High CourtsSingle Bench

Raj Kumar vs Chief Administrator, HUDA and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 15 July 2010 · Citation: (2010) 07 P&H CK 0166

HON’BLE JUDGES
Mehinder Singh Sullar, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Section 100 · Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 18, 30, 4, 6
RESULT
Dismissed
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 802 words

Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.—The matrix of the facts, relevant for disposal of the present appeal and emanating from the record, is that the civil suit filed by Kalawati (since deceased), being represented by her legal representatives (hereinafter to be referred as "the original plaintiff"), for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Haryana Urban Development Authority and its Chief Administrator respondent-defendants (hereinafter to be referred as "the HUDA-defendants") was dismissed by the trial Court, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 1.10.2009. The appeal, filed by the LRs of original plaintiff, was also dismissed by the Ist Appellate Court, vide impugned judgment and decree dated 10.12.2009.

2.

The appellant Raj Kumar, one of the legal representative of the original plaintiff Kalawati, still did not feel satisfied with the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below and filed the present appeal.

3.

Having heard the learned Counsel for the appellant, gone through the record of the case with his valuable assistance and considered the matter deeply, to me, there is no merit in the appeal.

4.

As is evident from the record that the original plaintiff filed the suit claiming herself to be a tenant over the disputed property for the last more than 50 years at a monthly rent of Rs. 1400/-. Subsequently, she claimed to be in possession and residing in it without paying any rent to any body and her possession had ripened into ownership by way of adverse possession. The defendants stoutly denied ownership and possession of the original plaintiff and claimed that the suit property alongwith adjacent land was acquired by the Government for development and utilization of the same for residential, commercial and industrial purposes, in pursuance of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short "the L.A. Act") and subsequently award of the acquired land was announced. Completely denying the other allegations contained in the plaint, the HUDA-defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit.

5.

During the course of hearing of this appeal on the previous date, the learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff contended that the disputed property has not been acquired and sought time to produce an affidavit of the appellant to that effect. But today, he refused to file the affidavit. Meaning thereby, the claim of the defendants that the suit property has already been acquired and award has already been passed, remained unassailable.

6.

There is another aspect of the matter, which can be viewed from a different angle. The original plaintiff claimed that earlier, she was in possession of the disputed property as a tenant at the rate of Rs. 1400/- per month for the last more than 50 years. At the same time, she pleaded that she was residing in it without paying any rent and her possession ripened into ownership by way of adverse possession. Thus, she has taken totally a contrary stand in this regard. When she has admitted her permissible possession as a tenant over the disputed property, in that eventuality, her plea of maturing her possession into ownership by way of adverse possession was not available to her. Once, it is proved that the disputed property has already been acquired and the award has already been passed, then assuming for the sake of arguments, (though not admitted), the original plaintiff was in possession of the property in dispute as a tenant, at the relevant time. Then, her LRs have alternative remedy to claim compensation being interested persons under Sections 18/30 of the L.A. Act.

7.

Be that as it may, the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below that the plaintiffs are not entitled for injunction, cannot possibly be set aside in the absence of any cogent material on record in this relevant connection. Such pure concurrent findings of fact based on the evidence, cannot legally be interfered with by this Court, while exercising the powers conferred u/s 100 CPC, unless and until, the same are illegal and perverse. No such patent illegality or legal infirmity has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, so as to take a contrary view, than that of the well reasoned decision already arrived at by the Courts below, in this regard.

8.

As no question of law, muchless substantial, is involved in the second appeal, in view of law laid down by Hon''ble Supreme Court in case Kashmir Singh Vs. Harnam Singh and Another, , so, no interference is warranted in the impugned judgments/decrees of the courts below as contemplated u/s 100 CPC in the obtaining circumstances of the instant case.

9.

No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant.

10.

In the light of the aforementioned reasons, as there is no merit, therefore, this appeal is hereby dismissed.