Raghavan vs Kalanithi Maran

M. Jaichandran , J.—This Original Side Appeal, in O.S.A. No. 226 of 2013, had been filed against the order and decree, dated 14.9.2012,

passed by the learned single Judge of this Court, in A. No. 3998 of 2012, in C.S. No. 141 of 2012. The application, in A. No. 3998 of 2012, has

been filed by the defendant, seeking to revoke the leave granted on 23.2.2012, in Application No. 891 of 2012, stating that the suit is not

maintainable in law and on facts and it is without jurisdiction. The learned single Judge, by his order, dated 14.9.2012, had dismissed the

application, in A. No. 3998 of 2012.

The applicant, in A. No. 3998 of 2012, is the appellant in the present Original Side Appeal. The appellant, who is the defendant in the suit, in

C.S. No. 141 of 2012, had filed the application, in A. No. 3998 of 2012. The said suit had been filed by the plaintiff, who is the respondent in the

present Original Side Appeal claiming damages for a sum of Rs. 1 crore, with future interest at 18% per annum and for a permanent injunction

restraining the defendant therein, the appellant in the present appeal, from publishing any article concerning the plaintiff, his family, his private life,

private life of his family members, his business activities carried on by him relating to the Tamil daily newspaper ''Dinamalar'', without ascertaining

the actual truth from the plaintiff.

The plaintiff in the suit, in C.S. No. 141 of 2012, had stated that several defamatory statements had been made against him in the Trichy edition

of the Tamil daily newspaper ''Dinamalar''. It had been stated that the cause of action had arisen at Chennai, where the plaintiff is residing, for the

filing of the suit before this Court.

It had been stated that the defamatory article had been reported from Chennai and published by the defendant in the suit, in the Trichy edition of

the Tamil daily newspaper, on 11.2.2012. The newspaper was made available at Chennai and it had been read by various persons. Thus, the

reputation of the plaintiff and his self esteem had been lowered. It had also caused mental agony and loss of reputation to the family members of the

plaintiff. Based on such cause of action, shown to have arisen at Chennai, leave had been granted to sue the defendant on the original side of this

Court. In such circumstances, the defendant in the suit, who is the appellant in the present appeal, had filed an application, in A. No. 3998 of

2012, to revoke the leave granted to the plaintiff, in A. No. 891 of 2012, by an order dated 23.2.2012, as the suit filed by the plaintiff is not

maintainable, both in law and on facts and it is without jurisdiction.

In the affidavit filed in support of the application to revoke the leave granted by this Court, it had been stated that the applicant is the Editor,

Printer and Publisher of the Trichy edition of the Tamil daily newspaper Dinamalar. The said newspaper is having circulation only in the Trichy

area. As such, the defendant had no right to sell the newspaper beyond the territorial limit of Trichy and its outskirts. The Tamil daily newspaper

''Dinamalar'' has a separate edition for Chennai, with its own Editor, Printer and Publisher, as per the rules of the Press and Registration of Books

Act, 1867. The plaintiff had merely pleaded that the publication is available in Chennai and therefore, the suit is maintainable before this Court.

However, there is no allegation that the defendant had defamed the plaintiff by publishing the defamatory statements at Chennai. Since, the entire

cause of action for the publication of the impugned article was only at Trichy the plaintiff is not entitled to sue the defendant, before this Court, at

Chennai.

The defendant had further stated that he had already filed an application, in A. No. 2384 of 2012, seeking to dismiss the suit, in C.S. No. 141

of 2012, stating that it was without jurisdiction. However, the plaintiff had contended that he had obtained leave to sue and therefore, the

application filed by the defendant, in A. No. 2384 of 2012, had been dismissed, vide order dated 22.8.2012, with liberty to the defendant to file

an application to revoke the leave granted by this Court. In view of the liberty granted by this court, in its order, dated 22.8.2012, the defendant

had filed the application, in A. No. 3998 of 2012, to revoke the leave granted by this Court.

It had been contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant that, even if the circulation of the newspaper in question had

been made at Chennai, it would not be a ground for suing the defendant at Chennai. The learned counsel relied on the decision of the Karnataka

High Court, in Sri. C.S. Sathya Vs. State of Karnataka, in support of his contention. He had also referred to a judgment of a Division Bench of this

Court, in National Westminster Bank Ltd. Vs. Devraj Mensee and Co. and others, , to state that this Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit, as no

cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the leave granted by this Court, which is contrary to law, ought to be

revoked.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff had contended that the cause of action for the filing of the suit would arise wherever the

newspaper in question is circulated. As copies of the Tamil daily newspaper ''Dinamalar'' had been supplied at Chennai, this Court had the

jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiff, in C.S. No. 141 of 2012.

