Raghbir Singh vs Sarita Sharma and Others

M.M. Kumar, J.—This revision petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeks to challenge order dated 6.2.2002 passed

by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Hoshiarpur (for brevity, ''the Tribunal'') allowing the application of insurance company-respondent No. 4

to prove entry dated 29.4.1993 in the register of District Transport Officer, Amritsar (for brevity, ''the DTO'') by leading secondary evidence in

the form of verification report and to prove that the driving licence No. 1604 dated 29.4.1993 was not issued by licensing authority.

Brief facts of the case which led to the filing of the present revision petition and necessary to decide the issue raised are that a claim petition u/s

166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 being MACT No. 149 of 3.11.1998 has been filed by claimant-respondents No. 1 to 3 against the driver-

petitioner, owner of the truck and the insurance company-respondent No. 4 claiming compensation on account of death of one Narinder Kumar.

In the accident wife of Narinder Kumar, his daughter and son also suffered injuries. They also filed their claim in lieu of the injuries suffered by

them. Petitioner who re driver of truck No. DL-1L-B-3619 alleged to have caused accident because of his rash and negligent driving. The

insurance company-respondent No. 4 has taken the stand that the driver-petitioner was not holding a valid driving licence at the time of alleged

accident and an issue has been framed as to whether driving licence relied upon by the driver-petitioner was fake. When the evidence of the

insurance company-respondent No. 4 was in progress it got issued a certificate from the office of District Transport Officer, Amritsar certifying

that licence No. 1604 dated 29.4.1993 was not issued by that licensing authority. A witness Harvinder Kaur who is said to have issued the

certificate denied her signature and her handwriting on that certificate. After the statement of Harvinder Kaur was recorded on 27.9.2001,

insurance company-respondent No. 4 filed an application submitting that it should be permitted to lead secondary evidence concerning entry dated

29.4.1993 made in the register of the DTO, Amritsar on the ground that the original register regarding the entry dated 29.4.1993 was destroyed in

a bomb blast which took place in the office of DTO, Amritsar. The Tribunal after affording opportunity to parties allowed the application by

recording the following order:-

After hearing to the learned counsel for the parties at length, the court is of the considered is proved to have been destroyed/lost in bomb blast by

the statements of the concerned officials working in the office of the District Transport Officer, Amritsar, prima facie good case is made out for

granting permission to lead secondary evidence because it is the applicant-insurance company who is to be fastened with the liability to pay the

amount of compensation to the claimants if the claim applications are accepted and if the insurance company proves that the driving licence was

fake, it can have legitimate legal remedy to recover the said amount from the owner of the alleged offending vehicle. Accordingly, the application of

respondent No. 3 insurance company under consideration is accepted and secondary evidence as prayed for in the application is allowed to be

led.

Shri P.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the driver-petitioners has assailed this order by arguing that no secondary evidence could be allowed once

the signatures have been denied by Harvinder Kaur, Clerk whose statement has been recorded on 27.9.2001. According to the learned counsel,

such a procedure is opposed to the provisions of sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Evidence act, 1872 (for brevity, ''the Act''). He has further

argued that the Court would be competent to consider the evidentiary value of the entry dated 29.4.1993 by evaluating the same in the light of the

statement made by Harvinder Kaur, Clerk but no secondary evidence could be permitted.

I have thoughtfully considered the contentions advanced by the learned counsel and regret my inability to accept the same because firstly Section

65(c) of the Act itself provides adducing of secondary evidence when the original has been destroyed or lost. Section 65(c) of the Act reads as

under:

Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.-Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or

contents of a document in the following cases: XX XX XX XX (c) When the original has been destroyed or lost, or when the party offering

evidence of its contents cannot, for any other reason not arising from his own default or neglect, produce it in reasonable time.

XX XX XX XX

A perusal of the Section 65(c) of the Act makes it obvious that secondary evidence is always permissible in case it is shown that the document

has been destroyed. In the present case, a report submitted by the DTO, Amritsar to the Tribunal shows that the record concerning licence No.

1604 dated 29.4.1993 has been destroyed/burnt in a bomb blast which took place in record room of his office on 2.6.1999. Therefore, 1 have no

hesitation in rejecting the argument raised by Shri P.K. Gupta, advocate that secondary evidence is not permissible. This view is supported by a

judgment of the Supreme Court in Marwari Kumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri, AIR 2000 S.C. 2620.

Moreover, I am further of the view that Section 169 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides that the Tribunal while holding inquiry u/s 168

could follow a summary procedure for making the award. In other words, the strict principles of evidence as provided by the Act are not required

to be followed. It is pertinent to mention that the Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary

Education v. K.S. Gandhi JT 1991(2) 296 reviewed the whole case law laying down the principle that the strict rules laid down in the Evidence

Act would not apply to the enquiries held by Domestic Tribunals. The observations of Their Lordships read as under:

It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental

proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable

material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. In

grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation etc. seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence

would furnish the proof, in our considered view inference from the evidence and circumstances much be carefully distinguished from conjectures or

speculation. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adopt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts

of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstances to deduce necessary inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can

be no inference unless there are objective facts, directs or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. In some

cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inferences do not go beyond

reasonable probability. If there are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences can be made the

method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation or conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been

held established there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be drawn. The standard of

proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt ""but"" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more

probable. Standard of proof cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. No mathematical formala could be laid on degree of proof. The probative

value could be gazed on facts and circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries.

The above view taken by the Supreme Court, would lead to the conclusion that even if the insurance company-respondent No. 4 does not fulfil

all the requirements of Section 65 of the Act, the evidence sought to be led by him could not be refused because the strict rules laid down by the

Evidence Act would not be applicable. Therefore, the revision petition merits rejection.

For the reasons recorded above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed.