R. Subbaroyan and Ors. vs Emperor

Spens, C.J.—Eight persons, including the four appellants before us, were tried tinder the provisions of Ordinance 2 of 1912, by the Special

Judge for the Presidency town of Madras at Chingleput, on charges of criminal conspiracy to commit various offences and also on charges of

substantive offences. The trial resulted in the conviction of the appellants, who were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment ranging from three to five

years and of one Ramaratnam who was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for seven years. The judgment of the Special Judge was pronounced

on 11th May 1943. The proceedings before the Special Judge were by virtue of the sentence passed on Ramaratnam, subject to review under

Section 8 (a) of the Ordinance. Before the review was completed, Ordinance 19 of 1943 came into force. We have held in Piare Dusadh v.

Emperor (''44) 31 A.I.R. 1944 F.C. 1 that a case like this fell within the purview of Section 4 of that Ordinance, with the result that the

proceedings had before the Special Judge must be treated as void and the case must be deemed to be transferred to the appropriate Court under

that section for inquiry and trial in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

What actually happened in this case was that the convicted persons preferred appeals under Section 8 (2) of Ordinance 19 to the Madras High

Court, with the result that Ramaratnam was acquitted and the appeals of the others were dismissed. The High Court granted a certificate under

Section 205, Constitution Act, and the case of the appellants is now before us on appeal.

It was urged on behalf of the Crown that Section 8 (a) of ordinance 2 of 1942 was applicable only to the case of Ramaratnam, and that the

cases of the appellants were governed not by Section 4 but by Section 3 (2) of ordinance 19, and that we could accordingly entertain their appeals

and dispose of them finally. It was contended that though the proceeding before the Special Judge in respect of all the eight accused persons was a

single trial, as soon as the convictions were recorded the proceeding with respect to each of them became in law a separate proceeding for the

purposes of Section 8 (a) of Ordinance 2, and that a review was obligatory only in respect of the proceeding relating to Ramaratnam; the

proceedings relating to the appellants not being subject to review at all. We are unable to accede to this contention. In our judgment, the

expression ''proceedings'' in Section 8 comprises the whole of the proceedings before a Special Judge, so that where in any such proceedings any

one of several convicted persons tried together is sentenced to death, or to transportation for life, or to imprisonment for a term of seven years or

more, a review becomes obligatory under Clause (a) of the section, not merely in respect of such convicted person, but in respect of the whole

case.

If the contention advanced on behalf of the Crown were to be accepted, the result in this case would be that with regard to Ramaratnam the

proceedings had before the Special Judge and the judgment of the High Court on appeal must be treated as void and his case must be deemed to

be pending before the appropriate Court under Section 4 of ordinance 19, while the cases of the appellants must be disposed of finally by us. They

were all tried together on charges of criminal conspiracy, and one of the contentions raised in the grounds of appeal on behalf of the appellants is

that as the result of the acquittal of Ramaratnam by the High Court and the discharge or acquittal of three of the original eight accused by the

Special Judge, vital links in the chain of the conspiracy have been knocked out, so that the charge of conspiracy against the appellants must fail on

that ground alone. It is obvious that that contention could not be finally disposed of by us so long as the matter of the guilt of Ramaratnam was still

the subject of judicial determination. We mention this merely to reinforce our view that ''proceedings'' in Section 8 of ordinance 2 must be

construed as meaning the whole case and not merely the case or cases of the convict or convicts sentenced to seven years'' imprisonment or a

severer punishment.

The result is that the appeal is allowed and it is declared that in place of the order of the High Court confirming the convictions, there shall be

substituted an order directing further proceedings in the case to be taken in accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of Ordinance 19 of 1943.