It had been further stated that Section 19 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, stipulates that the plaintiff would have an option to sue a wrong

doer at the place within whose local limits the wrong had been done, or in the court within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries on

business or personally works for gain.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff had relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court, in V. Selladurai Vs. N.

Nethaji and Thanthi Trust, Prop. Daily Thanthi, . The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff had also referred to the decision of the

Bombay High Court, in the The State of Maharashtra Vs. Sarvodaya Industries, , relating to the scope of Section 19 of the Civil Procedure Code,

1908.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff had also relied on the decision of the Gauhati High Court, in State of Meghalaya and

Others Vs. Jyotsna Das, , wherein the true meaning of the word ''wrong done'', found in Section 19 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, had been

considered.

Accepting the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiff the learned single Judge of this Court had held by his order, dated 14.9.2012, that

the application filed by the defendant, in A. No. 3998 of 2012, to revoke the leave granted by this Court, by its order, dated 23.2.2012, cannot

be entertained, as the disputed facts arising for the consideration of this court could be resolved only during the trial of the suit, on the basis of the

evidence let in by the parties concerned. Accordingly, the learned single Judge had dismissed the application filed by the defendant, in A. No.

3998 of 2012, by his order, dated 14.9.2012. Challenging the said order passed by the learned single Judge of this Court, dated 14.9.2012, the

defendant in the suit, in C.S. No. 141 of 2012, had filed the present original side appeal.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant had stated, inter alia, that the leave granted in favour of the plaintiff, to sue the

defendant before this Court, ought to have been revoked as no cause of action had arisen for the filing of the suit, within the jurisdiction of this

Court. It had also been stated that the learned single Judge had failed to consider that the defendant in the suit is the editor of the Trichy edition of

the Tamil daily newspaper ''Dina Malar'' and the newspaper published by him had circulation only in the Trichy area and that he had no right to sell

the newspaper outside the prescribed limits. It had also been stated that the learned single Judge had failed to consider the fact that the Chennai

edition of the Tamil newspaper ''Dinamalar'' had a separate editor and that the plaintiff had already instituted a suit against the said editor, in respect

of the same issue.

It had also been contended that, merely for the reason that the newspaper published at Trichy was made available to the plaintiff, at Chennai,

this court cannot to be held to possess the necessary jurisdiction. Further, the learned single Judge had failed to consider the fact that the suit had

been filed stating that a part of the cause of action had arisen at Chennai. Even though it was clear that no part of the cause of action had arisen

within the jurisdiction of this court, leave had been granted to the plaintiff, the respondent in the present appeal, to sue the appellant herein, before

this Court. Further, the learned single Judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that the term ''wrong done'', referred to in Section 19 of the Civil

Procedure Code, 1908, would take into account not only the initial action complained of but the resultant effect as well.

The learned single Judge had erred in reading the provisions of Sections 19 and 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, together, to arrive at

the conclusion that this Court would have jurisdiction to try the suit filed by the plaintiff, the respondent herein, even though it had been found that

the defendant was carrying on business at Trichy and that the defamatory article published in the newspaper concerned was in the Trichy edition.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants had relied on the decision of this Court, in V. Selladurai v. N. Nethaji and another

(supra), wherein, it had been held as follows:

From a conjoint reading of the aforesaid two Division Bench decisions, it is apparent that the Court will have jurisdiction, if the sole defendant

or all the defendants reside within the jurisdiction, and where some of the defendants reside, the question would depend upon the cause of action.

In the present case, it can be said that cause of action had arisen at least in part within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court inasmuch as

the publication has been made in a newspaper whose Head Quarters is coming within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. It is not disputed

at the Bar that leave had been obtained by the plaintiff for filing the suit in the Original Side of the Madras High Court and the defendants never

made nay effort to revoke such leave. Therefore, the conclusion of the learned single Judge that this Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the

matter cannot be sustained.

The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant had also relied on the decision of this Court, reported in Sreepathi Hosiery Mills (P)

Ltd., Calcutta and Another Vs. Chitra Knitting Co., Tiruppur, , wherein it had been held as follows:

Whenever a suit for compensation for wrong done to a person or to movable property is filed, the option is with the plaintiff to either institute the

cause based on such cause of action at the place where the defendant resides or works for gain or at the place where the wrong was committed.

