Raghu Singh vs Usuf Ail

Atkinson, J.—This application comes before us in revision seeking to set aside the order of the District Judge of Monghyr dated the 25th of June 1917. The facts out of which this application arises are that the plaintiffs, the petitioners before us, instituted a suit for recovery of money due on foot of a mortgage-bond, dated the 13th of September 1904; and for the purposes of Court-fee the suit was valued by the plaintiffs at Rs. 5,992-3-5. The case came on for hearing and was decreed ex parte. An application was then made by the defendants to sot aside the ex parte decree under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Subordinate Judge declined to set aside the ex parte decree and from that order there was an appeal to the District Judge. It is contended before us that the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal by virtue of the provisions of section 21, clause (a) of the Civil Courts Act of 1887. That section provides that a District Judge shall have jurisdiction in first appeal where the value of the suit appealed from does not exceed Rs. 5,000. Here, it is conceded that the value of the suit exceeds Rs. 5,000 and is nearly Rs. 6,000. Thus it is contended that the order of the learned District Judge is a nullity and is void. With that view we agree; and that view is amply supported by authority. The authorities may shortly be summarized to be that where a Court has no inherent jurisdiction to try a case it cannot pronounce any decree and if it does pronounce a decree that decree is null and void. On the other hand, if a Court has jurisdiction and the law requires some preliminary conditions to be observed ancillary to such jurisdiction being exercised, the parties may waive these conditions and in that event the jurisdiction cannot be impeached on the ground of irregularity in the exercise of the Court''s jurisdiction. The learned Vakil appearing on behalf of the petitioners has referred us to the case of (1887) ILR 9 191 (Privy Council) and at page 203 their Lordships of the Privy Council say: "When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit, the parties cannot by mutual consent convert it into a proper judicial process although they may constitute the Judge their arbiter and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him." I think that what their Lordships mean to lay down is that where the parties agree to submit their differences to a particular person who has no jurisdiction as a Judge that then they are bound by the decision of that arbiter to whom they submit for determination the matter in dispute between them. But where a Court has no inherent jurisdiction the consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction. That proposition has never been denied. The learned Vakil for the defendants has endeavored to argue that the plaintiffs, not having raised the question of jurisdiction before the learned District Judge when the application was before him, are estopped from doing so at this stage. In my opinion, there is no foundation for, or substance in, this argument. I think that at page 384 of the latest edition of Woodroffe''s CPC a correct summary of the law is to be found, where it is stated as follows:--

A party can only appeal when so allowed by Statute; and it is only the Court to which jurisdiction is given to entertain an appeal in a particular matter which can determine it. And where there is inherent incompetency in a Court, it has been held that objection can be taken at any time and that consent cannot confer jurisdiction.

Two cases have been referred to by the learned Vakil for the defendant. One is Jose Antonio Barreto Vs. Francisco Antonio Rodrigues, . That case is clearly distinguishable on its facts, because in that case the learned Judges were not dealing with the general proposition of law with which we are concerned. The only question in that case was as to the determination of the market value of a certain property for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction and it was held that as neither party raised any question as to want of jurisdiction on the part of the Court which tried the case, they must be taken to have admitted that the market value of the property in suit was below Rs. 5,000. That case was essentially different from the present case. The second case relied upon by the learned Vakil for the defendant is Dayaram Jagjivan Vs. Gordhandas Dayaram, . That case seems to be a very strong case because the learned Judges there admitted that the Court had no jurisdiction; but they declined to interfere on the ground that the plaintiff to whom relief was granted by the lower Appellate Court would, if the application was allowed, be obliged to bring a suit to establish the right which he claimed to the property in dispute after the expiry of the period of limitation within which he was entitled to bring that suit, I cannot follow the reasoning of the judgment of the learned Judges in that case. It seems to me to be quite inconsistent with the principles laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. In my opinion, the learned District Judge in the case with which we are dealing had no inherent jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that his judgment is, therefore, illegal and must be set aside. I would, therefore, allow this application and set aside the order of the learned Judge, dated the 25th of June 1917. There will be no order as to costs.

Chapman, J.

I agree.