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Judgment
Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, J.—This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 2215 of 2014 dated 9th July, 2014, whereby, the petition preferred by the appellant (original petitioner) has been dismissed and Clause No. 5 of the circular, issued by the Government dated 29th June, 2011 (Annexure-5 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) has been held as a valid one and both the Co-operative Societies, registered under the Bihar Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter to be referred as the "Act, 1935") as well as the society registered under the Bihar Self Supporting Co-operative Societies Act, 1996 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter to be referred as the "Act, 1996") have been treated at par with each other, so far as allocation of pond of fisheries is concerned. The appellant (original petitioner) is seeking priority because the appellant has been registered as a Co-operative Society under the Act, 1935.
Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was some litigation between respondent No. 5 and respondent No. 6 in the earlier writ petitions, which were decided by the learned Single Judge. The said order is annexed at Annexure-3 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal. Thereafter, both respondent No. 5 and respondent No. 6 had challenged the order in the Letters Patent Appeals and ultimately the Division Bench of this Court passed an order in their matters, in which, present appellant was never a party.
By virtue of some order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the Letters Patent Appeal and also on their own, policy decision has been taken by the State of Jharkhand that the Co-operative Societies, which are registered under the Act, 1935 as well as under the Act, 1996 shall be treated at par with each other, so far as allocation of pond of fisheries is concerned. The circular has been issued on 29th June, 2011 (Annexure-5 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal) and in Clause No. 5, this policy decision has been crystallized, which was under challenge by the appellant in the Letters Patent Appeal.
It appears that the appellant (original petitioner) has no right at all to point out to the respondent that priority should be given to the original petitioner because it was registered earlier in point of time as well as under the Act, 1935. There may be earlier circular also giving priority to the Co-operative Society under the Act, 1935. Be as it may, the policy is Governmental and the policies are bound to be changed and it cannot be stagnant. The Governmental policies are not always static in nature, looking to the need of the society. It all depends upon the Governmental decision to whom priority is given and whose priority should be brought to an end.
It appears that by virtue of the policy decision dated 29th June, 2011 (Annexure-5 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal), earlier priorities given to the Co-operative Societies registered under the Act, 1935 has been brought to an end. This is also a policy decision. The High Court will be extremely slow in interfering with the policy decision of the Government. The Government has their own priorities. The Court cannot replace even a better policy in place of existing one. The Court has no expertise knowledge. The Court is also not expert economist nor the Court is Chartered Accountant or Cost Accountant to whom priority is given in the State whether earlier Co-operative Societies registered under the Act, 1935 or subsequent Co-operative Societies registered under the Act, 1996 or both of them should be treated at par with each other. It is a function of the Government, alone. In the facts of the present case, as stated hereinabove, by virtue of the policy decision dated 29th June, 2011, both the Co-operative Societies under the Act, 1935 as well as under the Act, 1996 have been treated at par with other, so far as grant of pond for fisheries is concerned. We do not want to change this policy decision for any argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant and for any better reason. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge.
It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Lakshmi Vs. Punjab University and Others, AIR 2003 SC 3331 : (2003) 8 JT 259 : (2004) 137 PLR 124 : (2003) 8 SCALE 65 : (2003) 8 SCC 440 : (2004) SCC(L&S) 38 : (2003) 3 SCR 1034 Supp : (2004) 1 SLJ 387 : (2004) 1 UJ 249 : (2003) AIRSCW 4731 : (2003) 7 Supreme 256 which reads as under:
"8. It is difficult to agree to the aforesaid reasoning because as stated above, it is not for the court to sit in appeal against the policy decision taken by the State Government. It is for the State to decide whether such rule is a preventive or precautionary measure so that young fallible students may not be subjected to any sort of exploitation........................ "
(emphasis supplied)
It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Others Vs. Chaudhari Ran Beer Singh and Another, (2008) 106 CLT 390 : (2008) 3 SCALE 611 : (2008) 5 SCC 550 which reads as under:
"13. Cabinet''s decision was taken nearly eight years back and appears to be operative. That being so there is no scope for directing reconsideration as was done in Ram Milan case, though learned counsel for the respondents prayed that such a direction should be given. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the State, in matters of policy decisions, the scope of interference is extremely limited. The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can decide which policy should be adopted after considering all relevant aspects from different angles. In matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so'' long as the infringement of fundamental right is not shown, courts will have no occasion to interfere and the court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such'' matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the'' court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government."
