interests of the general public. Manifestly, it

is a restriction in the carrying on of business of rice milling. Section 8 of the Act prohibits the establishment of any new rice mill by any person or

authority after the commencement of the Act except under and in accordance with a permit granted u/s 5 of the Act, The permit has to be followed

by securing a licence u/s 6 for carrying on rice milling operation. There is a prohibition against an owner of a rice mill changing the location of the

whole or any part of the rice mill, and against expansion of the rice mill except with permission. Severe penalties, imprisonment and fine, are

provided by Section 13 for contravention of provisions of Section 8. Section 5 (1) requires an application to be made to the Central Government

for the grant of a permit for the establishment of a new rice mill or for re-commencing rice milling operation in a defunct rice mill Under statutory

powers, the Central Government has delegated its functions to the State Board of Revenue.

Section 5 (4) requires a full and complete investigation to be made in the manner prescribed, before the grant of a permit. The investigation should

have due regard to the number of rice mills operating in the locality, the availability of paddy in the locality, the availability of power and water

supply for the rice mill in respect of which a permit is applied for and the type of the rice huller type, sheller type or combined shelter huller type.

The investigation has also to be directed to ascertain whether the functioning of the rice mill would cause substantial unemployment in the locality

and other matters that may be prescribed. The rules made under the Act bring out more clearly the object of the Regulation. They emphasise that

the investigation shall be made with a view to ascertaining whether the grant of a permit is necessary for ensuring adequate supply of rice.

Information has to be gathered as to the pattern of trade and commerce in rice in the locality, the effect that the operation of the new or the defunct

rice mill may have on the local economy, and the necessity or otherwise for an addition to the productive capacity of the existing rice mills in the

locality. The enquiry inter alia must be directed to ascertain whether hand pounding industry in the locality is already well organised and whether the

establishment of a new rice mill is likely to affect adversely that industry.

The object of the Act, it is manifest, is not to give monopoly in rice mill business, but to regulate the rice mining industry in the interests of the

general public. At the same time, it emerges from the statutory provisions and rules that the grant of a permit is not arbitrary, but should have due

regard to the local potential for entertaining a new rice mill or what may be called local economic expediency, namely, the availability of paddy in

the area to be hulled, the existing number of rice mills which serve the public need, the availability of power and water supply for the efficient

running of the rice mills and the adverse effect a new rice mill may have on allied industries like hand pounding industry. Rice milling industry is thus

a controlled business and there is a restriction on the citizen''s right to carry on the business or occupation of rice milling. The regulation purports to

impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. In the cases before us, the existing rice mill owners carrying on business under

the Regulation complain that the regulation or rules made thereunder have been violated by the administrative agencies, authorised to grant permits,

by granting fresh permits when not warranted under the regulation and rules made thereunder. This contravention of the regulation or rules, it is

their case, prejudicially affects them, the local economy being disturbed.

The Full Bench reference is confined to a very narrow question; but counsel would raise other points. Inter alia Mr. V. K. Thiruvenkatachari,

learned counsel appearing for the respondent in one of the cases, would contend for invalidating the Act itself. It is said that the Act unreasonably

restricts lie carrying on of a common occupation and is, therefore, violative of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Reference is made to the opinion of the Supreme Court, United States, expressed in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 US 262 : 78 L Ed 747;

that a regulation which has the effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful private business, such as

manufacturing ice, cannot be upheld consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, it is urged that, if Act 21 of 1958, and rules made thereunder

could be utilised by as existing rice mill owner to prevent a competitor from entering into the business, the Act should be struck down as not

regulating the rice milling industry, but as precluding persons from engaging in the industry. In view of the limited nature of the question under

consideration in this reference, we leave open the question of vires of the Act. Nor is it necessary for us to examine whether existing rice mill

owners are entitled to notice on an application for a permit to instal a new rice mill in the locality and whether the authority, when overruling

objections raised by existing rice mill owners who intervene must give reasons for doing so.

