High CourtsDivision Bench

Radheshyam vs Sushil

Madhya Pradesh High Court · Decided on 15 December 2003 · Citation: (2006) 4 ACC 451

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.K. Kulshresth, J · Ashok Kumar Tiwari, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 · Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 173
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

3 paragraphs · 346 words
1.

Heard on M (C) PNo. 531 of 2003. The appeal is time barred by 952 days for which the appellants have filed the above application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act to seek condonation. Learned Counsel for the appellants has referred to Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act and to the decisions in Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Pateil Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and Others, and The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Others, , in support of the submission that sufficient cause must be construed liberally to as to advance justice and not to thwart it. She has further referred to a decision on 1998 ACJ 1311 of the Karnataka High Court in support of her contention that ignorance of provision and illiteracy are also the causes for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondent has referred to a decision to a decision in Prakash and Anr. v. Managing Director K.S.R.T.C. and Ors. 1 (2000) ACC 554 (SC) : AIR 2000 SC 3419, in which the Apex Court had not condoned the delay of 416 days in filing the appeal.

2.

In the present case the appellants have claimed compensation for the death of Ditya and they were granted a compensation of Rs. 1,05,000 by award dated 25.4.200 passed by the First Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, show in Claim Case No. 11 of 1998. The appellants have apparently participated in the proceedings before the Tribunal and have received the amount in accordance with the direction contained therein, in connection whereof they must have been in constant touch with their Counsel. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that they were not appraised about the limitation for filing an appeal against the inadequacy of the compensation. It, therefore, does not appear that they were prevented on account of their illiteracy from filing the appeal in time. There is no justification for the delay of 952 days in filing this appeal. The application is, therefore, dismissed.

3.

The appeal is, consequently, dismissed as time barred.