(emphasis supplied)
It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanchit Bansal and Another Vs. The Joint Admission Board (JAB) and Others, AIR 2012 SC 214 : (2011) 11 SCALE 593 : (2012) 1 SCC 157 : (2011) 6 UJ 4303 , which reads under:
"26. This Court has also repeatedly held that the courts are not concerned with the practicality or wisdom of the policies but only illegality. In Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain this Court held:
"16. ... Courts do not and cannot act as appellate authorities examining the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy of the Government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere with policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review."
(emphasis supplied)
It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Brij Mohan Lal Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2012) 4 SCALE 450 : (2012) 6 SCC 502 : (2012) AIRSCW 3906 , which read as under:
"96. It is a settled principle of law that matters relating to framing and implementation of policy primarily fall in the domain of the Government. It is an established requirement of good governance that the Government should frame policies which are fair and beneficial to the public at large. The Government enjoys freedom in relation to framing of policies. It is for the Government to adopt any particular policy as it may deem fit and proper and the law gives it liberty and freedom in framing the same. Normally, the courts would decline to exercise the power of judicial review in relation to such matters. But this general rule is not free from exceptions. The courts have repeatedly taken the view that they would not refuse to adjudicate upon policy matters if the policy decisions are arbitrary, capricious or mala fide.
We must examine the cases where this Court has stepped in and exercised limited power of judicial review in matters of policy. In Asif Hameed v. State of J&K this Court noticed that, where a challenge is to the action of the State, the court must act in accordance with law and determine whether the State has acted within the powers and functions assigned to it under the Constitution. I f not, it must strike down the action, of course, with due caution. Normally, the courts do not give directions or advise in such matters. This Court held as under:
"19. When a State action is challenged, the function of the court is to examine the action in accordance with law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution and if not, the court must strike down the action. While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the Government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not an appellate authority. The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonise qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers."
It is also a settled cannon of law that the Government has the authority and power to not only frame its policies, but also to change the same. The power of the Government, regarding how the policy should be shaped or implemented and what should be its scope, is very wide, subject to it not being arbitrary or unreasonable. In other words, the State may formulate or reformulate its policies to attain its obligations of governance or to achieve its objects, but the freedom so granted is subject to basic constitutional limitations and is not so absolute in its terms that it would permit even arbitrary actions.
Cases of this nature can be classified into two main classes: one class being the matters relating to general policy decisions of the State and the second relating to fiscal policies of the State. In the former class of cases, the courts have expanded the scope of judicial review when the actions are arbitrary, mala fide or contrary to the law of the land; while in the latter class of cases, the scope of such judicial review is far narrower. Nevertheless, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, unfair actions or policies contrary to the letter, intent and philosophy of law and policies expanding beyond the permissible limits of delegated power will be instances where the courts will step in to interfere with government policy.
The correct approach in relation to the scope of judicial review of policy decisions of the State can hardly be stated in absolute terms. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. Furthermore, the court would have to examine any elements of arbitrariness, unreasonableness and other constitutional facets in the policy decision of the State before it can step in to interfere and pass effective orders in such cases.
A challenge to the formation of a State policy or its subsequent alterations may be raised on very limited grounds. Again, the scope of judicial review in such matters is a very limited one. One of the most important aspects in adjudicating such a matter is that the State policy should not be opposed to basic rule of law or the statutory law in force. This is what has been termed by the courts as the philosophy of law, which must be adhered to by valid policy decisions."
(emphasis supplied)
It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Mr. Ehsan Khalid Vs. Union of India (UOI) thr. Secretary and Others, (2013) 10 SCALE 452 : (2013) 122 SCL 100 , which reads as under:
"8. What was involved in the present case was not the sale of assets but sale of equity capital. If after following the ICDR and on taking into consideration the relevant methodologies of valuation for sale of equity capital the price band of Rs. 226-245 per share was fixed, it cannot be said that the price band so fixed was unreasonable or sale of 10% equity capital by CIL was unfair. Where challenge is laid to a government policy, particularly economic policy, this Court does not interfere in such policy matter in its power of judicial review unless the impugned policy is found to be grossly arbitrary or unfair or unreasonable or irrational or violative of constitutional provisions or contrary to statutory provision."
(emphasis supplied)
As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we see no reason to alter the decision taken by the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 2215 of 2014 vide order dated 9th July, 2014. There being no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and, hence, the same is, hereby, dismissed.