High Courts

Raghubar Chaudhary vs The State of Bihar

Patna High Court · Decided on 20 December 2011 · Citation: (2011) 12 PAT CK 0105

RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Criminal Appeal (DB) No 509 of 1989
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

8 paragraphs · 2,147 words

Honourable Mr Justice Navaniti Prasad Singh

1.

This appeal, by the sole appellant, has been preferred against the judgment and order of conviction dated 30th September, 1989 passed in Sessions Trial No 130 of 1989 by the Sessions Judge, Siwan. By the aforesaid judgment, the appellant has been held guilty of offence punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). In respect of offence u/s 363, IPC no separate sentence has been awarded as in respect of offence u/s 366 IPC, petitioner has been awarded to undergo rigorous imprisonment (RI) for ten years. For offence u/s 376 IPC, he has been sentenced to RI for life and the sentences are to run concurrently. This appeal has been on our list for more than a month and we find that there is no representation on behalf of the appellant. We have ourselves gone through the records which have been received in this Court from the trial Court and have been assisted by the learned State Counsel.

2.

The prosecution case is based on the Fardbayan of Suresh Pandey (PW 4), the informant and the father of the alleged victim girl as given by him to the Officer-in-charge, Siwan Mufassil Police Station (PS) in writing. This Fardbayan was given on 09.03.1989, inter alia, alleging that on 06.03.1989 in his village Chakra, a Mahashivratri Mela was held which is quite crowded. His daughter Buchi Kumari aged about 15 years had gone there. She did not return in the evening, as such, family members started searching. In course of search, it revealed that his son and other daughter had seen Buchi Kumari talking with the appellant Raghubar Chaudhary near their house. They were known to each other. They searched the house of Raghubar Chaudhary where neither the girl was found nor Raghubar Chaudhary was found but allegedly they met the brother of Raghubar Chaudhary, namely, Kishore Chaudhary who is said to have said that a mistake had been committed but the girl would return. They waited for two days. When the girl has not returned, they were lodging the case alleging that Raghubar Chaudhary, the appellant had, with wrong intentions, kidnapped his minor daughter. On basis of this Fardbayan, which is Exhibit-1, police registered a case under Sections 363, 366A, 372, IPC. It appears that by 2 am on 10.03.1989 from the house of one Kamta Chaudhary in village Atwa, Buchi Kumari, the victim girl was recovered as per recovery memo which is Exhibit 4. Kamta Chaudhary is the uncle (phupha) of the appellant. Soon thereafter at about 10 am on 10.03.1989, the undergarment of the victim girl was seized as per Exhibit 4/1. On 10.03.1989 itself at 4 pm, Buchi Kumari was produced for medical examination which report was prepared by Dr Shanti Mishra, Medical Officer (PW 6) at the Sadar Hospital, Siwan and the report is Exhibit 2. In the report, it is noticed that she is about 17 to 18 years and has ruptured hymen because of sexual intercourse. Upon completion of investigation, police submitted chargesheet under Sections 363 and 366A, IPC but apparently, the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of offence punishable u/s 376 of IPC as well and, accordingly, committed the case to Court of Session for trial. It may be noticed here that chargesheet was filed not only against the appellant but against his brother Nawal Kishore Chaudhary as well. Charges were then framed in respect of the appellant u/s 376, IPC and Sections 363 and 366, IPC whereas against Nawal Kishore Chaudhary, charges were framed under Sections 363, 366A, IPC alone. After trial, Nawal Kishore Chaudhary has been acquitted giving benefit of doubt whereas, as noticed above, Raghubar Chaudhary, the appellant has been convicted.

3.

In course of trial, the prosecution has examined 7 witnesses in order to establish the charge. Munni Kumari (PW 1) is another daughter of the informant. She has merely been tendered. PW 2 is Sandip Kumar Pandey, the son of the informant. The only material thing that he has deposed is that in the morning of 06.03.1989, he had seen Buchi Kumari, the victim and the appellant meeting and talking together. PW 3 is Gayanti Devi, the wife of the informant being the mother of the victim girl. She has also deposed that the victim girl was familiar with Raghubar Chaudhary to whose house being in the neighbourhood, she used to go at times. PW 4 is Suresh Pandey, the informant. In his deposition also he has stated that the victim girl had gone to the Mahashivratri Mela but not returned in the evening. They started searching. His son and the other daughter told the informant that they had seen her talking with the appellant in the morning. They then went to the house of Raghubar Chaudhary where it is deposed that his elder brother stated that Raghubar Chaudhary had committed a mistake but the girl would be restored. When the girl did not turn up, they filed the case in which the girl was recovered. He admits that after recovery, statement of girl u/s 164 of Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) was recorded. The next witness is the victim herself that is PW 5 being Buchi Kumari.

4.

