High CourtsSingle Bench

Raj Krishna Lahiri & Anr vs State of West Bengal & Anr

Calcutta High Court · Decided on 9 January 2026 · Citation: (2026) 01 CAL CK 1347

HON’BLE JUDGES
Uday Kumar, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 482 · Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 120(B), 406, 420
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CRR 105 Of 2022
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Judgment

33 paragraphs · 1,722 words

Uday Kumar, J

1.

In the complex landscape of Indian jurisprudence, the distinction between a civil breach of contract and a criminal offense is frequently blurred by litigants seeking a "short-cut" to recovery. This Court is seized of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, where the thin line between commercial default and criminal culpability is significantly tested, is preferred by the Petitioners Sri Raj Krishna Lahiri (Advisor) and Sri Somnath Banerjee (Operations Executive) seeking quashing of the proceedings in Complaint Case No. CS 62450/2021 under Sections 420, 406, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), currently pending before the Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, Calcutta. The Petitioners, being an Advisor and an Operations Executive of a shipping entity, characterize the prosecution as a "vicious counter-blast" and an "arm-twisting tactic" designed to convert a purely mercantile dispute into a criminal ordeal.

2.

The genesis of this litigation is steeped in the intricacies of the shipping and multimodal transport industry. During the period of 2018-2019, a business arrangement was formed between the Complainant (Opposite Party No. 2) and M/s Nepal Shipping and Multimodal Transport Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the Principal Company"). The Complainant acted as a handling agent— the "human face" of the operations—under an agreement allegedly premised on promises of lucrative remuneration.

3.

Friction surfaced when a substantial claim of Rs.2.64 Crores remained unsettled. The Complainant alleges that the Petitioners, acting as the operational minds of the Principal Company, induced them to render services through fraudulent promises of high remuneration, only to ultimately default on payments and dishonestly withhold tangible property—specifically 40 shipping containers.

4.

The Petitioners paint a picture of "commercial retaliation," asserting that the present complaint is a strategically timed "counter-blast" to a prior criminal proceeding (Case No. CNS 545 of 2021) initiated by the Principal Company against the Complainant for the alleged misappropriation of 84 containers. Conversely, the Complainant maintains that the Petitioners’ inducement was fraudulent from its inception, intended to extract services without payment, culminating in the illegal retention of the 40 containers. Thus, the Court is called upon to navigate the thin line between a bona fide commercial default and calculated criminal deception.

5.

To arrive at a conclusive finding, this Court must address a fundamental question of law and fact is:

"Whether the specific overt acts attributed to the Petitioners in their individual capacities—specifically regarding the inducement to render services and the subsequent physical withholding of 40 containers— constitute disputed questions of fact that necessitate a trial, or whether the proceeding is an artfully draped civil recovery suit amounting to an abuse of the process of law?"

6.

Mr. Anand Keshari, learned counsel for the Petitioners strenuously argued that the dispute is "intrinsically commercial," revolving around a "settlement of accounts." Relying on Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168, he submitted that for an offense under Section 420 IPC, fraudulent intent must exist at the inception of the agreement. The Complainant’s admission of receiving "initial payments" effectively negates the theory of mens rea.

7.

Furthermore, relying on Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (2012) 5 SCC 661, Mr. Keshari contended that the non-joinder of the corporate entity as an accused renders the prosecution against its employees legally unsustainable.

8.

Mr. Keshari further contended that the non-joinder of the corporate entity (Nepal Shipping) as an accused renders the prosecution against its employees legally unsustainable, as a contractual debt does not constitute "entrustment" under Section 406 IPC, as held in Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh (2009) 14 SCC 696.

9.

Per contra, Mr. Dipankar Pramanick, learned counsel for the State argued that while the "shell" of the dispute appears commercial, its core is criminal. He contended that the withholding of 40 containers (tangible property) transcends a mere failure to pay money and constitutes an independent act of criminal breach of trust. Relying on Sushil Sethi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (2020) 3 SCC 240, he argued that employees can be held liable for their specific overt acts of deception regardless of the company's status.

10.

Mr. Pramanick contended that the "employee" status of the Petitioners is a smokescreen used to evade personal liability for overt criminal acts and that the intention to deceive was present when the final bills were ignored. Relying on Sushil Sethi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (2020) 3 SCC 240, they argue that employees can be held liable for their specific overt acts of deception regardless of the company's status.

11.

Finally, Mr. Pramanick asserted that the question of intent is a matter of trial and cannot be adjudicated in a summary proceeding under Section 482.

12.

