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Judgment
9 paragraphs · 709 wordsR.S. Kejriwal, J.—This miscellaneous appeal u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has been directed against the award dated 4.2.1994, passed by the Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ajmer, by which the claim of the appellants was rejected only on the ground that the claim application was filed beyond limitation.
Brief relevant facts of the case are that in a motor accident, which took place on 16.3.1990, Likham Das, husband of appellant No. 1 and the father of appellant Nos. 2 to 6 died. The appellants filed a claim petition on 6.4.1991. The learned Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ajmer, vide his order dated 4.2.1994, rejected the said application only on the ground that the same was filed beyond one year from the date of accident and as such was not maintainable in view of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Being aggrieved with the said award, the appellants filed the present appeal. During the pendency of appeal, Sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been deleted by Act No. 54 of 1994, which came into force on 14.11.1994. Now, in the amended Act, there is no period prescribed for filing a claim application, meaning thereby that the claim petition can be filed even today.
Counsel for the appellants submits that this court should take notice of the subsequent amendment, which came into force during the pendency of the appeal and should allow the appeal and remand the case to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ajmer, as the claim petition was dismissed only on the ground of limitation and not on merits,
On the other hand, counsel for the respondent No. 3 submits that the appellants are not entitled to get benefit of the amendment, which came into force during the pendency of the appeal. The amendment is not retrospective. It does not affect the appeals which were filed under the old Act. The appeal should be decided under the provisions of the old Act. In support of his arguments, he placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court passed in Vinod Gurudas Raikar Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others,
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record and also the judgment cited by counsel for the respondent No. 3. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court held that the right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. This authority is not helpful to the counsel for the respondents.
In AIR 1941 5 (Federal Court) it has been quoted as under:
We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but also to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered.
It is a settled law that for making the right or remedy claimed by the parties just and meaningful in accordance with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cognizance of the events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both the sides are scrupulously obeyed. On account of the amendment a claimant can file a claim petition at any time. Even for the accident which took place on 16.3.1990, in which the said Likham Das died, the claimants can still file fresh claim application. When the claimants have a right to file fresh claim application their right to get their claim decided in the present application cannot be denied.
Consequently, I allow the appeal, set aside the award dated 4.2.1994, passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ajmer, and remand the case to the said Tribunal with a direction to decide the claim petition on merits within a period of one year from receipt of a copy of this order, after notice to Surendra Pal and Ravindra Singh. The claimants and the respondent No. 3 are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 2.2.1995.
