High CourtsDivision Bench

Raj Kumar Singh vs The Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. and Others

Patna High Court · Decided on 30 August 2010 · Citation: (2012) 2 PLJR 360

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.K. Katriar, J · Birendra Pd. Verma, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 38, 39(b), 46
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CWJC No. 1636 of 1993
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Judgment

29 paragraphs · 3,335 words

S.K. Katriar, J.—This writ petition is directed against the order dated 29.1.1993 (Annexure-T), passed by the learned Administrator of the respondent Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank (hereinafter referred to as the ''Bank''), whereby the petitioner has been removed from the services of the Bank with effect from the date of issue of the order. It appears from the order dated 12.7.2010, passed in the present writ petition, that it was adjourned to enable the Bank to re-examine the whole matter. Learned counsel for the Bank today submits that it has on reconsideration, come to the conclusion that an appropriate order has been passed against the petitioner and, therefore, they would like to contest the writ petition.

2.

A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of this writ petition may be indicated. The Bank is a public sector undertaking of the State of Bihar and is engaged in banking business for the benefit of the rural population of this State, inter alia, with particular emphasis on agriculture. The petitioner had initially joined the services of the Bank on 16.11.1979, as Chief Accounts Officer, and was posted in the head office in Patna. On 7.8.1981, the post of Chief Accounts Officer was redesignated as Deputy Managing Director (Finance and Accounts). Subsequently, on 1.4.1982, this post was redesignated as Director (Finance). In view of deterioration in the working of the Bank, its Board of Directors was superseded and the State Government had deputed an Administrator to control the affairs of the Bank who had joined on 29.7.1988.

2.1. The petitioner was served with charge-sheet dated 11.9.1988 (Annexure-5), incorporating therein 13 charges against the petitioner which was served on him on 12.9.1988. He participated in the enquiry proceedings and the learned enquiry officer submitted his report which was accepted by the learned disciplinary authority who removed him from service. The petitioner challenged the same by preferring C.W.J.C. No. 2551 of 1989, which was allowed by this Court by order dated 29.1.1990, the order of dismissal from service was set aside, and the Bank was directed to hold fresh enquiry from the stage as it stood on 26.10.1988.

2.2. The Bank thereafter served an additional charge on the petitioner on 30.3.1991. He participated in the enquiry proceedings, and adduced evidence in support of his case. On a consideration of the materials on record, the learned enquiry officer submitted his report dated 27.5.1992 (Annexure-10), whereby he found some of the charges not to have been proved, some of the other charges have been held to have been partly proved, and the remaining charges have been held to have been proved. This was followed by second show-cause notice to the petitioner to which he had shown cause. On a consideration of the materials on record, the learned disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the learned enquiry officer. It has been held that charge nos. 2, 7, 8 and 9 have not been proved. It has been further held that charge nos. 3 to 5 have been partly proved, and the remaining charges, namely, charge nos. 1, 6 and 10 to 13 have been proved. He, therefore, passed the impugned order of removal from service.

3.

While assailing the validity of the impugned action, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the proven charges do not show corruption, embezzlement, falsification of accounts and the like, but only financial mis-management which has never been treated in the eye of law to be misconduct. He submits that it is at best a case of negligence and carelessness which is clearly distinct from misconduct. There is also no allegation of causing loss to the Bank. He next submits that charge nos. 10 to 13 are based on a factually incorrect premise. The charges are to the effect that the branches of the Bank mentioned therein were restricted branches, whereas the correct position Is that those were unrestricted branches. He next submits that the learned enquiry officer has not acted independently and impartially. He also submits that it is evident on a plain reading of the charge-sheet, the enquiry report, and the impugned order that there were other functionaries of the Board who were equally responsible for the irregularities who have not been proceeded against, and the petitioner has been made the scapegoat. He lastly submits that the impugned order is perverse, the findings are based on no evidence, and the petitioner should be exonerated.

4.

Learned counsel for the Bank has submitted that corruption is not the only ground for dismissal from service. The petitioner''s acts of omission and commission had brought the Bank into complete mess, which had led to heavy losses. He submits in the same vein that the mess created by him had led to supersession of the Board of Directors, and the administration of the Bank had been taken over by the State Government. He relies on the following reported judgments:

(i) Tara Chand Vyas Vs. Chairman and Disciplinary Authority and Others, .

(ii) Bank of India and Another Vs. Degala Suryanarayana, .

4.1. He also submits that, if a person has been erroneously let off, the same cannot be a ground to exonerate the person against whom charges have been proved. He next submits that the charges have been proved on the basis of documentary evidence. He lastly submits that appropriate punishment has been inflicted on the petitioner. On the own showing of the petitioner disclosed in his supplementary affidavit, the petitioner has been able to rehabilitate himself and is gainfully employed.

