High CourtsDivision Bench

Raghavendra Hanmantrao Bennur vs Industrial Bank

Bombay High Court · Decided on 7 August 1935 · Citation: AIR 1936 Bom 396 : (1936) 38 BOMLR 927 : 165 Ind. Cas. 512

HON’BLE JUDGES
N.J. Wadia, J · John Beaumont, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 — Section 65 · Limitation Act, 1908 — Article 182
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal No. 552 of 1933
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Judgment

4 paragraphs · 379 words

Beaumont, C.J.—This is a second appeal from a decision of the District judge of Bijapur and it raises a short point.

2.

In the year 1926 an award was made between the present appellant and the respondent u/s 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act of 1925 and under that award the present appellant was directed to pay Rs. 180 and interest to the respondent. On April 22, 1931, an application was made to the Registrar to grant a certificate u/s 59 (2) (a) of the Act and the certificate was granted on the same date and these darkhast proceedings were filed on March 12, 1932. It is argued that the darkhast is barred by Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. That article limits the time for the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court. Now it seems to me perfectly clear that the award of an arbitrator made u/s 54 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act is not a decree of a civil Court; but it is suggested that it has the characteristics of a decree of a civil Court u/s 59. That section, so far as material, provides that every order passed by the Registrar or his nominee or arbitrators u/s 54 shall, if not carried out, be executed on a certificate signed by the Registrar or by any civil Court in the same manner as a decree of such Court. It may perhaps be said that when a certificate is granted by the Registrar the award of the arbitrator should be treated as a decree of a civil Court, but this does not help the appellant, as the darkhast proceedings were filed within three years of the date of the certificate. I rather doubt myself whether the award ever becomes a decree of a civil Court within the meaning of Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act; but it is not necessary to consider that point. The view of the learned District Judge was that the darkhast proceedings were in time because they were filed within three years of the date of the grant of the certificate by the Registrar, and in my opinion that decision is right. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed with costs.

N.J. Wadia, J.

3.

I agree.