It is not contended for the existing rice mill owners that any of their fundamental rights is violated. They say ""we do not have and we are not

claiming any monopoly in the business. We are carrying on business under the restrictions imposed by the Act and rules made thereunder. When,

without due regard to local economy, availability of paddy and the capacity of existing rice mills, a permit is granted to another person, the grant

prejudicially affects our business. But we are not free to adjust our economy. We cannot shift elsewhere at our convenience to maintain the

required turnover for profitable business. We are constrained to carry on the business under the Act and the rules thereunder. Even so, let the new

entrant be permitted to enter business, if that can be done subject to the same conditions, that is in accord with the Act and rules. Arbitrary grants

in breach of the law in a business activity regulated by the statute injures our business. Constrain the authority administering the Act to apply the

law and rules current to all and at all stages with an even hand, so that the rule of law may prevail.

The question is whether, when that is the prayer, it is correct for this Court to say, without examining whether in fact there is breach of any rule or

the Regulation and whether there is reasonable cause for feeling aggrieved, that the grievance of an existing rice mill owner, if any, is not one which

the Court should take cognisance of and grant redress under Article 226 of the Constitution, and turn him away at the threshold. Our answer, as

will be presently seen, has to be ''no''.

Article 226 of the Constitution confers powers on High Courts in language of the widest amplitude to issue to any person or authority, including

in appropriate cases any Government orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and

certiorari, or any of them, not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but also for any other purpose. The Article does not, in terms, provide as

to who can apply for writs or orders thereunder. It is pointed out by the Supreme Court in The Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. Vs. The

State of West Bengal and Others, :

It is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right.....The right that can be

enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs

like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified"".

In Election Commission, India Vs. Saka Venkata Subba Rao and, , the Supreme Court observed that power of High Courts for issuing directions,

orders or writs for purposes other than fundamental rights was conferred with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in

somewhat the same position as the Court of King''s Bench in England. In T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa and Another, the Supreme Court said :--

In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs

in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order

or issue a writ in the nature of certiorari in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the broad and fundamental

principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law.

In the light of the above observations, when on the question as to who may legitimately apply for certiorari, it may not be out of place to examine

the broad principles on which the standing of an applicant for certiorari is viewed in English Courts. We are assuming that there is good ground for

the remedy. No serious problem of locus standi can properly arise, when a judicial or quasi-judicial order of a lis inter se between parties is sought

to be quashed. In such a case manifestly a party could be aggrieved by an adverse decision, and, so, would have status to attack it. Again, if an

authority has power to do an act under a statute which will prejudicially affect a citizen, then, even though there are no two parties apart from the

authority and the person affected, and the contest is between the administrative authority and a citizen opposing it, clearly the citizen, would be a

person aggrieved if the order passed is against him. The question of locus standi acutely arises for consideration, when third parties who oppose

such orders are affected by them is it open to them, because they have been prejudicially affected, to question the legality of the orders passed on

one or other ground on which a writ of certiorari could be issued? The citizen affected may not be able to aver infringement of any common law

right or direct violation of his individual right yet the citizen''s interests might have been adversely affected by an unreasonable or arbitrary

determination of the administrative authority. Keir and Lawson in Cases in Constitutional Law, 5th Edn, page 406, have this to say on the question:

As has already been said, the direct control of public authorities becomes especially necessary when a subject cannot show that he has suffered

the infringement of an actual right. The question therefore arises, what sort of locus standi an applicant for relief must have. The matter has been

mainly discussed of recent years in relation to the prerogative orders and the view is generally held that, although the older decisions seem to apply

different tests to the various orders, at the present day the matter is entirely in the hands of the Judges, except where the Crown applies for an

order and probably also where the applicant, though a subject, can show that an actual right of his has been infringed. This discretionary power of

the Judges, since it allows them to refuse an order on general grounds, also makes it unnecessary for them to insist on any proot of locus standi in

the applicant; they can in a proper case say that his interest is too remote without giving any special reasons. Thus the prerogative orders can be

granted at the instance of any person who has an interest sufficient to satisfy the Judges that he has reasonable grounds for his application; and, for

instance, it was once a matter of course for a brewery company to apply for certiorari to quash a licence granted to a rival company. This freedom

from strict rules of locus standi would seem to be one of the most valuable characteristics of the prerogative orders.

