Rahul Singh vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, an aspiring candidate for the police services, against the

order dated 01.06.2017 passed by the respondent No.3- Inspector General of Police, Personnel/Security, Special Branch, Bhopal (M.P.) whereby the

petitioner has been declared as disqualified for the appointment in police services on the ground that he had faced a criminal prosecution for offences

under Sections 147, 148, 323, 325, 451 and 201 of IPC.

The petitioner's contention is that the aforesaid facts regarding the criminal case were duly disclosed by the petitioner in the verification form that

he has already been acquitted in the aforesaid case but the respondents have held that since the petitioner has already been tried in a criminal case

involving moral turpitude, hence even his acquittal cannot entitle him to claim the post as the acquittal in itself is not an honorable acquittal.

In brief the facts of the case are that an advertisement was issued by the respondent No.2- Director General of Police, PHQ, Bhopal for the

recruitment in the Police Department for various posts which was to be conducted through Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board. The

petitioner applied for the post of Sub Inspector and was selected vide letter dated 27.2.2017. The petitioner, in his character verification form

specifically stated that he was tried and acquitted in a Criminal Case No.559/2014 under Sections 147, 148, 323, 325, 451 and 201 of IPC.

The petitioner's contention is that the aforesaid criminal case was lodged on account of a dispute between the families. As a counter FIR was also

lodged against the complainant party and in these two FIRs almost all the family members of both the families were implicated. It is further submitted

that in the FIR against the petitioner's side, as many as 8 persons were named including the petitioner although no overt act has been attributed to him.

It is further submitted that he has got no past criminal record and, in fact, it was a trivial case where the FIR was lodged against him. It is further

submitted that during the trial a compromise was entered into between the parties which led to the compounding of the aforesaid case under Sections

147, 148, 323, 325 and 451 of IPC and under Section 201 of IPC which was not compoundable in nature acquittal of the petitioner was made vide

order dated 7.2.2017 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Teothar, District Rewa.

The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that theScreening Committee of the respondent, vide its order dated 1.6.2017 has held that since the

offences under Sections 201, 325 and 451 involve moral turpitude, the acquittal of the petitioner on the basis of compounding of offence cannot be said

to be a clean or honourable and since the police service requires high moral character, hence the involvement in the criminal activities at one point of

time cannot be ruled out and the further involvement in future and the petitioner has been declared ineligible.

The counsel for the petitioner has assailed the aforesaid order on the ground that the same has been passed arbitrarily and without application of

mind and with mala fide intention to disqualify the petitioner from the Government services. Counsel has further submitted that in the present case the

action of the respondent amounts to malice in law which can be ascertained from the order itself. It is further submitted that the order has been

passed in a mechanical manner without going into the dispute between the parties which led to filing of FIR against the petitioner and his role in the

aforesaid case. It is further submitted that the case of the petitioner is covered by the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in the case of State of

Madhya Pradesh and others Vs. Hajarilal (2008) 3 SCC 273, as also Avtar Singh vs Union of India, (2016 ) 8 SCC 471 and Ravindra Kumar Pandoria

vs State of M.P. and others, 2016(4) MPLJ 431.

Shri Rahul Rawat, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand has opposed the prayer and has supported the impugned order and further

submitted that no illegality has been committed by the respondents in holding that the acquittal of the petitioner was not a clean or honourable acquittal

and the sections of the Penal Code involved in the case relate to moral turpitude. Shri Rawat has relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the

case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another vs Mehar Singh, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 768 (para 28) and also relied upon para 53(c) of

the Police Regulation which provides that a candidate for appointment as Police Constable must possess good moral character and antecedents.

The counsel has also relied on Rule 6(3) of the M.P. Civil Services (General Conditions of Services), Rules, 1961 which provides disqualifications.

Counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the Larger Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ashutosh Pawar vs High Court of M.P. &

another in W.P. No.5865/2016 decided on 12.1.2018.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

So far as the case against the petitioner is concerned, the FIR was lodged on 20.5.2014 under Sections 147, 148, 323, 325, 451 and 201 of IPC, the

FIR also reveals that no overt act has been attributed to the petitioner in respect of the aforesaid offence. It is true that a person who aspires to be in

police services must have a clean record and must be a person of no criminal antecedents but it is equally true that it is very easy to falsely implicate a

person in a criminal case. Merely because a person has been implicated in a case would not amount to his automatic disqualification from Government

employment especially when he has been acquitted.

