Raghvendra Kumar Singh and Others vs Smt. Krishna Kumari and Another

S.N. Sahay, J.—This appeal is directed against the order of Civil Judge, Hardoi dated August 4,1987 granting succession certificate to the Respondent No. 1 in respect of certain properties left by her late husband Mohan Singh.

The application for succession certificate was moved by Respondent No. 1 on the basis of the allegations that she is the widow and an heir of the deceased. It is stated that he (Mohan Singh) executed a Will in respect of some of his properties, but not all. Respondent No. 1 claimed that she is entitled to succession certificate in respect of those properties which are not covered by the Will executed by the deceased. The particulars of such properties are given in the schedule to the application for succession certificate and it indicates that the properties consist of National Savings Certificates and Zamindari Abolition Compensation Bonds.

Notices of the application were served upon the Appellants who were named as parties in the said application and the usual proclamation was also issued. The Appellants appeared in the Court and applied for time to file objections, which was granted, but no objection was filed by them. As no objection was filed by any one, the learned Civil Judge proceeded to allow the application and granted succession certificate, as prayed, by means of the order dated August 4, 1987 against which this appeal has been preferred.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant has urged that no inquiry was made by the learned Civil Judge in the allegations made by Respondent No. 1 and on the basis of the application itself the order granting succession certificate was passed in her Kunwar favour. He has relied on Bal Mukund v. Kundan ILR 27 All 452, and Hum Krishna Panda v. Balbhadra Panda ILR 23 Cal 431 in support of the contention that the Court was bound to make some inquiry before granting succession certificate. Both these cases are distinguishable from the facts of the present case, inasmuch as objections were filed in those cases and the application for grant of succession certificate was contested. In the present case, no objection was filed by the Appellants in spite of time taken by them for the purpose. Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act enjoins upon the Court to decide an application for succession certificate in a summary manner. It does not make it obligatory upon the Court to make inquiry in every case, whether it is contested or not although the Court will be well-advised ordinarily to take some evidence in support of the application. There can be no doubt that when an application is contested, the right to succession certificate cannot be determined without making some inquiry, but if there is no contest, the inquiry may be dispensed with in the circumstances of the particular case. The only requirement of law is, as indicated in Section 372 (1), that the Court is satisfied for entertaining the application and for granting the certificate prayed for. It is a significant that in the present Case, the Appellants did not file any objection, but they even confined their right to the property of the deceased on the basis of the Will executed by the deceased. In the application for stay moved by them in this Court, it is clearly stated in paragraph 4 that the applicants are entitled to succeed to the property of late Mohan Singh on the basis of the registered will and are also in possession of the agricultural fields as well as house etc. The Respondent No. 1 has not claimed certificate in respect of any property which is the subject matter of bequest made by or under the Will left by the deceased. She has claimed right in respect of the property which is not covered by the Will. Therefore, even in this appeal there is absolutely no contest between the parties. The Appellants have no right to challenge the order under appeal. We have accordingly come to the conclusion that the appeal has no force and is liable to be dismissed.

For the reasons given above, the appeal is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. The interim order dated August 17, 1987 is vacated.