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Judgment
Balasubrahmanyan, J.—This appeal raises a point of jurisdiction Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, following the amendment of S.110 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. By Amendment Act No. 100 of 1965 Parliament introduced a set of provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for
establishing separate Tribunals and separate procedures for enquiry into motor accidents in the context of claims for compensation for personal
injury caused by such accidents. Under this Amending Act. the State Government were to constitute Claims Tribunals for the purpose of--
adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor
vehicles.
Subsequently, Parliament brought in two further amendments, under Act 56 of 1969. One amendment, introduced in S.96(2) of the Act, enacted
that policies of insurance covering third party risks shall also cover a liability, upto a limit of two thousand rupees, in respect of damage to any
property of a third party. The other amendment, which was made in S.110, enlarged the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to adjudicate upon
claims for compensation so as to cover also ""damages to any property of a third party so arising"". These amendments came into force on 2nd
March 1970.
This case arose out of an accident which occurred on 9th February 1971. In that accident a motor lorry M. D. T. 6043, was hit by another
lorry. The owner of M. D. T. 6043, filed a claim for compensation for damage to that lorry. The claim was filed before the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal, Ramanathapuram. The Tribunal was inclined to hold that the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving on the part of the
driver of the other vehicle. For there was, practically, no defence to the lorry owner''s claim on the merits. But the respondent, the owner of the
offending vehicle, contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to go into the question of damages to property and it had no power to award any
compensation for any damage to property. Reliance was placed on G.O. No. No. 2173 (Home) d. 28th June 1961, which established the
Tribunal and invested it with jurisdiction under the Act. Under the terms of this order of the State Government the Tribunal was empowered ""to
adjudicate upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involved in the death of or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor
vehicles"".
The Tribunal sustained the preliminary objection and held that under the terms of the Government Notification, it had no jurisdiction to go into or
award any compensation for damage to property.
In the present appeal, brought by the owner of the damaged lorry, his learned counsel, Mr. Pandi, urges that the Tribunal had proceeded on a
too literal construction of the notification. He said that such a construction was not warranted in the conditions created by the enlargement of the
Claims Tribunal''s jurisdiction under the recent amendment to S.110.
I am inclined to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel. Learned counsel is also supported by the authority of a Division Bench
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Banwarilal v. Vishnunarayan 1975 A.C.J. 40, which he cited in the course of his argument. In that case, an
accident happened on 20th January 1971, subsequent to the coming into force of the amendment to S.110. by Central Act 56 of 1969. The claim
before the Tribunal was for compensation arising out of the damage caused to a vehicle by another vehicle in a collision. The Tribunal took the
view, that, on the terms of the notification constituting it, damage to property and award of compensation therefore were not within its adjudicatory
power. The Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, however, observed that such a narrow construction of the notification was not
called for. According to the learned Judges, the notification by itself by no means defined and delimited the powers to be exercised by the
Tribunals, the purpose of the notification was only to constitute the Tribunals. The Tribunal''s powers were derived, directly, from S.110(1) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, and neither the notification nor the language in which the notification was couched was decisive. In that view, the learned
Judges sent the case back to the Tribunal for a determination on the merits.
With respect, I agree with the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. In my view, when once the Accidents Claims Tribunals had been
constituted by notification by the Government as provided under the Act, the ambit of their jurisdiction is really determined by the terms of the
statute. So, when in 1969, Parliament amended the enabling provisions of S.110. the Tribunal''s jurisdiction stood enlarged so as to cover the
subjects added by the amendment. It may be that if one goes to the language of the notification G.O. Ms. No. 2173 (Home) d. 28th June 1961,
word by word, the Tribunal may be regarded as having no other jurisdiction than what was specified therein. But, even as a literal construction of
the notification, that would hold good only till so long as the enabling section remained unamended. But, the moment the statute itself was amended
and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal go enlarged, it would be a mistake to hark back on the limited terminology of the notification which, although it
faithfully adopted that language of the statute as it originally stood became out of the date with the passing of the Amendment Act.
Mr. Pandi brought to my notice a further notification of the State Government, G.O. Ms. No. 1969 d. 7th August 1974. This latter notification
amended the original notification G.O. Ms. No. 2173 (Home) d. 28th June 1961. Under the amendment, the Tribunals constituted under the
earlier notification were declared as having been constituted also for the purpose of adjudicating upon damages to any property of a third party.
The appellant''s counsel submitted that by some mischance, this amending notification bearing the date August 1974, was not brought to the notice
of the Tribunal when it heard this case. But, I am not quite sure that the Tribunal would have been persuaded to exercise its jurisdiction in this case,
if it had been made aware of the amended notification. For even now, before me an argument was addressed from the other side that the amended
notification did not apply to the instant case. The respondents learned counsel pointed out that the accident in this case had occurred on 9th
February 1971, prior to the date when the amended notification was issued. An answer to this submission is found in the decision of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court to which I had earlier referred. There, the learned Judges had laid down that the ambit of jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be
determined with reference to the time when it proceeded to exercise it, and not otherwise. It is however, unnecessary for me to go into this aspect
finally in the view I take that even without any amendment to the notification in G.O. Ms. No. 2173 (Home) d. 28th June 1961, fresh powers have
been added unto the tribunal by the mere force of the amendment of S.110brought about by Act 56 of 1969. In this view, if any significance is to
be attached to the amended notification G.O. Ms. No. 1969 d. 7th August 1974, at all, that can only be to regard it as clarificatory of the powers
of the Tribunal in the conditions created by the amendment, of the parent provision in the statute. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in rejecting
the appellant''s claim application before it as not entertainable. The Tribunal''s award is, accordingly set aside. M.A.C.O.P. No. 33 of 1971 is
restored to the Tribunal''s file. The Tribunal is directed to hear and determine that petition on the merits and in accordance with law. There will be
no order as to costs.