So far as the nature of acquittal is concerned, the order of acquittal dated 7.2.2017 reveals that none of the prosecution witnesses have supported

the case of the prosecution and even the complainant himself who is said to be injured has not supported the case of the prosecution. In view of the

same all the accused persons have been acquitted under Section 201 of IPC. Nowhere in the order of acquittal it is mentioned that the accused

persons are being given the benefit of doubt and in respect of other sections, viz. under sections 147, 148, 323, 325, and 451 of IPC, the parties have

already compounded the same even prior to such acquittal u/s.201 of IPC. In the impugned order it is mentioned that the said acquittal is not

“Clean or Honourableâ€​.

In its latest judgment, the Apex court in the case of Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and others v. Pradeep Kumar and another, (2018)

1 SCC 797 has held as under:-

“15. From the above details, we find that the Screening Committee examined each and every case of the respondents and reasonings for their

acquittal and taken the decision. While deciding whether a person involved in a criminal case has been acquitted or discharged should be appointed to

a post in a police force, nature of offence in which he is involved, whether it was an honourable acquittal or only an extension of benefit of doubt

because of witnesses turned hostile and flaws in the prosecution are all the aspects to be considered by the Screening Committee for taking the

decision whether the candidate is suitable for the post. As pointed out earlier, the Screening Committee examined each and every case and reasonings

for their acquittal and took the decision that the respondents are not suitable for the post of Constable in Chandigarh Police. The procedure followed is

as per Guideline 2(A)(b) and object of such screening is to ensure that only persons with impeccable character enters police force. While so, the court

cannot substitute its views for the decision of the Screening Committee.

On behalf of the respondents, much reliance was placed upon Joginder Singh  v. State (UT of Chandigarh) . In the said case, the appellant

thereon was charged under Sections 148, 149, 323, 325 and 307 IPC but acquitted by the trial court holding that the prosecution has failed to prove the

charges levelled against him since complainant as well as injured eyewitnesses failed to identify the assailants and the complainant had stated that his

signature was obtained on a blank sheet by the investigating officer. The case involved was a family dispute. In such facts and circumstances, this

Court held that acquittal of appellant Joginder Singh was an honourable acquittal and hence, he should not be denied appointment to the post in

question. The decision in Joginder Singh case does not advance the case of the respondents herein.

In a catena of judgments, the importanceof integrity and high standard of conduct in police force has been emphasised. As held in Mehar Singh

case , the decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In the case in hand, there is nothing to suggest that the

decision of the Screening Committee is mala fide. The decision of the Screening Committee that the respondents are not suitable for being appointed

to the post of Constable does not call for interference. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the decision of the

Screening Committee and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.â€​

(emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforesaid dictum to the facts of the present case, it is seen that in the present case also so far as Section 201 of IPC is concerned, the

acquittal is on account of all the witnesses turning hostile and is not based on benefit of doubt however, under Sections 147, 148, 323, 325 and 451 of

IPC it has been compounded or compromised. It may be that this case also involved a family dispute as averred by the petitioner but it in the light of

the order passed in the case of Ashutosh Pawar (supra) the decision in the case of Joginder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2015) 2 SCC 377 is

of no help to the petitioner as it has no binding precedent. The larger bench of this court in para 22 to 24 has held thus:-

“22. The reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as (2015) 2 SCC 377 ( Joginder Singh

 v. Union Territory of Chandigarh and others  ) is of no help to the arguments raised as the attention of the Court was not drawn to earlier

judgment  in Mehar Singh's case (supra). After the judgment  in Joginder Singh (supra), Parvez Khan's case (supra) was decided on 1.12.2014

and Pradeep Kumar's case (supra) has been decided recently on 08.01.2018 quoting extensively from the judgment in Mehar Singh's case (supra).

The view taken in Mehar Singh ; Parvez Khan and Pradeep Kumar's cases (supra) is no different than the view taken by the larger Bench of the

Supreme Court in Avtar Singh's case (supra), which unequivocally held that the decision in respect of suitability of a candidate has to be taken by the

employer.

