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Judgment
22 paragraphs · 2,478 wordsN.K. Sodhi, J.—By a notification dated April 4, 1989 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisitive Act, 1894 (as amended uptodate and hereinafter called ''the Act'') the State of Punjab sought to acquire a total of 53 kanals and 8 marlas of land including 16 marlas of land belonging to the petitioner Company in village Jandiali, Tehsil and District Ludhiana at public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the widening of existing road from Jandiali to Budhewal by 11 ft. (2 karams) on both sides of the road for smooth transportation of sugarcane to the Doraha Cooperative Sugar mills Ltd., Budhewal, Tehsil and District Ludhiana. Simultaneously, the urgency provisions under clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 17 of the Act as amendment by the State of Punjab, were also invoked on the ground that the land described in the notification was urgently required for the aforesaid purpose. The declaration under section 6 was also published by a notification of the same date and the Land Acquisition Collector, Ludhiana was directed to proceed to take possession of the land described in the notifications. The Land Acquisition Collector gave his award on March 25, 1991. These acquisition proceedings have been challenged by the petitionerCompany in the present writ petition filed in August, 1991 under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The notification Under Section 4 of the Act was published in the daily ''Tribune'' on June 21, 1989 and in the Punjabi Daily ''Rozana Nawan Zamana'' on June 21, 1989. Similarly, the declaration under section 6 was published in the daily ''Tribune'' dated June 30, 1989 and Punjabi ''Roznana Nawan Zamana'' on June 28, 1989. A proclamation by beat of drum was also made in the locality on July 13, 1989. In the background of this factual position, it was strenuously urged on behalf of the writ petitioner that since there was a gap of more than three months, between the publication of the notification under Section 4 in the Official Gazette and the proclamation made in the locality and since it was not done simultaneously, the acquisition proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground. Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak, AIR 1973 S.C. 2361.
Having given our thoughtful consideration to the contention raised by the petitioner, we regret our inability to accept the same. It is true that in the case before their Lordship of the Supreme Court, the gap between the publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act in the Official Gazette and the publication in the locality was about 21/2 months and the notification had been quashed by the High Court of Mysore on the ground of this delay, their Lordships upheld the judgment of the High Court but that a case which pertained to the unamended provisions of the Act. Moreover, that was not a case in which the urgency provisions had been invoked. Section 4(1) and 5A of the Act, as they then stood in the year 1961, read as under :
"4(1). Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality."
"5A(1). Any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4, subsection (1), as being needed or likely to be need for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be."
While upholding the judgment of the High Court of Mysore, their Lordships in Abdul Razak''s case observed as under :
"Section 5A empowers the interested person to object to the acquisition of any land but his objection should be filed within thirty days from the date of issue of the notification. Any objection filed thereafter need not be considered as the same is filed after the time stipulated in section 5A(1).
With the above background we have to consider the scope of Section 4(1). Under certain circumstances publications in the Official Gazette are presumed to be notice to all concerned. But in the case of a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act the law has prescribed that in addition to the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette the Collector must also give publicity of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality. Unless both these conditions are satisfied, section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be said to have been compiled. The publication of the notice in the locality is a mandatory requirement. It has an important purpose behind it. In the absence of such publication the interested persons may not be able to file their objections about the acquisition proceedings and they will be deprived of the right of representation provided under Section 5A, which is a very valuable right."
Section 4(1) of the Act it now stands after the amending Act 68 of 1984, reads as under :
"4(1) Whenever it appears to the (appropriate Government) that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose (or for a company), a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette (and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language) and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the notification)."
A bare reading of these provision leaves no room for doubt that the notification has to be published in the Official Gazette and also in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality of which at least one must be in the regional language. In addition to this, the Collector is enjoined to cause public notice of the substance of the notification in the locality and it is the last of the dates of the publication and giving of public notice that has to be treated as the date of the publication of the notification. It is from this last date that the period of thirty days for filing objections under Section 5A will commence in cases where urgency provisions have not been invoked. If in a given case, the substance of the notification is not simultaneously published in the locality, the landowner would not suffer inasmuch as the period for filing objections would commence only after such publication was not the case under the unamended provisions which were under consideration by their Lordship of the Supreme Court. Under the old law, the period of thirty days was to commence only from the date of issue of the notification in the Official Gazette under section 4(1) of the Act.
Even though we are of the view that under the provisions of the Act as they now stand, the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality need not be simultaneous with its publication in the Official Gazette, yet, we should not be understood to mean that the publication in the locality can be delayed indefinitely. This publication must be made within a reasonable time which, obviously, would vary from case to case depending upon the fact and circumstances. In the very nature of things, the publication in the Official Gazette and the public notice in the locality must, necessarily, be separated by a gap of time, which does not mean that the publication and the public notice should be separated by a long interval. It is necessary that continuity of action should not be broken by a long inordinate gap.