In our view, this sums up the position in England neatly. To examine some of the leading cases; in R. v. Surrey JJ (1870) LR 5 QB 466, Justices

had made an order that the repair of certain unnecessary roads by the parishes should cease and be stopped up. An appeal against the order

failed. The statute concerned had provided that notices of the stopping-up should appear at each end of the roads to be stopped up. But notices

had appeared only at one end of each of the roads. On certiorari being sought by an inhabitant, to have the order quashed, a question arose as to

who should apply for the writ. The following observations of Cock-burn C. J. governed the case:

I entirely concur in the proposition that, although the Court will listen to a person who is a stranger, and who interferes to point out that some other

Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, whereby some wrong or grievance has been sustained, yet that is not ex debito justitiae, but a matter upon

which the Court may properly exercise its discretion, as distinguished from the case of party aggrieved, who is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae, if

he suffiers from the usurpation of jurisdiction by another Court.

The expressions certiorari ""of right"" or ""ex debito justitiae"" mean only certiorari that cannot be had until due grounds are shown, but then will not be

refused unless the grounds shown are answered. In Reg v. Nieholson (1899) 2 QB 455, Vaugham Williams L. J. remarked that besides the case

of an aggrieved person who applies as of right for the writ, there is another case in which the Court has regard to the question whether the

applicant is an aggrieved person, and that is where the Court has to exercise its discretion as to the issue of the writ. ""In such a case"" it is observed,

the Court will consider whether the interest of the applicant is so small, or his grievance so like that of the rest of Her Majesty''s subjects, as to

have no sufficient ground for the issue of a writ."" A. L. Smith L. J. observed that as a matter of discretion the certiorari ought not to go, as the

applicants should have shown that they have a peculiar grievance of their own beyond some inconvenience suffered by them in common with the

rest of the public. In Rex v. Groom Ex parte Cobbald, 1901 2 KB 157, a case under the Licensing Act relating to sale of intoxicating liquors, Lord

Alverstone C. J. after observing that if he could see his way to decide against the applicants for certiorari who were only rivals in trade of the

person to whom the licence had been granted and were taking a purely technical objection he should be glad to do so, made the rule absolute as

he had to recognise their locus standi. He observed :

As to the question whether the applicants for the rule are persons aggrieved, there can be no doubt that they have no real grievance arising from

the omission to serve the notice in time. That, however, is not the sense in which persons applying for a certiorari are required to be persons

aggrieved. It is sufficient if they have a real interest in the decision of the justices, and they have in this case. They took the point now raised before

the Justices at the adjourned general annual licensing meeting and when the confirming order was made, and it would be too strong to say that they

had not a sufficient interest in the matter to enable them to apply for the rule.

In Rex v. Ex parte Howitt, 1921 1 KB 248, another case under the Licensing Act in respect of sale of liquors, setting out the true principle on

which Courts act in the matter of certiorari, the Earl of Reading C. J. observed:

Here the applicant had an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law being wrongly administered.

It was further observed:

The question whether a person has a particular interest in the subject matter as distinguished from the interest which the general public has must

always be a question of degree. Of course, it may be that a person''s interest is so slight that the Court will not act upon it, but where, as here, it is

substantial the Court is bound to issue the writ when it appears on the face of the order that there has been a wrongful exercise of jurisdiction in the

sense of an excess of jurisdiction.

The applicant in that case, it is remarked, did not stand in the same category as a member of the public who could be said to have only a general

interest in seeing that the law was properly carried out; but he had a particular interest in the subject matter and that was shown by the fact that he

incurred the expense of instructing Counsel to secure if he could, the refusal of the confirmation, and to contend that the confirming authority had no

jurisdiction. The applicant for writ in that case was only a licensee of other premises in the same borough. We may here notice that the principle,

enunciated in the foregoing two decisions, was accepted by a Full Bench o� this Court in Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd. Vs. Raman and

Raman (Private) Ltd. and Others, . Referring to these decisions, the Full Bench observed--

The true principle is to determine whether the applicant has an interest distinct from the general inconvenience which may be suffered by the law

being wrongly administered.

In Maurice v. London County Council, 1964 2 QB 362, interpreting the words ""persons aggrieved"" in a statute, Lord Denning M. R. observing

that the narrow view that had been given to the words in the Court that it meant a person who had suffered a legal grievance must be rejected

adopted the following observations of the Judicial Committee in Attorney General of the Gambia v. N''Jie, 1961 AC 617,---

The words ''person aggrieved'' are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a

mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order

has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.