There is no way out of this limitation as to jurisdiction envisaged in S. 19, C.P.C. The argument is that the plaintiff has examined a witness who has

sworn to the fact that he heard about the alleged damage done to the plaintiff. If this were to be the basis on which jurisdiction can be created or

vested in a civil court, then S. 19 would be otiose. When the Code, which more or less lays down the substantive law, though procedural in

aspect, regarding such matters of jurisdiction, creates certain peripheries and limitations, particularly in the matter of the laying of suits in the forum

of specified courts, then no option is left to the litigant except to strictly adhere to such prescriptions in the section of the Code. S. 19 is a specific

section. It says that, where a suit for compensation for wrong done to person is laid, it should be filed at the place where the wrong is done or at

the place where the author of the wrong resides or works for gain. There being no other choice available to the litigant who wishes to seek such

compensation, he cannot whittle down the express prescription in S. 19, C.P.C., and lay emphasis on the oral evidence casually let in by him so as

to create or vest jurisdiction in the court, which has none. The order of the court below is therefore erroneous and suffers from an error of

jurisdiction.

In M/s. Scientific Compounds and Processes Private Limited Vs. M/s. National Soapnut Works Bangalore , it had been held as follows:

The learned single Judge has revoked the leave granted, holding that this Court has no jurisdiction on the basis of the statement made in the

affidavit of the respondent filed in support of Application No. 1539/91. In the said affidavit the respondent has denied that its products were sold

at Madras at all. It is relevant to stale here itself that the appellant has made specific averment in the plaint that the respondent''s goods are sold

within the city of Madras at several places.

We find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that, whether the Court has jurisdiction or not, could not have been

decided on the basis of the statement made in the affidavit filed by the respondent, in support of the Application No. 1539/91; and the Court, at

the time of deciding whether it has jurisdiction or not would have taken note of the averments made in the plaint, which is the settled law. Further

the appellant had no opportunity to rebut the statement made by the respondent in the affidavit that its products are not sold in Madras. The proper

course would have been, after the respondent had filed the written statement, an issue could be taken as to the jurisdiction and that could have

been dealt with either as a preliminary issue or along with other issues on the basis of the evidence that could be let in by the parties.

In State of Maharashtra v. Sarvodaya Industries, a registered partnership doing business of Poha at Akola (supra), it had been held as follows:

Provisions of Section 19 are specific in subject and clear in its operation. Firstly, it governs a suit seeking restitutive reliefs of compensation on

the basis of wrong done to the person or to movable property. Secondly it offers and furnishes option or choice if the conditions indicated by the

qualifying clause are satisfied in that wrong complained of was done within the local limit of one Court while the defendant in fact resides or carries

on business within the Local limits of jurisdiction of another Court. Unless both these conditions together are available no question of option or

choice for forum can conceivably, arise. The conjunction ""and"" in the qualifying clause is very much indicative of this result, leaving aside the cases

where these conditions together are not available, the matters, of such suit are still governed by other provisions of the Code. It is noticeable that in

the body of Section 19 the phrase ""the cause of action, wholly or in part"" has not been used and it only finds place in Section 20 of the Code. In a

suit for compensation ""wrong Code. In a suit for compensation ""wrong done"" ""or"" ""complained of"" is the cause of action by which Code

understands and contemplates all the bundle of necessary facts capable on proof of sustaining the relief claimed. Compensation clearly posits an

injury resulting in loss and damage. Mere injury or wrong without anything more would not suffice to sustain the claim for compensation. It is clear

that the phrase ""wrong done"" is not used in any narrow sense but has to be understood in all its amplitude so as to afford forum and necessary

relief. That clearly takes in both cause and effect. Injury or actual wrong may occur at place A but its effect may be felt at places other than ''A''

and may effect places ''B'' or ''C'' Act or actions taking place at a given place may still give rise at places quite different and at all these places and

for all those effects, cause would arise seeking compensation. Without resultant loss or its proof restitutive justice may not afford any relief nor

there could be any remedy in vacuum. Thus the phraseology used by Section 19 about ""the wrong done"" would clearly take in not only the initial

action complained on but its result an effect.

Putting the matter in terms of Section 20(c) the resultant damage would surely be the part of cause of action and would feedback the answer

for jurisdiction. Assuming, therefore, that both Sections are to be read together the same would indicate a overlapping which is not at all

attributable to such legislative scheme. It is enough to answer that Section 19, which deals with cases of compensation for wrong done to the

person or movable property is wide enough to take in those places where plaintiff or person complaining actually suffered the loss because of the

alleged wrongful act notwithstanding the place of such wrongful act clearly furnishing place of action. The phrase ""wrong done"" is indicative of

completed action as stated (supra) and is wide enough to take in the results as the basis for the purposes of restitution. The Court within whose

local jurisdiction damage was caused or suffered or sustained would clearly answer the requirements of Section 19 for the purpose of suits

mentioned therein. The matters option afforded are not relevant nor decisive for this purpose nor the provisions of section 20(c) The extract of the

provisions of the sections 20 (supra) by its opening part indicates that section 19 is striated as limitation upon the generality of the provisions of