5.

We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. There is no need to recapitulate the state of affairs prior to the order of this Court in C.W.J.C. 2551 of 1989. The articles of charges incorporating 13 charges (plus the additional charge subsequently added), and the cause shown by the petitioner etc. had not been disapproved by this Court and are, therefore, relevant in the present proceedings. As stated hereinabove, the learned disciplinary authority in his detailed discussion in the impugned order of punishment, has agreed with the findings of the learned enquiry officer, and is summarized hereinbelow:--

6.

It is evident on a perusal of the enquiry report and the order of the learned disciplinary authority that, out of the 13 charges, four charges have not been proved, three charges have been partly proved, and eight charges have been fully proved. We will consider the combined effect of the three sets of findings at the appropriate stage.

7.

We are at present completely omitting from our consideration the findings with respect to the four charges which are in favour of the petitioner, and indeed the learned counsel for the respondents has made no grievance with respect to the same. It is in relation to the remaining charges that we have to consider the petitioner''s submission whether or not a case of misconduct is made out. It appears to us on a perusal of the discussion in the enquiry report and the order of the learned disciplinary authority that it was not a case of mere financial irregularities. Learned counsel for the respondents is right in his submission that the petitioner''s working had brought about a near-collapse of the banking functions of the Bank. It appears that he was in full command of the situation and was, therefore, engaging himself in all kinds of acts of omission and commission which led to the situation that the Bank incurred heavy losses and its administration had been taken over by the State Government, in other words, the losses incurred by the Bank and attributable to the petitioner has had to be made good by the tax-payers money. The petitioner had joined the services of the Bank on 16.11.1979 as Chief Accounts Officer, and had been given the position of Director (Finance) in the Bank on 1.4.1982. He was thus fully conversant with the affairs of the Bank. On the date of service of the charge-sheet, he had already put in nine years of service and was, as head of the Finance Department, in full command of the situation. He was releasing excess amounts to the restricted branches at his own Will, and was taking no care at all for recovery of loans. These are essential functions of banking business which the petitioner had put to complete disarray by his acts of omission and commission. It is evident that the Director (Finance) in a banking company Is perhaps the most important functionary, and his primary duty undoubtedly is financial management of the Bank. He seems to be treating the Bank as his personal fiefdom.

8.

Learned counsel for the respondents has rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tara Chand Vyas vs. Chairman & Disciplinary Authority and Others (supra), wherein the importance and the perspective of banking company has been emphasized. Paragraphs 1 to 3 of the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:--

"1. The petitioner was imputed with the charges that while working as a Branch Manager of the respondent Gramin Bank, Khareri Branch, between 17.3.1982 to 8.8.1983, he derelicted in the performance of the duties in making payment of loans without ensuring supply of implements to the loanees and deposit of adequate security from the dealers as a consequence of which the respondent Bank was put to loss. The enquiry officer found that all the fourteen charges were proved. On the basis thereof, the disciplinary authority found that the charges were established and imposed the proposed punishment. Impugned order came to be passed, on appeal, by the Board. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The Special Appeal No. 1009 was also dismissed on 4.10.1996 by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench. Thus, this special leave petition.

2.

Economic empowerment is a fundamental right of the weaker sections of the people, in particular the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, ensured under Article 46 as a part of social and economic justice envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution; the State is enjoined to promote their welfare effectuated under Article 38. Distribution of material resources to elongate that purpose envisaged in Article 39(b) is the means for the development of the weaker sections. The banking business and services were nationalized to achieve the above objects. The nationalized banks, therefore, are the prime sources and pillars for establishment of socio-economic justice for the weaker sections. The employees and officers working in the banks are not merely the trustees of the society, but also bear responsibility and owe duty to the society for effectuation of socio-economic empowerment. Their acts and conduct should be in discharge of that constitutional objective and if they derelict in the performance of their duty, it impinges upon the enforcement of the constitutional philosophy, objective and the goals under the rule of law. Corruption has taken deep roots among the sections of the society and the employees holding public office or responsibility equally became amenable to corrupt conduct in the discharge of their official duty for illegal gratification. The banking business and services are also vitally affected by catastrophic corruption. Disciplinary measures should, therefore, aim to eradicate the corrupt proclivity of conduct on the part of the employees/ officers in the public offices including those in banks. It would, therefore, be necessary to consider, from this perspective, the need for disciplinary action to eradicate corruption to properly channelise the use of the public funds, the live wire for effectuation of socioeconomic justice in order to achieve the constitutional goals set down in the Preamble and to see that the corrupt conduct of the officers does not degenerate the efficiency of service leading to denationalization of the banking system. What is more, the nationalization of the banking service was done in the public interest. Every employee/officer in the bank should strive to see that banking operations or services are rendered in the best interest of the system and the society so as to effectuate the object of nationalization. Any conduct that damages, destroys, defeats or tends to defeat the said purposes resultantly defeats or tends to defeat the constitutional objectives which can be meted out with disciplinary action in accordance with rules lest rectitude in public service is lost and service becomes a means and source of unjust enrichment at the cost of the society.

