RABI PODH AND OTHERS vs CHHUTA PODH AND OTHERS

Dr. A.K.Rath, J Â

Defendants are the appellants against a reversing judgment.

Plaintiffs-respondents 1 and 2 instituted the suit for partition. Case of the plaintiffs is that Amar Podh was the common ancestor of the parties. He

had two wives. Mangalsai and Dinabandhu are the sons of Amar through first wife. Bhanka, Chhuta and Ude are the sons of Amar through second

wife. Defendants are the heirs of Mangalsai, Dinabandhu and Bhanka. Other defendants are transferees of a portion of the suit lands from the heirs

of Mangalsai, Dinabandhu and Bhanka. The suit property is the ancestral joint family properties of the parties. Due to increase the number of the

family members, plaintiffs requested the defendants for partition of the suit properties, but the defendants maintained a stony like silence.

Defendant no.7 entered contest and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. He disputed the genealogy. According to

him, the plaintiffs are not related to the defendants. The suit land was partitioned between the sons of Mangalsai, Dinabandhu and Bhanka forty years

back. Mangalsai purchased the lands from Dhansingh Majhi and Jamkhunta Bhag. He reclaimed Anabadi lands and amalgamated the same with his

own lands. The said lands were recorded in the name of the sons of Mangalsai, Dinabandhu and Bhanka in the ROR published in the year 1936.

Plaintiffs’ name does not find place in the ROR. Plaintiffs managed to record the lands in the Hal ROR. Most of the suit lands had been sold by

the defendants from their share. The purchasers are in possession of the lands.

On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck seven issues. Parties led evidence, both oral and documentary. Learned trial court

dismissed the suit holding, inter alia, that the plaintiffs are not related to Amar Podh. The suit property was the selfacquired property of Mangalsai,

Dinabandhu and Bhanka. The plaintiffs have no semblance of right, title and interest over the same. They are not the co-parceners. Feeling aggrieved,

the plaintiffs filed Title Appeal No.25/4 of 1982-87 before the learned Addl. District Judge, Titilagarh. Learned appellate court came to hold that the

plaintiffs are the sons of Amar Podh. Held so, it allowed the appeal.

The appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law. Â

“Whether relationship of the plaintiff with Amar has been proved in compliance with the requirement of Section 50 of the Evidence Act.â€​

Heard Mr. Lalit Kumar Maharana on behalf of Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Ramakanta Mohanty, learned

Senior Advocate along with Ms. Sumitra Mohanty, learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2.

Mr. Maharana, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the plaintiffs are not the sons of Amar Podh. The evidence led by P.Ws.2 and 3

does not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. P.W.3 in his evidence merely stated that his father had four brothers.

Mangalsai and Dinabandhu are sons of Amar Podh through first wife. Bhanka, Chhuta and Ude are sons through second wife. Placing reliance on

Sec. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act, he submitted that if a person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge on

the particular subject of relationship, then what is relevant in his opinion expressed by conduct. Opinion means something more than a mere gossip or

hearsay; it means judgment and belief i.e. a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question. The belief or conviction may

manifest itself in conduct or behaviour which indicates the existence of the belief or the opinion. He further submitted that though P.Ws.2 and 3 are

family members, but they have nowhere proved their statements through conduct. Their statement has not been explained anywhere. He further

submitted that the offered item of evidence is the conduct. The opinion expressed by such conduct is admissible in evidence. In order to enable the

court to infer the opinion, the conduct must be of a tenor which cannot well be supposed to have been willed without the inner existence of the opinion.

When the conduct is of such a tenor, the court only gets to a relevant piece of evidence, namely, the opinion of a person. It still remains for the court

to weigh such evidence and come to its own opinion as to the ‘factum probandum’ â€" as to the relationship in question’. Applying the same

tests, it can be held that evidence of P.W.1 and 5 is not admissible evidence being not in conformity with Sec. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act. He

placed reliance of the decisions in the case of Dolgobinda Paricha and Nimai Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 914, Sanatan Das and others v. Ahalya Dei

and others, 120 (2015) CLT 978, Sarat Chandra Behera and others v. Santosh Kumar Behera and others, AIR 2015 Orissa 185 and Krupasindhu

Dash and others v. Khulana Dash and others (RSA No.595 of 2003 disposed of on 1.2.2018).

