R. Raja Konar and Others vs Andal Ammal

This petition has been filed by the tenants against an order of the District Judge Madurai, passed in C. R. P. 23 of 1970. The contention that is

raised in this court is that the orders passed by the courts below were based on a compromise and not on a finding that the tenants have committed

a breach as required u/s 10(2) clauses (f) to (vii) and therefore the order of eviction is not executable. I find on facts that this submission is not

borne out. Before the Rent Controller, the landlady contended that the tenants were guilty of willful default in payment of rent, that the tenants have

subleased the premises, that the tenants had denied the title of the landlady and that the landlady required the building bona fide for the immediate

purpose of demolition and reconstruction. It is unnecessary to consider the other grounds except the requirement by the landlady of the building

bona fide for the immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction. The trial court in paragraph 8 of its order found that the requirement by the

landlady is bona fide and allowed the petition, granting the tenant three months time for vacating the premises. The appeal was preferred on the

ground that the Rent Controller was in error in holding that the landlady required the premises bona fide for immediate demolition and

reconstruction. During the hearing of the appeal the tenants submitted to an order of eviction and requested that the Court may grant 3 1/2 years

time to vacate the premises. The landlady agreed to grant nine months time to the tenants to vacate. The appellate court after hearing both the

parties granted 11/2 years time to the tenants for vacating the premises. In the result the appellate court confirmed the order of the Rent Controller

except for the modification that the tenants were granted 11/2 years time from the date of the order for vacating the premises. The tenants took up

the matter up on revision to the District Judge. Madurai. The learned District Judge found that the parties had agreed that the order of eviction may

be confirmed but the tenants wanted 31/2 years time to vacate the premises while the landlady agreed to grant only nine months time. As the

parties could not agree regarding the time for eviction, the matter was left to the discretion of the court. In the revision preferred by the tenants, it

was contended that the order of the Appellate authority granting 11/2 years time was erroneous and that it should have granted 31/2 years time to

vacate the premises. Regarding the contention that the order of eviction based on the joint endorsement of the parties was a nullity, the learned

District Judge held that both the parties made a written statement that the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller may be confirmed and

hence the order of eviction was confirmed on merits and the only question that was in dispute was about the time that has to be granted to the

tenants for vacating.

On the facts stated above it is clear that the Rent Controller found that the requirement by the landlady for demolition and reconstruction was

accepted by the tenants in the lower appellate Court. The revisional Court also found that the tenants did consent to an order of eviction on the

basis that the landlady wanted the building bona that the landlady wanted the building bona fide for demolition and reconstruction and prayed for

time. The only question therefore for time. The only question therefore that was before the appellate court and the revisional Court was about the

time the revisional Court was about the time that was to be granted to the tenants. The tenants having explicitly agreed to the order of eviction on

the ground that the landlady required the building bona fide for demolition and reconstruction and the court having accepted the plea of the

landlady that the premises were required bona fide for demolition and reconstruction it is not open to the petitioner to contend that the order for

eviction passed by the courts below merely on the compromise memo without considering the question whether the landlady has made out any of

the grounds that are required u/s 10 of the Act to enable her to get an order of eviction, is inexecutable. On the facts therefore there can be no

doubt that the courts below were satisfied that the landlady bona fide required the premises for demolition and reconstruction and the order was

passed on such a finding and not on a compromise. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court

in Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Shri K.L. Bansal, and in Ferozi Lal Jain Vs. Man Mal and Another, . The facts are different and the finding of

the Supreme Court is that the decree was passed by the court on the basis of the award without satisfying itself that the ground of eviction existed.

The Supreme Court on a reading of Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 laid down that the court was forbidden to pass

a decree without satisfying itself that the landlord has succeeded in a establishing that he is entitled to eviction on one of the grounds permissible in

the Act. The decisions were followed by this Court in Seshadri v. Chari. (1971) 84 MLW 9. The decision cited had no application to the facts of

this case where the courts below were satisfied that the landlady required the premises bona fide for demolition and reconstruction and passed the

order for eviction on that ground. The courts below did apply their mind and came to the conclusion that the landlady was entitled to an order of

eviction and did not pass an order merely on the memo of compromise filed by the parties. On these facts, the decisions cited by the learned

counsel are inapplicable. The orders of the courts below are therefore on merits and are executable and the plea raised by the petitioners has to be

rejected. The petition is dismissed with costs. The petitioners had already the indulgence of the appellate court''s order of 11/2 years time. I will not

be order of 11/2 years time. I will not be justified in granting any further time.

Petition dismissed.