Raj Kumar Shrimali vs The State of Rajasthan

Vijay Bishnoi, J.—The petitioner, in this writ petition, has challenged the validity of the amended proviso to Rule 10 of the Rajasthan Medical & Health Subordinate Service Rules, 1965 (for short ''the Rules of 1965'' hereinafter ) vide notification dated 06.02.2013 to the extent it limits the age relaxation to the period maximum of five years to the persons working under the Government, Chief Minister BPL, Jeevan Raksha Kosh, National Rural Health Mission, Medi Care Relief Society, AIDS Control Society, Institutes under Co-operative Department or Sahakari Upbhokta Bhandar. The petitioner has claimed that the benefit of age relaxation should be provided up to the number of years of service rendered by a candidate under Government, Chief Minister BPL, Jeevan Raksha Kosh, National Rural Health Mission, Medi Care Relief Society, AIDS Control Society, Institutes under Co-operative Department or Sahakari Upbhokta Bhandar. The petitioner has also challenged the validity of provision of Rule 10 of the Rules of 1965, which provides determination of maximum age of a candidate on the first day of January next falling the last date fixed for the receipt of the applications and claimed that the maximum age of a candidate should be determined while taking into consideration the last date of submission of application. The petitioner has further claimed that fixing of cutoff date prescribing maximum age for a candidate for direct recruitment to the service as first day of January next falling the last date fixed for the receipt of the applications is arbitrary and ultra vires and has no nexus with the object to be achieved and, therefore, the same is liable to be struck down and the respondents be directed to consider the last date of receipt of application as cut-off date for determination of maximum age of a candidate.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that putting rider of providing five years of age relaxation to those employees, who are working under the Government, Chief Minister BPL, Jeevan Raksha Kosh, National Rural Health Mission, Medi Care Relief Society, AIDS Control Society, Institutes under Co-operative Department or Sahakari Upbhokta Bhandar is highly discriminatory and it would cause prejudice to those employees, who had more than five years'' working experience in the above named institutions. It is contended that the said provisions of fixing the benefit of age relaxation maximum to five years limits the equal opportunity in public employment and, therefore, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that determination of maximum age on the first day of January next falling the last date fixed for the receipt of the applications is also discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further contended that the determination of maximum age should be on the last date of submission of application form.

Per contra, the learned counsels for the respondents have argued that there is no illegality in limiting the age relaxation maximum for five years as it is perfectly valid because it is within the domain of the Government to provide age relaxation up to a particular period to the candidates belonging to a particular class after considering various aspects such as nature of job, experience gained etc.

It is further submitted that benefit of age relaxation to the candidates working under Government, Chief Minister BPL, Jeevan Raksha Kosh, National Rural Health Mission, Medi Care Relief Society, AIDS Control Society, Institutes under Cooperative Department or Sahakari Upbhokta Bhandar for more number of years may cause prejudice to the candidates belonging to the other categories, therefore, the Government has rightly limited the same up to maximum five years.

So far regarding the challenge of the petitioner to the provisions of determination of maximum age on the first day of January next falling the last date fixed for the receipt of the applications is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondents have argued that it is solely within the domain of the rule making authority to fix a cut-off date for determination of maximum age and the same is not liable to be interfered until and unless it is capricious, whimsical or very much wide of the mark.

Having given anxious consideration to the submissions made and having examined the material placed on record, we are clearly of the view that this writ petition remains bereft of substance and does not merit admission.