But even if there is conflict between the two judgments of the Supreme Court by the equal strength, even then the earlier view would be binding

precedent if the earlier judgment was not brought to the notice of the Court in a later judgment. A Full Bench of this Court in 2003 (1) MPHT 226

(FB) (Jabalpur Bus Operators Association v. State of M.P) has held that in case of conflict between the two judgments of the coordinate Bench of

the Supreme Court, the earlier judgment will prevail. The relevant extract is reproduced as under:â€

“9. Having considered the matter with broader dimensions, we find that various High Courts have given different opinion on the question involved.

Some hold that in case of conflict between two judgments on a point of law, later decision should be followed; while others say that the Court should

follow the decision which is correct and accurate whether it is earlier or later. There are High Courts which hold that decision of earlier Bench is

binding because of the theory of binding precedent and Article 141 of the Constitution of India. There are also decisions which hold that Single Judge

differing from another Single Judge decision should refer the case to Larger Bench, otherwise he is bound by it. Decisions which are rendered without

considering the decisions expressing contrary view have no value as a precedent. But in our considered opinion, the position may be stated thus-

With regard to the High Court, a Single Bench is bound by the decision of another Single Bench. In case, he does not agree with the view of the other

Single Bench, he should refer the matter to the Larger Bench. Similarly, Division Bench is bound by the judgment of earlier Division Bench. In case, it

does not agree with the view of the earlier Division Bench, it should refer the matter to Larger Bench. In case of conflict between judgments of two

Division Benches of equal strength, the decision of earlier Division Bench shall be followed except when it is explained by the latter Division Bench in

which case the decision of later Division Bench shall be binding. The decision of Larger Bench is binding on Smaller Benches.

In case of conflict between two decisions of the Apex Court, Benches comprising of equal number of Judges, decision of earlier Bench is binding

unless explained by the latter Bench of equal strength, in which case the later decision is binding. Decision of a Larger Bench is binding on smaller

Benches. Therefore, the decision of earlier Division Bench, unless distinguished by latter Division Bench, is binding on the High Courts and the

Subordinate Courts. Similarly, in presence of Division Bench decisions and Larger Bench decisions, the decisions of Larger Bench are binding on the

High Courts and the Subordinate Courts. No decision of Apex Court has been brought to our notice which holds that in case of conflict between the

two decisions by equal number of Judges, the later decision in binding in all circumstances, or the High Courts and Subordinate Courts can follow any

decision which is found correct and accurate to the case under consideration. High Courts and Subordinate Courts should lack competence to interpret

decisions of Apex Court since that would not only defeat what is envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution of India but also militate hierarchical

supremacy of Courts. The common thread which runs through various decisions of Apex Court seems to be that great value has to be attached to

precedent which has taken the shape of rule being followed by it for the purpose of consistency and exactness in decisions of Court, unless the Court

can clearly distinguish the decision put up as a precedent or is per incuriam, having been rendered without noticing some earlier precedents with which

the Court agrees. Full Bench decision in Balbir Singh's case (supra) which holds that if there is conflict of views between the two co-equal Benches

of the Apex Court, the High Court has to follow the judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and more accurately and in

conformity with the scheme of the Act, in our considered opinion, for reasons recorded in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, does not lay down

the correct law as to application of precedent and is, therefore, over-ruled on this point.â€​

In view of the judgment in Avtar Singh's case (supra), the reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of the Supreme Court

reported as (2011) 4 SCC 644 ( Commissioner of Police  v. Sandeep Kumar ) and on Joginder Singh (supra) is not tenable. â€​

(emphasis supplied)

So far as the impugned order is concerned, it is true that the high level committee has considered the case of the petitioner in an objective manner

instead of subjective as it has only broadly looked into the nature of acquittal that it is not a clean acquittal, although the role played by the petitioner in

the said criminal case has not been discussed in the impugned order. The committee has apparently closed its eyes from the ground realities and the

routine manner in which criminal complaints are lodged.

Be that as it may, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the respondent’s action amounts to malice-in-law cannot be accepted as

there is no material to accept the same and as has been held by the larger bench in para 22 in the case of Ashutosh Pawar (supra) that the decision in

respect of suitability of a candidate has to be taken by the employer only.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for interference.

As a result, the petition stands dismissed.

No costs.