Section 20 itself, Reading both sections together if a case is not squarely answered by the earlier sections then it may still be answered by Section

20 itself. Its term are thus residuary. Turning to suits for compensations, if any narrow constructions to be placed on the phrase ""wrong done

available in Section 19 then the matter still can be answered by Section 20(c) of the Code. For then Section 19 would indicate and only operate as

part of cause of action"" having in mind only the initial act or cause indicated by ""wrong done"" and not its effect and though the latter as of necessity

must be established to have relief, for that reliance will have to be placed on the intendments of Section 20(c) of the Code. Such dichotomy is not

indicated nor such exercise necessary for the structure of Section 19 itself both parts of cause of action, i.e., the initial act and its effect are capable

of being worked out. Therefore, by its contemplation a suit filed in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the damages was suffered

would still uphold its jurisdiction.

In Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. Vs. Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd., , it had been held as follows:

6.2 As claimed by the petitioner there are three grounds for conferring territorial jurisdiction on this Court, (i) above said endorsement; (ii) the

petitioner is having its Head Quarter at Delhi; and (iii) the Arbitrators have issued directions (Annexure ''F'') dated 29th March, 1995. Directions

of the Arbitrator in this regard do not appear to be material. Sections 19 & 20(a) and (b) of CPC do not allow the petitioner to confer territorial

jurisdiction on this Court simply on the ground that the petitioner is living in Delhi. Section 19, CPC gives option to choose one out of the two

Courts if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides or carries on business or personally

works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another. It does not given option to choose this Court for no wrong was committed by

the defendant within jurisdiction of this Court nor defendant No. 1 resides or carries on business in Delhi, Defendant Nos. 2 & 3 also do not reside

in Delhi.

In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties concerned and on a perusal of the records

available, and on considering the decisions cited supra, it is noted that certain statements, alleged to be defamatory in nature, had been published in

the Trichy Edition of the Tamil daily newspaper ""Dinamalar"" on 11.2.2012. The issue as to whether the said statements were really defamatory in

nature could be gone into only at the time of trial, based on the evidence available. Further, with regard to the jurisdiction of this court to try the

suit, in C.S. No. 141 of 2012, is a mixed question of facts and law. Even though the defendant in the said suit, the appellant in the present Original

Side Appeal, who is the Editor, Printer and Publisher of the Trichy edition of the Tamil Daily newspaper ''Dinamalar'', had contended that this

Court would not have jurisdiction to try the suit, as no cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this court, we are of the considered

opinion that such an issue could also be decided as a preliminary issue, at the time of the trial of the suit, as it would, substantially, depend on the

evidence made available before this Court, at that stage.

The appellant has claimed that the statements published in the Trichy edition of the Tamil daily newspaper ''Dinamalar'' is not defamatory in

nature and that the damage done, if any, as alleged by the plaintiff in the suit, the respondent in the present appeal, could only be at Trichy, contrary

to the claims made by the respondent herein. The appellant had also claimed that the Chennai edition of the Tamil daily newspaper ''Dinamalar'' has

a separate Editor, who is incharge of the local publication of the said newspaper. In such circumstances, the claim of the respondent in the present

appeal that there was some damage caused to his reputation, at Chennai, cannot be sustained. We are of the view that such claims made by the

appellant could be proved or disproved, based on the evidence made available by the parties concerned. As such, we are of the view that the

claim made by the appellant that this Court does not have jurisdiction need not be gone into, at this stage. As this court had already granted leave

to the respondent, the plaintiff in the suit, in C.S. No. 141 of 2012, to sue the appellant herein, who is the defendant in the said suit, we make it

clear that it would be appropriate for the learned single Judge of this court to frame the issue regarding the jurisdiction of this court, as a preliminary

issue, and to decide the same, as such, on merits and in accordance with law. It could also be open to decide the issue relating to the ''wrong

done'', as found in Section 19 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The claim of the plaintiff in the suit, the respondent herein, that there was no

''wrong done'', at Chennai, for claiming damages, would also depend upon the evidence adduced to substantiate the claim for damages. In such

circumstances, we deem it appropriate to dismiss the present appeal. It is made clear that the decision relating to the jurisdiction of this court would

depend on the facts pleaded and substantiated by sufficient evidence and the application of the relevant provisions of law. Accordingly, we dispose

of the present Original Side Appeal, with the above observations. No costs.