At the outset, it is imperative to delineate the boundaries of this Court's intervention. The Petitioners urge a deep dive into their "counter-blast" theory to establish the "absurdity" of the complaint. However, the law governing Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. demands a more disciplined approach.

13.

Regarding the scope of Section 482, the Petitioners urge this Court to evaluate the merits of their "counter-blast" theory to establish the "absurdity" of the complaint. However, the scope of inherent powers under Section 482, the law is well-settled. In Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) SCC OnLine SC 315, the Hon’ble Apex Court mandated that the High Court cannot embark upon an inquiry into the truthfulness of allegations or conduct a "mini-trial" at this stage. If the allegations, taken at face value, disclose the ingredients of a cognizable offense, the criminal machinery must be allowed to take its course to reach its logical conclusion.

14.

If the complaint, taken at face value, discloses the essential ingredients of a cognizable offense, the criminal machinery must be allowed. Inherent power is a reservoir of justice to be used to prevent the abuse of process, not to stifle a legitimate prosecution where triable issues of fact exist.

15.

Moving to the specific allegation of cheating, the Petitioners lean heavily on Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2000) 4 SCC 168, arguing that "partial payments" made during the business tenure negate any fraudulent intent at the inception.

16.

However, this Court observes that while initial payments may suggest bona fides, dishonest intention is a psychological fact often inferred from subsequent conduct. As held in Sushil Sethi & Anr. v. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 240, if a party offers nominal payments as "bait" to gain trust only to facilitate a larger misappropriation later later— specifically the withholding of 40 containers—the question of initial intent becomes a triable issue as it becomes a complex question of fact. Intent is rarely established through direct evidence; it is a tapestry woven from the conduct of the parties. Consequently, partial payments do not grant automatic immunity if they were utilized to lure the Complainant into a position of vulnerability.

17.

Furthermore, the allegation regarding the 40 shipping containers elevates the matter beyond a simple money suit. Following the rationale in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 241, while every breach of contract is not criminal, they may overlap. A failure to pay money or to clear an invoice is a civil debt; however, the dishonest refusal to return tangible property (containers) after the termination of an agency prima facie satisfies the ingredients of the ingredients of Criminal Breach of Trust under Section 406 IPC. Whether the retention of these containers was a legitimate exercise of a "mercantile lien" or a calculated act of misappropriation is a matter of evidence that must be ventilated before the Trial Court.

18.

The Petitioners seek immunity by claiming they are "mere employees" and that the Principal Company was not arraigned. On the issue of the "Corporate Veil," this Court observes that the principle in Aneeta Hada (Supra) primarily applies to vicarious liability in statutory offenses. In IPC offenses involving specific overt acts of deception and physical withholding of property, individual liability is independent. If the Petitioners were the active "minds" or "hands" that orchestrated the fraud, they cannot seek shelter under the corporate veil at this preliminary stage.

19.

The principle that emerges from this discourse is that the inherent power to quash cannot be invoked to stifle a legitimate prosecution where the status and roles of the accused and the nature of the intent are themselves disputed facts. A "civil flavor" or the existence of a "counter-case" does not grant immunity if the ingredients of a cognizable offense are prima facie present. Malice in the filing of a complaint may suggest a motive, but it does not sanitize the underlying / potential criminality if the assets of the Complainant are indeed being dishonestly withheld. To quash the proceedings at this stage would be to shut the doors of justice on a party that has allegedly lost both significant capital and physical assets.

20.

Upon a holistic perusal of the record, this Court finds that the allegations regarding the withholding of 40 containers and the specific inducements are neither "manifestly absurd" nor "inherently improbable." The complex interplay between the parties and the specific roles of the Petitioners belong strictly to the domain of the Trial Court. To quash the proceedings at this stage would be to shut the doors of justice on a party that has allegedly lost both significant capital and physical assets.

21.

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

a. C.R.R. No. 105 of 2022 is hereby dismissed.

b. There is no order as to the cost.

c. The Learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, Calcutta, is directed to proceed with Complaint Case No. CS 62450/2021 with utmost dispatch.

d. The Petitioners are at liberty to raise all defenses, including their specific roles and the nature of the "mercantile lien," at the stage of framing of charges.

e. Nothing said herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the final merits of the trial.

f. All interim orders stand vacated.

g. The Trial Court Record (TCR), if any, shall be sent down to the Trial Court, at once.

h. Case diary, if any, be returned forthwith.

i. Registrar (Judicial) is directed to communicate this order to the Court below for immediate compliance.

22.

Urgent certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon compliance with requisite formalities.