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Judgment
V. Kanagaraj, J.—Petitioner has filed this writ petition praying to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the impugned order dated
12.7.1999 as corrected by erratum dated 13.7.1999 in A.G.A. No.1 of 99 on the file of the first respondent calling for the records therein and
further direct the third respondent to pay the sum of Rs.54,375/= towards Gratuity for 29 continuous years of service by restoring the order dated
30.10.1999 passed in P.G.No.9 of 1998 on the file of the second respondent together with interest at the rate of 12% from 1.2.1997 till the date
of payment.
In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner would submit that he joined the service as a Sales Representative in Messrs.
S.S.M. Brothers Private Limited in May 1968 which is constituted by five brothers as the Board of Directors; that in the same building, three
companies are located, under the name and style of (i) Messrs. S.S.M. Brothers Private Limited, (ii) Messrs. S.S.M. Brothers Trust and (iii)
Messrs. Veena Textiles Private Limited, along with the third respondent herein; that all the above units are having only one entrance for ingress and
egress, common staff and security men and a common telephone; that there is no distinction between the staff of each Unit and that for all
purposes, all the three units are unitary in nature and forms one unit with the unity of ownership, management and control.
The petitioner would further submit that he had been in continuous and uninterrupted service of the said three units from May 1968 to 1.2.1997
and his last drawn salary inclusive of basic pay, D.A., H.R.A., etc. was Rs.3,250/= per month; that while so, the respondent making using of the
fabricated documents in which it commonly obtained the signature of the petitioner in blank papers, sent a lawyer''s notice dated 13.2.1998
admitting the service only from 31.12.1990 and from 1.2.1995 to 31.1.1997 and refused to pay gratuity on ground that he was not in continuous
service exceeding five years as required u/s 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act.
The further averments of the writ petition are that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Salem issued a cheque bearing No.431047 dated
30.5.1997 for a sum of Rs.1,25,028/=, in favour of the petitioner, towards the provident fund accrued for 29 years as evidenced by Ex.R.2, the
statement of account from 1970-71; that he has been in continuous service of Messrs. S.S.M. Brothers Private Limited, Messrs. S.S.M. Brothers
Trust and the third respondent, and therefore, the third respondent is estopped from pleading that all the units are different entity; that he filed an
application in P.G.9/98 before the second respondent and the second respondent allowed the said application based on the oral and documentary
evidence placed on record, particularly placing reliance on Ex.R.2; that the three units are one establishment and that Provident Fund was paid for
a continuous period of 27 years amounting to Rs.1,25,028/=; that the trademark and trade name of Messrs. S.S.M. Brothers Private Limited and
Messrs. Veena Textiles Private Limited are one and the same as ''VEENA'', further concluding that all the three units are owned by one and the
same family. But, on appeal in A.G.A.No.1/99, the appellate authority, as per its order dated 30.10.1998, without proper appreciation of the
evidence and on miserable misconception, would conclude that the petitioner had not completed his service of five years, thus placing reliance on a
judgment reported in Management of Cholamandalam Software Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, I Addl. Labour Court, Madras and Others, . On such
grounds, the petitioner has prayed for the reliefs extracted supra.
No counter has been filed by the other side, but the learned Government Advocate would argue on instructions. On a perusal of the order
passed by the Controller, it is seen that that he has not only framed proper points for determination of the questions involved in the whole of the
case but also has considered the facts and circumstances in the context of the evidence made available on record, wherein it is seen that all the
three units are one and the same establishment. The Controller had also seen that the petitioner had clearly deposed in his evidence to the effect
that he had been paid the gratuity for having served for 27 years to the extent of Rs.1,25,028 and that the other units have not paid anything to him,
and therefore, ultimate conclusions would be arrived at by the Controller to the effect that the petitioner had been employed by the third
respondent from 1968 to 1997 for a continuous stretch of 29 years and his monthly salary last drawn was Rs.3,250/= and calculating the same,
would arrive at the figures of Rs.54,375/= requiring the third respondent to pay the same in favour of the petitioner within thirty days immediately
after the receipt of the order, as per its order dated 30.10.1998.
The learned counsel would also submit that the appellate authority did not consider Ex.R.2, showing the extracts of the statement of the
provident fund account, properly and would pose a question as to why the appellate authority has not considered the same wherein 29 years of
service rendered by the petitioner has not been glaringly evidenced; that the appellate authority showing some distinction between one unit to that
of the others and ultimately opining that there is no legal bar for a Director to be the Director in another Company and signing the documents in
such capacity, cannot make different establishments one and the mere fact of common ownership by itself is not sufficient to satisfy the test of
functional integrality as it has been decided by the Bombay High Court in the case reported in 1993 (1) L.L.J. 369 and therefore, he is inclined to
accept the contention of the management and had set aside the order of the Controller.
On the contrary, it would be argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there cannot be two versions attributed on the part of the
management, one is the provident fund and the other is the payment of gratuity. True, that only in recognition of the service of the petitioner for 29
long years and computing the same, he has been provided with the provident fund and that the appellate authority did not have the mind to
consider either the balance sheet or the vital aspects of the three units mentioned above either it is pertaining to the location in one and the same
campus having only one entrance, one office, staff, security personnel, etc., besides exchange of the employees from one unit to other units freely,
and therefore, accepting only one Veena Enterprises, the service for more than 5 years and dismissing the claim of the petitioner is nothing but a
vindictive act perpetrated on the part of the management and the appellate authority has fallen a prey to such a false pretends, knowingly that for
the purpose of Provident Fund the petitioner''s service in the same Veena Enterprises has been counted for 29 years, and therefore, the functional
integrality on all these respects would only indicate that they are not three distinct and different entities, but one and the same establishment within
the meaning of providing gratuity to the employees under the Payment of Gratuity Act.
The Controller having analyzed the case in the right angle and adopting the right approach and appreciating the available materials in the manner
expected by law, had rightly decided to allow the petitioner''s application thereby granting the gratuity amount of Rs.54,375/=. But on the contrary,
the appellate authority, without assigning proper reasons for differing with the controlling authority whose orders could be interpreted with only for
specific reasons and without properly considering the valid points such as the petitioner having paid the provident Fund contribution for 29 years of
service which is also found glaring in the balance sheet filed in Ex.R.2, has arrived at wrong conclusions, and therefore, the only conclusion that
could be arrived at so far as it is concerned with the order of the appellate authority is that the appreciation of the appellate authority is perverse.
Patent errors of law and perversity in approach have crept into the order of the appellate authority, and therefore, the said order becomes liable
only to be quashed and the same is quashed accordingly.