Awarding the benefit of age relaxation for the purpose of recruitment is itself a matter of concession and cannot be considered to be a matter of right. As to how, and in what manner, the concession is, if at all, to be given, remains within the domain of the employer concerned. We are unable to find any basis for the claim made by the petitioner that such age relaxation ought to be provided for the experience of higher duration too. As to which, and how much of the age relaxation is to be provided, again, a matter within the domain and jurisdiction of the employer concerned and it cannot be claimed as a matter of right. The Government in its wisdom has limits the benefit of age relaxation to the candidates working under the Government, Chief Minister BPL, Jeevan Raksha Kosh, National Rural Health Mission, Medi Care Relief Society, AIDS Control Society, Institutes under Cooperative Department or Sahakari Upbhokta Bhandar up to maximum of five years after considering the nature of job and experience gained by such candidates and the petitioner has failed to show any illegality or unconstitutionality in the amended provision to Rule 10 of Rules of 1965 which limits the benefit of age relaxation to the candidates working under Government, Chief Minister BPL, Jeevan Raksha Kosh, National Rural Health Mission, Medi Care Relief Society, ADDS Control Society, Institutes under Cooperative Department or Sahakari Upbhokta Bhandar up to maximum of five years or any illegality in the decision taken by the Government.

So far challenge of the petitioner to the fixing of cut-off date for determination of maximum age of a candidate as the first day of January next falling the last date fixed for the receipt of the applications is concerned, the same controversy is no more res integra. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Surendra Singh Rao & 28 Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in 1995 (1) WLC 197, while examining the power of the rule making authority of fixing the cut-off date prescribing maximum age for a candidate for direct recruitment has held as under:

To our mind, the fixing of a cut-off date in a service Rule is to ensure that all candidates eligible on such a date may be considered and the best candidates amongst them may be selected and appointed. The fixing of a cut-off date eliminates the uncertainty in the minds of prospective candidates about their eligibility. Moreover, fixing of such a date would no longer be open to challenge in light of Union of India and Another Vs. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, particularly when fixing of such a date could not be dubbed as capricious, whimsical or very much wide of the mark. Maybe by fixing of such a cut-off date, some candidates would be eligible and some would be ineligible. But this would happen in every case, where a cut-off date is fixed, whether by way of last date on receipt of applications or as on the date of the application. As stated elsewhere, when the date is fixed by the Rule, itself, it is known well in advance to every body; on the other hand if the date of notification or advertisement or last date of receipt of applications is fixed as a cut-off date, it would always be fluctuating according to whims and caprices, of the person charged with the duty of fixing such a date. We, therefore, find that fixing a cut-off date in the Service Rules is not bad constitutionally. It cannot be said that the cut-off date fixed by the rule has been picked from a hat or is quite wide of the mark.

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Hence we could answer question No. 1 by saying that the rule making authority was competent to fix a cut-off date prescribing maximum age for direct recruitment and merely because such a cut-off date has been fixed, it could not be said to be arbitrary or capricious. On a parity of reasoning, we hold that likewise fixing of a cut-off date for reckoning minimum age for recruitment in a service rule could not be dubbed as arbitrary or capricious so as to enable the Court to strike it down.

We have already said that a cut-off date with reference to last date of receipt of application, when a service rule already fixes such a date, would be improper. Such a date could always be manipulated and would be uncertain and would fluctuate with the individual whim and caprice of the person charged with the fixing of the date. Such a date could not in anyways be known in advance.

Now, it may be stated that whether the statutory cut-off date precedes the last date fixed for inviting the application or succeeds such a date, would always be immaterial and would always provide a fixed point with reference to which the minimum and maximum age would be reckoned. All those who are eligible within such parameters would form one class and the classification cannot be said to be violative of the equality clauses of the Constitution of India. Hence, the third question is answered accordingly.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Dr. Ami Lal Bhat Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, while considering the similar challenge to the fixing of cut-off date in service as first day of January next falling the last date fixed for the receipt of the applications, has held as under:

In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependant on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fail on the wrong side of such a cut off date may well contend that the cut off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier: Or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is by this Court has said in the case of Parameshwaran Match Works (supra) and later cases that the cut off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the Calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain.

On an overall consideration of the relevant facts and the underlying objective of the amendment to Rule 10 of Rules of 1965, we subscribe to the proposition laid down by the Co-ordinate Benches as above. Hence, the challenge to the fixing of the cut-off date for determination of the maximum age of a candidate is bereft of any merit. In the result, this writ petition fails and is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.