High CourtsSingle Bench

Radhey Sham vs Gobind Lal and others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 2 May 1989 · Citation: AIR 1990 P&H 62 : (1989) 2 RCR(Rent) 343

HON’BLE JUDGES
G.R. Majithia, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 115, 21, 47, 99 · Suits Valuation Act, 1887 — Section 11
CASE NUMBER
Civil Revision No. 198 of 1982
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

10 paragraphs · 894 words
1.

This revision petition is directed against the order of the learned Executing Court whereby he held that the decree will not be executed since it was not passed by the competent Court.

2.

Brief facts:-- A preliminary decree for partition was granted by Shri S. K. Kapoor, Subordinate Judge II Class. The valuation of the suit for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction was fixed at Rs. 18,000/-. Shri S. K. Kapoor had no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. The learned Executing Court came to the conclusion that since the decree was passed by the Court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction, the decree was illegal. The decree holder has come up in the revision petition assailing the correctness of the order of the learned Executing Court.

3.

The view taken by the learned trial Judge is unsustainable. Section 21 of the CPC enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by the appellate or revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. The objection regarding pecuniary jurisdiction was not raised in the suit by the contesting defendants it could not be raised in the execution proceedings. This matter came up for consideration before the apex Court in Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others, , wherein it was held thus (at p. 342):--

"With reference to objection relating to territorial jurisdiction, S. 21 of the CPC enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional Court unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in S. 11 of Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Ss. 21 and 99, CPC and S. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under S. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act".

This view was followed by this Court in Inder Singh Vs. Suba Singh, and thereafter in Narain Kumar Vs. Neki Ram and Others, ). In Narain Kumar''s case (supra), the learned Judge after referring to the earlier decision held as under;--

"Shri P. S. Bajaj, Subordinate Judge III Class passed the decree on Dec. 7, 1973, in favour of Neki Ram and against the petitioner and his fasther on the basis of a compromise. No objection was raised by the petitioner regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Subordinate Judge before filing the objection petition under S. 47 of the CPC in the execution proceedings initiated by the decree holder to execute the decree. The observations made by the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh''s case (supra) are squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case. No foundation has been laid by the petitioner to warrant a finding that the lack of pecuniary jurisdiction on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge has prejudiced the case of the petitioner on merits. The ratio of the decisions in Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others, and Mahadeo Vs. Hanumanmal and Others, also support the case of Neki Ram decree holder that the objection regarding the lack of pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot be raised in execution proceedings by the petitioner in the absence of any prejudice on merits".

This matter was again considered by the learned single Judge of this Court in Niranjan Lal (Dead) v. Chhotey Lal (1988) 94 P LR 466 and it was held thus:--

"Thus, obviously the intent of the Legislature was to curtail the time of taking objection to territorial or pecuniary to the earliest possible opportunity and debarring a party from taking such objection in the Appellate or Revisional Court for the first time, unless it has resulted in failure of justice. As a matter of fact, there could not be any failure of justice if a suit triable by a Sub Judge I Class had been tried by a Sub Judge III Class. Admittedly, no objection was taken by the defendant regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction before the trial Court. The lower Court has taken a wrong view by holding that the provisions of S. 21 of the CPC are applicable to the Appellate or Revisional Court and not to the Court executing the decree. Taking up such objections before the Appellate or the Revisional Court stand on the better footing than before the executing Court, as the latter cannot go behind or beyond the decree passed by the trial Court".

4.

For the aforesaid reasons this revision petition is allowed. The impugned order under challenge is quashed. The learned executing Court will revive the execution proceedings and proceed with the same expeditiously. The parties through their Counsel are directed to appear before the learned executing Court on May 31, 1989.

5.

Petition allowed.