Rahman Bivi and others vs Aysa Bivi and another

Chandra Reddy, J.—This appeal raises a question relating to the applicability of the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1954. Defendants 1 and 3 are the appellants. For an administration action by a Muhammadan heir a decree was passed which inter alias provided that defendants 1 to 3 personally and on a charge of their share in the plaint B schedule properties allotted to defendants 1 to 6 should pay to the first and third plaintiffs and the 7th defendant (originally the second plaintiff) within two years from the date, the sum of Rs. 3178. Rs. 7636 and Rs. 7686 respectively with interest thereon at 5 1/2 per cent per annum from the date till payment to equalize the value of the share allotted to them. It may be mentioned that this was a compromise decree. In pursuance of the terms of the decree defendants 1 and 3 were put in possession of the share allotted to them under this decree but they failed to pay the owlet due by them to the plaintiffs 1 and To enforce the liability arising under this consent decree, plaintiffs filed execution petition E. P. No. 80 of 1953. Pending this execution petition the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1954 came into operation. Taking advantage of this the appellants filed E. A. No. 39 of 1954 for stay of further proceedings for one year under S. 4 of the Act. This was opposed on the ground that as the liability arising under the decree is not a debt within the definition of S. 2 (b) of the Act, no stay could be granted. This objection prevailed with the lower Court with the result the application for relief under S. 4 of the Act was dismissed. Hence this appeal.

In support of this appeal it is urged by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar that the liability, although arising under a compromise decree and in an administrative action, is still a debt within the meaning of S. 2 (b) of the Act. It is argued that since it is a sum of money liable to be paid by his clients under a contract for consideration received, it is attracted by the said definition. According to him the appellant is liable to pay this sum in consideration of his having received a share in excess of the one that he is entitled to get under the Muhammdan law. In support of his contention, Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar called in aid Vasantha Rao Sahib Bhonsle v. Narayanaswami Aiyar (1989) 2 M.L.J. 745=60 L.W. 636 where Pandrang Row, J., laid down that the definition of the word ''''debt'''' under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act is wide enough to include a decree for restitution. This decision is not very helpful in this case, and further it is not necessary for us to express any opinion on the question whether owlet payable by the appellants is a debt falling under the definition of "debt" or not, in the view we take that the liability of the appellants is excluded by Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. Sections 3 of the Act is in the following words ''No suit for the recovery of a debt shall be instituted; no application for the execution of a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt shall be made, and no suit or application for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of a debt shall be instituted or made, against any agriculturist in any civil or revenue Court before the expiry of a year from the date of commencement of this Act."

S. 4 provides for stay of all further proceedings in suits and applications of the nature mentioned in S. 3 on which relief is claimed against an agriculturist etc. It is clear from this that it is only in cases falling under S. 3 of the Act that a stay of further proceedings can be granted. The point, therefore, for consideration is whether in this case there is any execution application pending which attracts S. 4 of the Act. If the other requirements of the Act are complied with S. 4 of the Act will certainly be applicable. What S. 3 prohibits is the entertainment of a suit or application for the execution of a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt, thus laying emphasis on the nature of the suit. Thus to bar an execution petition under S. 3 or to stay such proceedings it is essential that the decrees should have been passed in a suit for the recovery of money. It is the character of the suit that determines the applicability of Ss. 3 and 4, In this case it cannot be contended with any force that the suit is not for the recovery of a debt It was an administration action which was in effect a suit for partition. The fact that ultimately the appellants are required to pay a sum of money in adjustment of shares will not convert the suit into one for the recovery of money. It is only the nature of the suit that counts and not the ultimate result thereof. In these circumstances we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to invoke S. 4 of the Act, and the judgment of the lower Court dismissing his application is correct. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellants are given time till the 15th July 1954 for payment of the amount. The execution petition will be kept pending on the file.