Firstly, it must be noticed that her age, as medically examined, is about 17-18 years at the time of occurrence. As is well established this has a margin of about one or two years, as noticed by the Apex Court in the case of Jaya Mala Vs. Home Secretary, Government of Jammu and Kashmir and Others, In her deposition, she admits having made statement before Court (statement recorded u/s 164, Cr PC). We would advert to this statement a bit later. In her entire deposition, she admits that on 06.03.1989, she had gone to Mahashivratri Mela in her village. From there, she went to another Mela in the neighbouring village at Atwa. She got delayed there. She got scared in returning home, as such, she went to the house of the uncle (Phupha) of the appellant and stayed there. It is this very house she was recovered by the police who had come alongwith her father. In the end of her examination-in-chief, she merely mentions that on one night while she was at the house of the uncle of the appellant, Raghubar Chaudhary had sexual intercourse with her (did wrong act - what a grown up man does with a grown up lady). The statement u/s 164, CrPC, which was recorded on 14.03.1989 after her recovery on 10.03.1989 has been proved and marked as Exhibit-A. We have gone through the statement. Firstly, it must be noticed that she was recovered from the custody of the uncle of the appellant in the early hours of 10.03.1989. Thus, she was under no threat of either the appellant or any of his relations. She must have been with his parents. She was produced for recording her statement on 14.03.1989. In her statement all she says is that because she had got delayed in the Mela, she stayed in the house of the uncle of the appellant. The appellant had not taken her to Atwa or to that house or brought her there. She admits having met the appellant at the Mela only. Then we have the medical evidence of Dr Shanti Mishra (PW 6). She has noted the estimated age to be 17 to 18 years. She has then noted that hymen was torn as a result of sexual intercourse. Let it be noted that she has not, either in the report or in her deposition, stated that there was any mark of forceful sexual intercourse much less rape. We then have the Investigating Officer (IO) Rajeshwar Singh (PW 7). In his cross-examination, he has admitted that when he reached the house of the uncle of the appellant in the early hours of 10.03.1989, he did not find the appellant there and found the victim girl (PW 5) in an open room all alone. We have noticed this to show that the girl was not under any threat or illegal restrain when she was recovered. The defence of the appellant has been that he is not guilty of the offence, as charged.

5.

Having considered the matter, in our opinion, the appeal must succeed. As noticed above, the trial Court has convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 363 and 366, IPC. So far as Section 363, IPC is concerned, it is punishment for kidnapping and Section 366 is kidnapping, abducting or enticing a woman to compel marriage. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship is defined u/s 361, IPC. If we compare, we would find that the main ingredient of an offence of kidnapping or for that matter Section 366, IPC is taking away or enticing a person. If we refer to the evidence on record including the deposition of the victim girl and her statement, as recorded u/s 164 CrPC, we do not find that there is an iota of evidence leading to the conclusion of taking away or enticing the victim girl by the appellant in any manner. To the contrary, the evidence of the victim girl is that she herself went to the house of the appellant''s uncle and stayed there. From the mere fact that the two were seen talking in the morning before going to the Mela, nothing could be inferred which could lead us to the conclusion for taking away or enticing the girl by the appellant. Thus, on this finding alone, the conviction of the appellant for offence u/s 363, IPC or for that matter, Section 366, IPC is unsustainable. There is no material to support the charge much less the conviction.

6.

Now we come to Section 376, IPC. Section 376, IPC is punishment for rape and rape is defined u/s 375 of IPC. The evidence in regard to this charge is that the girl is about 17 to 18 years of age which could be in fact more than 18 years if we keep the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Jaya Mala (supra) in mind but in any event she is found to be above 16 years of age. From the entire records all that can be seen is that the appellant had sexual intercourse with the girl though in her statement u/s 164, CrPC recorded four days after her recovery, she does not mention this fact at all even though the medical report is already there. It is only subsequently before the trial Court she states that the appellant had sexual intercourse with her in the night before recovery. Nowhere has she stated that it was without her consent or without her will. In fact, her undergarments were seized immediately after recovery but were never sent for chemical examination. It may be that there had been a sexual intercourse for which she had regretted later on but surely there is no evidence to suggest that the sexual intercourse was against her will or without her consent. As noticed above, she is grown up girl inasmuch as she had gone to the Mela all alone. She has been medically found to be about 17 to 18 years old and, as such, having sufficient physical and mental maturity to understand what had happened. Even though her statement was recorded u/s 164, CrPC after four days of her recovery, there is not a whisper of any sexual intercourse much less forceful to make it a rape. The medical report does not make any mention thereof except that hymen was found ruptured. There was sign of sexual intercourse but the report also notices that there were no signs of sperm or epithelial cells and no other injury was found. It is only subsequently when she comes to depose in the Court, she only mentions that wrong thing was done with her. The learned trial Court sought to understand what wrong thing is and all she said was what a man does with a woman. Again, there was no suggestion that it was a forceful, unwilling, unconsented act. The witness could be thinking that it is wrong to have sexual intercourse without marriage but surely she did not say that it was forced upon her. When this statement is compared and seen with the statement recorded u/s 164 CrPC, it could very well be that this part was a tutored part of deposition wrongly understood by the trial Judge as rape. Thus, we find that the fundamental element of rape that is against her will, without her consent has not been established especially when admittedly and undisputedly, she is above 16 years of age.

7.

In that view of the matter, we are unable to uphold the conviction. We allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and the appellant, who is already on bail, is discharged from the liabilities of his bail bond.