A wide interpretation has been given to the words ""persons aggrieved"", even when they are found in a statute. When an order is passed against a

person prejudicially affecting his interest, he may have cause for genuine grievance. The determination need not have arisen between him and the

authority; it would be sufficient if he had intervened to protect his interests. In the English cases under licensing Acts cited above, an existing

licensee, as a person concerned with the grant or withholding of licence to another public house, was held to have sufficient interest to be a person

aggrieved. Another illustration case where the interest was not considered remote to give locus standi is the decision in R. v. Minister of Health ex

p. Dore 1927 1 KB 765. There, an auditor and surcharged Borough councillors for overpaying or expending and when the Minister or Health

without jurisdiction remitted the surcharge, a person who was only a rate-payer from the District which the Councillors, represented, applied for

and had certiorari. In a recent case Reg v. Russel Ex parte Beverbrook Newspapers Ltd., 1968 3 WLR 999 , the question arose whether the

proprietors of a newspaper have sufficient standing to apply for certiorari to quash an order in committal proceedings, which lifted the restrictions

against publication of the proceedings imposed under the Criminal Justice Act, 1967 to a limited extent only. The Act permitted removal of the

restrictions on an application by a person charged, and on the application of one of the five persons involved, the Magistrate lifted the ban limiting

its effect to those parts of the proceedings relating to the applicant. The proprietors of the newspapers contended that, in law, in the circumstances,

they were entitled to an unlimited order and applied for orders of certiorari and mandamus. On the question whether the newspaper proprietors

had a standing to make the application Parker C. J. observed that the standing of the proprietors of the newspaper to apply for the order was

perfectly clear and they were certainly ""a person aggrieved"" so as to be able to make the application. S. A. De Smith in his Judicial Review of

Administrative Action, at p. 313, sums up the position thus :

....in strict law any member of the public may apply for certiorari to quash an order; in practice no application is likely to succeed except one

made by a person aggrieved; the meaning of a person aggrieved is, for this purpose, much wider than in most other branches of the law; but an

applicant''s personal interest in the subject-matter of an impugned order may be too slight or too remote for him to be tested as a person aggrieved

by it.

The broad principles are well established. The interest of the applicant need not be proprietary, but as a claim for certiorari implies a grievance,

there must be a grievance -- a grievance that the Court would take cognisance of. Having regard particularly to the amplitude of the power of the

Court that may be invoked under Article 226, a scrutiny of the locus standi of an applicant for certiorari is clearly necessary to keep off

meddlesome interlopers and professional litigants invoking the jurisdiction of the Court in matters that do not in the least concern them. In Godde

Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others, , the Supreme Court observes :

This Court held in the decision cited The Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. Vs. The State of West Bengal and Others, that ordinarily'' the

petitioner who seeks to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-

matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect to a proprietary interest; it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in

exceptional cases, as the expression ''ordinarily'' indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can

file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof.

An existing rice mill owner who contends that he is prejudicially affected by the grant of a permit for installation of another mill in the locality

contrary to law would, manifestly under the principles discussed above, be entitled to apply for relief under Article 226. A case where a business

rival was held to be a person aggrieved is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Narain Agarwal Vs. State Transport Authority,

U.P. and Another, , a case under the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 47 (3) of that Act provides for determination by the Regional Transport

Authority of the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type for which stage carriage permits may be granted in a region or in any

specified area or route within the region. There is no specific provision for representations to be made at an enquiry in the matter by persons

already providing transport facilities. A revision is provided for from the order at the instance of a person aggrieved. While answering in the

affirmative the question whether a revision would lie at the instance of an existing operator as a person aggrieved, the Supreme Court observed :

We are unable to say that no existing operator can be aggrieved by an order made u/s 47 (3), increasing or decreasing the number of stage

carriages; it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In a particular case it may be to his advantage and he then would not file a

revision against it, but if he files a revision when an order made u/s 47 (3) is prejudicial to his interests, there is no ground for denying him the right

to approach the revisional authority and seeking its order. An order u/s 47 (3) affects the future working on a route and we are of the view that

such an order would have repercussions on the working of the existing operators, whether for their good or not.

