Raghunath and Others vs State of Maharashtra and Others

S. Ranganathan, J.—We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of the appeal after hearing both counsel.

The point raised in the appeal is a very short one. The lands, belonging to the petitioners were among those sought to be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') by means of a notification u/s 4 issued on 22nd June, 1982. This was followed up by a declaration u/s 6 dated 15th March, 1983. The petitioners challenged both the notification and the declaration in writ petition No. 947 of 1983 before the High Court. The notification u/s 4 was challenged on the ground of mala fides and the declaration u/s 6 on the short ground that the petitioners' objections had not been heard before the making of the declaration. When this writ petition came up for hearing, a statement was made on behalf of the Government that the notification u/s 6 was being withdrawn. On this statement being made, the writ petition was withdrawn and disposed of accordingly. Thereafter the petitioners were heard u/s 5A of the Act and a fresh declaration u/s 6 was issued on 4th April, 1985.

The petitioners again filed a writ petition in the High Court, being writ petition No. 1143 of 1985, the judgment in which forms the subject matter of the present appeal. In this writ petition they again challenged the notification u/s 4 as vitiated by mala fides and non-application of mind. The High Court has found no merit in this contention and rejected the same. We see no reason to interfere with this conclusion of the High Court.

However, another question was also raised by the petitioners, namely, that the withdrawal of the earlier declaration dated 15.3.1983 had the automatic effect of also rendering the notification u/s 4 dated 22.6.1982 ineffective and infructuous. On the strength of the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others Vs. Vishnu Prasad Sharma and Others, , it was contended that, once a declaration u/s 6 was issued, the notification u/s 4 exhausted itself. It made no difference, it was said, that the notification issued u/s 6 had been withdrawn. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ajitsingh Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others, in support of this proposition. This contention, however, was rejected by the High Court and hence the present appeal.

We are of opinion that the decision of the High Court is correct and should be upheld. The Bench has rightly pointed out that Ajit Singh's case (supra) had failed to take note of the decisions of this Court in Girdharilal Amratlal Shodan and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, ; State of Gujarat Vs. Musamigan Imam Haider Bux Razvi and Another, and State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Bhogilal Keshavlal and Another, and therefore, does not represent the correct law.

In Vishnu Prasad Sharma's case (supra) the question for consideration of this Court was whether there could be successive declarations in respect of various parcels of land covered by a notification u/s 4(1). Considering the scheme of the Act as it then stood, the Court held that the Act envisaged a single declaration u/s 6 in respect of a notification u/s 4 and that, when once a declaration u/s 6 particularising the area in the locality specified in the notification u/s 4(1) is issued, the remaining non-particularised area stands automatically released. The Court also referred to the provisions of Section 48 of the Act in this context. The following observations appear in the judgment of Sarkar J.

...It seems to me that if the correct interpretation is that only one declaration can be made u/s 6, that also would exhaust the notification u/s 4 that notification would no longer remain in force to justify successive declarations u/s 6 in respect of different areas included in it. There is nothing in the Act to support the view that it is only a withdrawal u/s 48 that puts a notification u/s 4 completely out of the way. The effect of Section 48 is to withdraw the acquisition proceedings, including the notification u/s 4 with which it started. We are concerned not with a withdrawal but with the force of a notification u/s 4 having become exhausted.

The High Court was correct in pointing out that the above observations were made in the context of a valid declaration u/s 6. The Court held that once there is a valid declaration u/s 6, the scope of the notification u/s 4 will get exhausted. This principle cannot clearly apply to a case where the declaration u/s 6 proves to be invalid, ineffective or infructuous for some reason. It has been so held by this Court in a number of decisions. In Girdhari Lal Amrit Lal's case (supra) which was decided about a week earlier to Vishnu Prasad Sharma's case, this Court held that, where a notification u/s 6 is invalid, the Government may treat it as ineffective and issue in its place a fresh notification u/s 6 and that there is nothing in Section 48 of the Act to preclude the Government from doing so. This view has been repeated in State of Gujarat Vs. Musamigan Imam Haider Bux Razvi and Another, and State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Bhogilal Keshavlal and Another, . These decisions have clearly pointed out the distinction between a case where there is an effective declaration u/s 6 (which precludes the issue of further declarations in respect of other parts of the land covered by the notification u/s 4 not covered by the declaration issued u/s 6 and a case where, for some reason, the declaration u/s 6 is invalid.

It is true that in the present case there was no occasion for the High Court in the earlier writ petition to pronounce the declaration dated 15.3.1983 to be invalid. But the validity of the declaration had been challenged on the ground that the petitioners had not been heard u/s 5A, an irregularity, which ex facie rendered the declaration invalid, The State Government obviously acknowledged this and withdrew the declaration on its own instead of obtaining a judgment to that effect from the Court. In principle, there is no distinction between a case where a declaration u/s 6 is declared invalid by the Court and a case in which the Government itself withdraws the declaration u/s 6 when some obvious illegality is pointed out. The point in issue in this appeal is thus directly governed by the three earlier decisions of this Court and the High Court was fully justified in dismissing the writ petition on this ground.

Before concluding we must refer to one circumstance which was brought to our notice by learned Counsel for the petitioners and which has also been noticed in the judgment of the High Court. It appears that, between the date of withdrawal of the earlier writ petition (namely, 23rd August, 1983) and the issue of the second declaration u/s 6 (namely, 4.4.1985), the Government had issued a fresh notification u/s 4 for the acquisition of certain lands. The lands in the two notifications u/s 4 do not completely overlap but it appears that some fields are common in both. No declaration u/s 6 appears to have been issued in furtherance of the second notification u/s 4 when the High Court heard the matter. learned Counsel for the petitioners points out that, atleast in respect of such of the lands comprised in the Section 4 notification dated 22.6.1982 as are also covered by the subsequent notification u/s 4, it is legitimate to infer that the State Government has superseded the earlier notification by the latter one. This contention is clearly well founded. We would, therefore, like to make it clear that in respect of the lands covered by the first notification u/s 4 which are also covered by or comprised in, the second notification u/s 4, further proceedings regarding acquisition should be taken, in accordance with law, only in pursuance of the latter notification and the proceedings initiated in respect of such lands by the first notification dated 22.6.1982 should be deemed to have been superseded.

With the above clarification, we affirm the order of the High Court had dismiss this appeal. In the circumstances, however, we make no order as to costs.