3.

Shri B.D. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that for proof of the charges none of the witnesses was examined nor any opportunity was given to cross-examine them and the petitioner has disputed his liability. As a consequence, the entire enquiry was vitiated by manifest error apparent on the face of the record. We find no force in the contention. The thrust of the imputation of charges was that he had not discharged his duty as a responsible officer to safeguard the interest of the Bank by securing adequate security before the grant of the loans to the dealers, and had not ensured supply of goods to the loanees. It is based upon the documentary evidence which has already been part of the record and copies thereof had been supplied to the petitioner. Under those circumstances, we do not think that there is any manifest error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference. It is then contended that no reasons have been given in support of the conclusions to substantiate the charges. The enquiry officer had elaborately discussed each charge and given reasons which were considered by the disciplinary authority and reached the conclusion that the charges were proved. So had the appellate authority. They are not like a civil court."

The contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is rejected.

9.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that charge nos. 10 to 13 are based on factually incorrect premise. The same incorrectly state that the branches mentioned therein were restricted branches, with limited powers of disbursement. It is submitted that those branches were really unrestricted branches. This appears to us to be mere Ipse Dixit of the learned counsel for the petitioner, and is a completely unsubstantiated submission. It is essentially an issue of facts, and it was open to the petitioner to lead appropriate evidence before the learned enquiry officer to prove that these branches were unrestricted branches. There is no such material on record. The learned enquiry officer as well as the learned disciplinary authority have found that, in spite of the position that those were restricted branches with limited powers of disbursement, the petitioner forwarded funds beyond permissible limits to those branches with higher powers of disbursement as if those were unrestricted branches. Huge amounts of loans disbursed by those branches were not recovered. The contention is rejected.

10.

Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the enquiry officer has not acted independently and impartially. Except the verbal statement at the Bar, no material has been brought to our notice to substantiate the submission. The contention is rejected.

11.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has next submitted that other functionaries in the Bank were equally responsible for the rot that had overtaken the Bank who have not been proceeded against, the petitioner alone has been singled out and made the scapegoat. The contention again is wholly unsubstantiated. No material has been brought on record to show that other persons were also responsible for the acts of omission and commission and ought to have been proceeded against. On the contrary, we get a clear impression and has been indicated hereinabove, that the petitioner was in full command of the Finance Department and everything was happening in his department at his behest, completely ignoring the established procedure and the Banking norms. It was open to the petitioner to establish his defence to that effect during the course of enquiry, which he completely failed to do. The entire responsibility, therefore, must go to him.

12.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has lastly submitted that the findings recorded by the learned enquiry officer are perverse. The contention is stated only to be rejected. The Bank has brought on record a huge mass of materials during the course of enquiry proceedings which were almost entirely documentary in nature and were really audit report and other reports of the Bank. In other words, the charges have been proved primarily on the basis of documentary evidence of. unimpeachable nature. In fact, on a perusal of the report of the learned enquiry officer and the order of the learned disciplinary authority, we are more than satisfied that the enquiry proceedings were conducted in a most meticulous manner, both are very well written normally not found in departmental proceedings. Paragraph-14 of the charge-sheet (Annexure-5) is illuminating and is reproduced hereinbelow:--

13.

Learned counsel for the respondents has rightly relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bank of India and another vs. Degala Surya Narayana (supra), paragraph 11 of which is reproduced hereinbelow for the facility of quick reference:--

"11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India (UOI) Vs. H.C. Goel, the Constitution Bench has held:--

"[T]he High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.

We are thus of the view that eight charges have been fully proved, and three charges have been partly proved, on the basis of most reliable and cogent evidence of unimpeachable nature.

14.

On a perusal of the materials on record, it appears to us that crystallized charges had been served on the petitioner, the prescribed procedure was followed, the principles of natural justice were observed, and the charges have been proved primarily on the basis of documentary evidence. The combined effect of the charges held to have been fully proved and those which have been partly proved creates a clear impression in our minds that the petitioner, being in full command of the situation, had brought about near-collapse of the Bank, causing heavy losses to the Bank, as a result of which the State Government had to take over the administration of the Bank. He was guilty of grave acts of omission and commission, and indeed we see from the discussion in the reports that he had engaged himself in financial irregularities of personal nature. In such a situation, we are convinced that removal from service is the only appropriate punishment fit to be inflicted on the petitioner.

15.

in the result, we do not find, any merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Birendra Prasad Verma, J.

I agree.