Even so the installation of a fresh rice mill would have its repercussions on the working of existing rice mills in the locality. Existing rice mill owners

may be affected by the installation of a new rice mill, if the paddy available in the locality is not sufficient to go round for all the mills. It is thus clear,

on the legal principles involved and on the authorities, that an existing rice mill owner will have locus standi to approach this Court for certiorari, if

he is aggrieved by the grant of a permit for a fresh rice mill in the locality. The Act may provide for appearance and representation by existing rice

mill owners in the locality. The Act may not provide for appearance and representation by existing rice mill owners in the locality. But the authority

is constrained, by the Jaw and rules made thereunder, to have due regard to certain considerations. There is nothing to preclude an existing rice mill

owner suo motu placing before the authority these considerations, as failure to have regard to them may affect him prejudicially. An adverse order

need not necessarily be against a person, who, as of right, is entitled to make representation. In Lakshmi Narain Agarwal Vs. State Transport

Authority, U.P. and Another, , the existing operator had been given no statutory right to make representation. S. A. De Smith in his Judicial

Review of Administrative Action at p. 307, referring to authority, states:--

It would seem that one who has no right to appear or to be represented at a hearing may nevertheless be a person aggrieved by the determination

made in consequence of that hearing.

It is relevant, in this connection, to refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Valliammal Vs. State of Madras and Others, , where a

person applied for certiorari to quash proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of a land adjacent to his land. When the question of

locus standi of the applicant was raised, it was observed by this Court:

It is not in dispute that the writ appellant has a site immediately adjoining the site proposed to be acquired as a burial and burning ground; if the

writ appellant builds a house thereon, and other houses also spring up in the locality the inmates of those houses may very well claim as the Kala

Kshetra authorities previously did, that the proximity of this cremation and burial ground is an injury to health and hygiene. In that sense, the writ

appellant is a person affected and it is in accordance with the principles of equity and law, that too rigid an interpretation of that term ought not to

be adopted by Courts.

The Court proceeded in the view that the applicant had, by reason of his local situation, a peculiar grievance of his own entitling him to a writ ex

debito justitiae.

The decided cases show that when certiorari is sought, the Court generally looks for some personal interest of the applicant in the matter,

something more substanial and related to the applicant than due observance of law by authorities, and do not countenance a mere excess of zeal in

the observance of law by others. A person who is denied a permit or one who is wrongfully deprived or refused something to which he is entitled,

or on whom a legal burden is cast are obvious cases. But that does not exhaust the list. Other persons may be affected and genuinely aggrieved by

excess or abuse of powers. The requirements as to the standing of an applicant for certiorari cannot be circumscribed by any narrow limitation. Of

necessity it would vary according to the law administered, the illegality alleged, and the grievance suffered. The right to apply for relief deeming

himself aggrieved --if that is the test--is one thing; making out a case for the issue of a certiorari is a different thing. That would depend on the

judicial scrutiny of the record in relation to and his establishing one or other of the recognised grounds for quashing. The necessity for judicial

scrutiny, when a person conies to Court complaining against an act of commission or omission of an administrative authority regulating trade,

business or occupation under law which prejudicially affects him, springs from our concept of the supremacy of the Rule of law and the authority of

the Court to determine the legality of the act. The fact that the licencing law vests the authority with some discretion in the matter, does not take the

act of the authority out of judicial scrutiny. When an authority is entrusted with discretion, the authority must direct himself properly in law. He must

direct his attention to matters which he is bound to consider and he must exclude from consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to

consider. If he does not obey those rules, then he oversteps the bounds of his jurisdiction. In matters that could vitally affect citizens in their normal

avocations, trade and business, there is no such thing as absolute discretion in administrative authorities. The law on these matters, to be valid, has

to provide guidelines and the discretion has to be controlled by the guide-lines. We may here adopt the observations of Lord Reading in Ridge v.

Baldwin, 1964 AC 40, where the learned Law Lord said--

....nothing short of a decision of this Court (House of Lords) directly in point would induce me to accept the position that, although an enactment

expressly requires an official to have reasonable grounds for his decision, our law is so defective that a subject cannot bring up such a decision for

review however seriously he may be affected and however obvious it may be that the official acted in breach of his statutory obligation.