At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the following observations in Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, AIR S.C. 1721 : 1984 R.R.R. 207 :
"3. It may be noticed at once that Section 4(1) does not prescribed that public notice of the substance of the notification should be given in the locality simultaneously with the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette or immediately thereafter. Publication in the Official Gazette and public notice in the locality are two vital steps required to be taken under Section 4(1) before proceedings to take the next step of entering upon the land under Section 4(2). The time factor is not a vital element of Section 4(1) and there is no warrant for reading the words ''simultaneously'' or ''immediately thereafter'' into Section 4(1). Publication in the Official Gazette and public notice in the locality are the essential elements of Section 4(1) and not the simultaneously or immediately of the publication and the public notice. But since the steps contemplated by Section 4(2) cannot be undertaken unless publication is made and public notice given as contemplated by Section 4(1), it is implicit that the publication and the public notice must be contemporaneous though not simultaneous or immediately after one another. Naturally contemporaneity may involve a gap of time and by the very nature of the things, the publication in the Official Gazette and the public notice in the locality must necessarily be separated by a gap of time. This does not mean that the publication and the public notice may be separated by a long interval of time. What is necessary, is that the continuity of action should not appear to be broken by a deep gap. If there is publication in the Gazette and if there is public notice in the locality, the requirements of Section 4(1) must be held to be satisfied unless the two are unlinked from each other by a gap of time so large as may lead one to the prima faice conclusion of lack of bona fides in the proceedings for acquisition. If the notification and the public notice are separated by such a large gap of time it may become necessary to probe further to discover if there is any cause for the delay and if the delay has caused prejudice to anyone."
Collector, Allahabad and another v. Raja Ram Jaiswal, AIR 1985 S.C. 1622 was cited to contend that publication of substance of the notification in the locality is a mandatory requirement. There can be no quarrel with this proposition.
In the instant case, the acquisition proceedings cannot be held to be invalid merely because the substance of the notification under Section 4 was published in the locality on July 13, 1989. The rule laid down in Abdul Razak''s case (supra) would not apply to the amended provisions of the Act as they now stand as the period for filing objections would commence from the last of the dates of publication and the giving of public notice as envisaged in Section 4(1) of the Act through publication of the substance of the notification in the newspapers as well as in the locality are the essential requirements of Section 4(1) even after its amendment. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is, therefore devoid of merit.
It was next urged that the acquisition proceedings were the result of colourable exercise of power because after invoking the urgency provisions, possession was not taken for a period of more than one year. It is true that notice under section 9(1) of the Act was issued in December, 1990 to all persons interested in the land which was sought to be acquired including the petitioner. Mere delay in taking possession or issuing notice under Section 9(1) does not perse lead to the conclusion that there was a colourable exercise of power while acquiring the land. If the acquisition is otherwise valid, which we find it is and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act has become final, the mere fact that the Government did not take possession of that land sought to be acquired for a period of more than one year does not make the acquisition proceedings illegal or invalid. It may be that after invoking the power under Section 17 of the Act, the proceedings for acquisition dragged on and the possession for some reason was not taken. Reference in this regard may be made to the observations made in Babu Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1979 S.C. 1713. We may hasten to add that in some cases long delay in taking possession may indicate that there was no urgency and that there was a colourable exercise of power though this is not so in the instant case. After going through the impugned notifications, written statement filed by the respondents and also the plan of the area sought to be acquired, we are satisfied that all other land owners whose lands are included in the present acquisition proceedings have already delivered possession and the petition alone is causing obstruction in the widening of the road which is absolutely essential in the public interest as there are factories situated on both sides of the road.
Lastly, it was contended that the petitioner did not receive any notice under Section 9(1) of the Act which is mandatory and, therefore, the acquisition proceedings qua its land deserve to be quashed. There is no merit in this submission either. There is a categoric averment in the written statement that a notice was issued to the petitioner and the same was received by one of the cosharers, namely, Shri Devi Dyal. Not only this, in reply to the notice under Section 9(1), the petitionerCompany filed its claim for compensation before the Land Acquisition Collector, a copy of which is Annexure R10 with the return.
Before concluding we may mention that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were issued and published in the year 1989 and the present petition was filed in August 1991 after a period of more than two years. No explanation whatsoever has been furnished for this delay except that the petitioner claims that it remained ignorant about the notifications. This claim of the petitioner cannot be accepted as already stated the substance of the notifications was also published in the locality besides publication in the newspapers. In our opinion, the writ petition merits dismissal on the ground of laches alone.
No other point was raised.
For the reasons recorded above there is no merit in the writ petition and the same stands dismissed with no order as to cost.
Revision allowed.