Mr. Mohanty, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents 1 and 2 submitted that defendant no.1 was examined as D.W. 3. In his evidence he has

categorically stated that the plaintiffs are sons of Amar Podh. Defendnat no.1 is a member of the family. He had special means of knowledge. Other

witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiffs have unequivocally stated that the plaintiffs are the sons of Amar Podh. Considering the evidence on

record and the pleadings, learned appellate court held that the plaintiffs are the sons of Amar Podh.

Sec. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act reads thus ; “50. Opinion on relationship, when relevant.â€"When the Court has to form an opinion as to the

relationship of one person to another, the opinion, expressed by conduct, as to the existence of such relationship, of any person who, as a member of

the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge on the subject, is a relevant fact.â€​

Sec. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act was the subject-matter of interpretation in Dolgobinda Paricha (supra). The apex Court held : “On a plain

reading of the section it is quite clear that it deals with relevancy of a particular fact. It states in effect that when the Court has to form an opinion as

to the relationship of one person to another the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship of any person who has special

means of knowledge on the subject of that relationship is a relevant fact. The two illustrations appended to the section clearly bring out the true scope

and effect of the section. It appears to us that the essential requirements of the section are- (1) there must be a case where the court has to form an

opinion as to the relationship of one person to another; (2) in such a case, the opinion expressed by conduct as to the existence of such relationship is a

relevant fact; (3) but the person whose opinion expressed by conduct is relevant must be a person who as a member of the family or otherwise has

special means of knowledge on the particular subject of relationship; in other words, the person must fulfil the condition laid down in the latter part of

the section. If the person fulfils that condition, then what is relevant is his opinion expressed by conduct. Opinion means something more than more

retailing of gossip or of hearsay; it means judgment or belief, that is, a belief or a conviction resulting from what one thinks on a particular question.

Now, the ‘belief’ or conviction may manifest itself in conduct or behaviour which indicates the existence of the belief or opinion. What the

section says is that such conduct or outward behaviour as evidence of the opinion held is relevant and may, therefore, be proved.â€​

The dispute between the parties centres around whether the plaintiffs are the sons of Amar Podh? To substantiate the case, the plaintiffs had

examined five witnesses. Bhanka is the son of Amar. Defendant no.1 is the son of Bhanka. Defendant no.1 was examined as P.W.3. In his evidence

he stated that his father Bhanka had four brothers, namely, Mangalsai, Dinabandhu, Chhuta and Ude (plaintiffs 1 and 2). Mangalsai and Dinabandhu

are the sons of Amar through first wife whereas Chhuta and Ude are sons through second wife. P.W.2 is the agnatic relation of the parties. He stated

that the plaintiffs, Mangalsai, Dinabandhu and Bhanka are brothers being the sons of Amar. He is related to the plaintiffs and the defendants. He used

to attend different ceremonies and functions in the house of the parties. Learned appellate court came to hold that the oral evidence adduced by

P.Ws.2 and 3 satisfies the three essential tests laid down in Sec. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act as they are members of the family and have special

means of knowledge about the relationship of the plaintiffs with common ancestor Amar Podh. P.W.1 (plaintiff no.2) in his evidence has stated that he

is the son of Amar Podh through second wife. P.Ws.4 and 5 are the neighbours of the plaintiffs and the defendants. They have unequivocally stated

that the plaintiffs are the sons of Amar Podh. All the witnesses were subjected to extensive cross-examination, but nothing was elicited from them.

The suit properties have been jointly recorded in the name of the parties in the Hal ROR. On an anatomy of the pleadings and the evidence on record,

learned appellate court came to hold that the suit lands are the joint family properties of the parties. There is no evidence on record that the lands have

purchased by Mangalsai, Dinabandhu and Bhanka. There is no perversity or illegality in the findings of the learned appellate court. The substantial

question of law is answered accordingly.

This Court in Sanatan Das (supra) relied on the decision of the apex Court in the case of Dolgobinda Paricha (supra). The decision in Sanatan Das

(supra) is distinguishable on facts. Sec. 50 of the Indian Evidence Act was not the subject-matter of consideration in the said case. The case pertains

to adoption.

A priori, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.