Of the decisions of this Court on the question under consideration, the earliest directly on the question is that of Rajagopalan J. in P.K.N. Abdul

Mazid Vs. The State of Madras and Others, . It was given under the Rice Mills Licensing Order, 1955, which was replaced by the Rice Milling

Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. It is not contended that the replacement of the licensing order by the Act makes any difference. The applicant for

certiorari in that case was an existing rice mill owner who objected to the grant of a fresh Licence in the locality. On the question of locus standi of

the applicant, the learned Judge observed--

In my opinion a statutory right to object to the grant of licence or permission may not be the exclusive test to apply in deciding whether an

applicant for a writ of certiorari is an ''aggrieved'' person entitled to challenge the validity of the order which he seeks to avoid.....the petitioner

before me certainly had an interest of his own in the question, whether the third respondent should be granted a licence to work a rice mill in close

proximity to the petitioner''s. That the statutory rules in the Rice Mills Licensing Order did not specifically confer a right on a trade rival, situate as

the petitioner was, to object to the grant of a licence under that order may not in my opinion, affect the real principle to apply in such cases.

In the next case, Ramasundara Nadar and Co. v. State of Madras, W.P. 644 of 1961, Jagadisan J. having found against the applicant on the

merits, considered it unnecessary to examine the question whether the applicant had any locus standi. In Ramanathan Chettiar v. Board of

Revenue, 1963 2 MLJ 320, when the question of locus standi of existing rice mill owners was raised, Veeraswami J., observed that, as the

records established that the authority was satisfied about the surplus position of paddy, before the issue of the new permits, the petition for

certiorari need not be dismissed for want of locus standi. There is no express decision on the question of locus standi.

W. A. 195 of 1962 (Mad), which Kailasam J. purported to follow and is relied on before us, does not, on our reading of the judgment (one of

us was a party to it), decide the question of locus standi. The writ appeal was dismissed, at the admission stage, on an examination of the case on

merits. It is observed therein :

There are no materials to assume that the Commissioner did not consider the relevant matters. Further we are by no means satisfied that by

granting the licence to the first respondent any right of the appellant had been affected so as to entitle him to approach this Court by way of a writ

of certiorari.

The reference to ''right of the appellant'', it is apparent from the context in which the above observation was made is to the factual aspect. Referring

to the argument that the productive capacity of the village being limited the running of more than four rice mills for the locality would entail a

lessening of the business of the appellant in that only less paddy would come to his mill for husking, it was observed:--

That argument is based upon several speculative hypothesis, none of which has been made out by the materials available on record.

We are unable to take this decision as determining that an existing rice mill owner has no locus standi to question the grant of a permit for a fresh

rice mill in the locality. In Lakshmiamma v. Commissioner for Land Revenue, W.P. 1091 of 1962 : ILR (1964) Mad 869, Veeraswami J.,

declined to entertain the writ petition, filed by an existing rice mill owner who had opposed the grant of a permit to instal a new rice mill in the area,

on the ground that the applicant could not be deemed to be a person aggrieved. On writ appeal, therefrom, ILR (1964) Mad 869 = W. P. 1091

of 1962, the dismissal of the writ petition was confirmed, but on other grounds on the merits. On the question of locus standi, tie learned Judges

observed--

The conclusion reached by the learned Judge can, in our opinion, be supported on the merits of the case as well.

The question of locus standi was not discussed. All the same the learned Judges were not inclined to differ from the view taken by Veeraswami J.

The question was not specifically left open. The question of locus standi was the subject of specific discussion and consideration by Kailasam J., in

W. P. 2332 of 1986 (Mad), referred to already. The learned Judge proceeded in the view that the mere fact that a person who has a mill in close

proximity to the one to which licence has been granted is likely to suffer financial loss is not sufficient to make him an aggrieved person in law. The

learned Judge thought that the decision of the Division Bench in W. A. 195 of 1962 (Mad), has held that the grant of a new licence to a person will

not entitle an existing rice mill licence holder to approach this Court for a writ of certiorari. In this view, the learned Judge would hold, as already

stated, that the decision in P.K.N. Abdul Mazid Vs. The State of Madras and Others, , cannot be said to be good law. The learned Judge

observed that, as the petitioners before him (existing rice mill owners) were not aggrieved persons, they were not entitled to move this Court and

''challenge the orders on any ground''. It may be observed that the learned Judge, however, examined the records produced by the Government,

and was satisfied that an elaborate enquiry had been made by the authorities in compliance with the requirements of the Act and rules. The learned

Judge, it may be pointed out, in Veerappa Gounder v. State of Madras W. P. 1042 of 1967. (Mad), quashed an order granting permit, on the

application of an existing rice mill licence holder observing:--

It is no doubt true that this Court has held that an existing rice mill licence holder is not a person aggrieved. But the Court has the discretion to

grant a writ at the instance of even a stranger who brings to the notice of the Court that statutory requirements have not been complied

with.....This, in my opinion, is a fit case for the issue of a writ, even though the petitioner cannot be called an aggrieved person.

