High Courts

Raj Kumar vs Financial Commissioner, Revenue

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 22 July 1997 · Citation: (1997) 2 CurLJ 457 : (1998) 2 LLR 122 : (1997) 3 RCR(Civil) 480

HON’BLE JUDGES
Sat Pal, J
CASE NUMBER
Civil Writ Petition No. 1771 of 1981
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Judgment

11 paragraphs · 1,247 words

Sat Pal, J.

1.

This writ petition is directed against the order dated 19th February, 1981 (Annexure P4) passed by the Financial Commissioner, Revenue and Secretary to Government, Punjab, Rehabilitation Department. By this order, the Financial Commissioner, Revenue, exercising the residuary powers of the Central Government under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) set aside the order dated 17th December, 1979 (Annexure P2) passed by the Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Jullundur and the order dated 7th May, 1980 (Annexure P3) passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Jullundur, and ordered the cancellation of the sale certificate in favour of Raj Kumar (petitioner herein) with regard to the evacuee property bearing No. 2653/9 Amritsar.

2.

Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner Raj Kumar purchased evacuee property No. 2653/9 Amritsar in open auction for Rs. 9600/ in the year 1969. The petitioner deposited the earnest money of Rs. 1920/ and the balance amount Rs. 7680/ was to be deposited by the petitioner upto 6th December, 1969.

3.

Since the petitioner failed to deposit the aforesaid balance amount of Rs. 7680/ within the stipulated time, the Managing Officer (Sales) by his order dated 22nd January, 1970 cancelled the sale with regard to the above mentioned evacuee property. The said order dated 22nd January, 1970 was challenged under Section 22 of the Act by the petitioner before the Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Jullundur, on the ground that the petitioner could not deposit the balance amount of Rs. 7680/ as the urban property which was part of the compensation pool was transferred to the State of Punjab in accordance with the arrangement between the Central Government and the State Government which was called the package deal and the final administrative arrangement came into operation with effect from 15th September, 1969. The appeal of the writ petitioner was accepted by the Settlement Commissioner, Punjab by his order, dated 17th December, 1979 and it was held that the nondeposit of the balance price was beyond the control of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the case. The aforesaid order dated 17th December, 1979 was confirmed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, Jullundur, vide order dated 7th May, 1980. The said order, dated 7th May, 1980 was, however, set aside by the Financial Commissioner, Revenue, and Secretary to Government, Punjab, by his order dated 19th February, 1981 (Annexure P4) as stated earlier.

4.

Mr. Patwalia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that under Rule 90(11) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the rules), the Settlement Commissioner could extend the period granted at the time of auction by such period not exceeding 15 days and the Chief Settlement Commissioner could extend this period without any limit. He, therefore, contended that the learned Financial Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside the orders passed by the Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

5.

Mr. Manohar Lal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent, however, submitted that under Rule 90(11) of the Rules, the period granted for deposit of the balance amount could be extended initially for a period not exceeding 15 days by the Settlement Commissioner and the period could be extended without any limit by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. He contended that since the period for deposit of balance amount was not initially extended by the Settlement Commissioner, it could not have been extended by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. He further submitted that the private respondent who was in occupation of the disputed property was entitled to get the said property transferred in his name under Rule 9 of the Punjab Packtage Deal Properties Rules, 1976.

6.

Mr. Dhillon, learned DAG appearing on behalf of the State, submitted that vide order, dated 27th February, 1970, the management of the urban property which was part of the compensation pool, was transferred by the Central Government to the State Government with effect from 1st March, 1970 vide letter No. 2(ii)/Spl. cell/69 dated 27th February, 1970, addressed by the Secretary to the Government of India, MInistry of Labour, Employment and Rehabilitation (Department of Rehabilitation), New Delhi, to the Secretary, Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Chandigarh. He, therefore, contended that upto 6th December, 1969, the date upto which the balance amount was to be deposited by the petitioner, the management of the urban property belonging to the compensation pool was still with the Central Government and had not been transferred to the State of Punjab and as such the delay in depositing this amount could not have been condoned by the Settlement Commissioner and the Chief Settlement Commissioner.

7.

I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the records. In para 7 of the impugned order (Annexure P4), it has been held that in the presence of the order of cancellation dated 22.1.1970, passed against respondent No. 5 (petitioner herein) it was not open to him to seek the transfer of the property except by way of challenging the same in appeal and getting it set aside. The relevant portion from this paragraph is reproduced herein below :

"I have carefully considered the arguments advanced for both the sides and also gone through the record. In the presence of the order of cancellation dated 22.1.1970, passed against respondent No. 5 it was not open to him to seek the transfer of the property except by way of challenging that order in appeal and getting it set aside. But apparently he did not choose to do so and cleverly resorted to the device of applying for depositing the balance amount in the year 1973 in what he learned "at his own risk". This was nothing short of a fraudulent attempt to nullify the order already passed against him, against which he had not availed of any remedy provided to him under the law. It was rightly held by the Managing Officer on 26.11.1979 that the property could not be transferred in favour of the respondent because of his predecessor having already cancelled it on 22.1.1970."

From the contents of Para 7, it is thus clear that the learned Financial Commissioner, Revenue and Secretary to Government Punjab has given a finding that the order of cancellation dated 22.1.1970 was not challenged by the writ petitioner by filing an appeal under the provisions of the Act but this finding is totally perverse and is contrary to the facts on record. The order dated 7th January, 1979 (Annexure P2) passed by the Settlement Commissioner, Punjab, itself shows that the writ petitioner had filed the appeal under Section 22 of the Act against the order dated 22nd January, 1970 of the Managing Officer (Sales). From this, it is clear that while passing the impugned Order (Annexure P4), the learned Financial Commissioner, Revenue and Secretary to Government Punjab, did not apply his mind and as such, this order cannot be sustained.

In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 19.2.1981 (Annexure P4) passed by the Financial Commissioner, Revenue and Secretary to Government, is set aside and the case is remanded back to the said authority to pass the orders afresh in accordance with law after hearing the parties. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.