The decision of Kailasam J. (in W. F. 2332 of 1966 etc. batch) was taken up in appeals, Paramasiva v. Pannerselvam batch, W. A. 87 of 1967

(Mad). The writ appeals were dismissed at the admission stage itself. On the question whether existing rice mill owners who had objected to the

grant of new permits are aggrieved persons, it was observed that it was not necessary to examine the matter at any length for disposal of the writ

appeals. The point particularly pressed in the writ appeals was the absence of reasoning in the order granting a permit and the Court was satisfied

that there was an elaborate enquiry, at which all objections of the objectors were duly considered. The Court was inclined to agree with the

contention of the objectors that the authorities, while granting the permit, were exercising ''some kind of a quasi-judicial function, it for no other

reason, for the sufficing reason that to refuse a permit, may be to abridge or curtail a fundamental right.

In the appeal in W. A. 150 of 1968 (reported in Thiruvengadam Vs. Muthu Chettiar and Another, , Veeraswami O. C. J. and Ramaprasada

Rao, J. from a decision of Kailasam J., dismissing an application for certiorari questioning the grant of a permit for installation of a rice mill by the

representative of a temple on the ground that the order granting the permit was an administrative order and that in any case the applicant could not

be considered to be an aggrieved person, the learned Judges examined the records and felt satisfied that the licensing authority, in making the

impugned order u/s 5 of the Act, had applied its mind to all the relevant matters enjoined by the statutory provision to be taken into account. On

the contention of the Government that the applicant in any case cannot be regarded as an aggrieved person, the Court, while observing that the

question did not call for consideration in the case, affirmed the principle laid down by this Court in Swami Motor Transport (Private) Ltd. Vs.

Raman and Raman (Private) Ltd. and Others, , already set out, that the applicant must have interest distinct from the general inconvenience which

may be suffered by the law wrongly administered. The learned Judges were inclined to the view that an existing rice mill owner would be a person

aggrieved, for they observe, when examining the locus standi of the appellants before them:

He is not a rival applicant for a rice mill permit, nor is he the owner of a rice mill, nor, as far as we are able to see, is he interested in the matters,

specified in Section 5 (4) of the Act.

The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venugopala Reddi v. Amara Venkata Narasimhalu AIR 1962 Andh Pra 363, 368, does not

help the respondent, as the grant of permit in that case was found to be in conformity with the licensing provision. It was observed that an existing

rice mill owner could not object merely on the ground that there was likelihood of his profits in the trade being diminished, as he had no exclusive

monopoly to do the rice milling business in the area though he was entitled to his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on his trade or

business. Manifestly there was no ground for quashing. The decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Maina Bai Vs. State of M.P. and

Another, , to which reference was made for the respondent, has no relevancy in the context of the issue now under consideration. The application

for certiorari in that case was against an order rejecting an application for the grant of rice milling permit. The question of locus standi as such was

not raised and considered.

It is not contended for the existing rice mill owners that they have monopoly in their area. Nor do they claim a right to question in certiorari

proceedings the installation of a fresh rice mill in their area, if there is no violation or infringement ot the rules and regulations governing the grant of

fresh permits, merely on the ground that their own trade or business may go down. Clearly if the law is wrongly administered and an existing rice

mill owner is prejudicially affected in consequence, his interest in due observance of the law is personal and sufficiently substantial. We are of

opinion, that an existing rice mill owner who has objected to the installation of a fresh rice mill in the locality and contends that he has been

prejudicially affected by the grant of permit for installation of a fresh rice mill, has sufficient interest to give him locus standi to make an application

for certiorari under Article 228, In our view, cases taking the contrary view are not correctly decided. The rejection of the applications for

certiorari in the cases now before us on the ground of want of locus standi cannot be sustained. The writ appeals are allowed. The writ petitions

will have to be disposed of on merits. Petition for leave to raise additional grounds are dismissed.

No order as to costs.