R.A.J. Rathinam vs The Revenue Divisional Officer Vriddhachalam and Others

Suryamurthy, J.—This is a Criminal Revision Petition Against the Judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, South Arcot Division at Cuddalore dismissing the Criminal Appeal No. 313 of 1976 and confirming the order passed by the Collector confiscating the Lorry PYS 6852 styled as ''Ramalingam''.

On 4th July, 1975 at 7-15 p. m. the lorry of the petitioner bearing Registration No. PYS 6852 was proceeding along G. S. T. Road from north to south. When it was intercepted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Yriddhachalam and checked 90 bags of boiled rice were found in the lorry. The driver of the Lorry produced a copy of no objection certificate issued by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, Madras to one M/s. Albert & Co., General Merchants and Commission Agents, 75, South Raja Street, Tuticorin, Tirunelveli District to import 100 tons of rice from the State of Andhra Pradesh into Tuticorin of Tamil Nadu. However, during an enquiry alleged to have been conducted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Yriddhachalam, the driver of the vehicle Thiru Loordhusami, son of Chinnaiya Nadar, No. II, Munuswami Koil street, Kalugumalai, Koilpatty Taluk is said to have given a statement that he went to Madras with a load on 2nd July, 1975 and after unloading the goods, he went to Ramesh Roadways at Madras to get the load for his lorry, that he was informed by a broker that there was load from Tindivanam, that thereupon he took the empty lorry to Tindivanam, and loaded 90 bags of boiled rice at a rice mill and that he did not know the address of the party. It was further alleged that the entries in the G.V.R. of the vehicle were made in the broker''s shed at Madras. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Yriddhachalam was further of the opinion that there was a high percentage of moisture in the boiled rice and that therefore, the rice was not imported from Andhra Pradesh as per the No Objection Certificate. He therefore, seized the lorry and the bags of rice and gave a report to the Collector for further action under S. 6- A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (to be referred to hereinafter as the Act.)

A notice under S. 6-B of the Act, dated 14th July, 1975 was issued by some officer of the Revenue Department on behalf of the Collector to the petitioner as well as the owner of the bags of rice directing them to appear before the Collector on 21st July, 1975 at the Collector''s Office, Cuddalore for being heard by the Collector in person. He was further informed that if he failed to respond to the terms of the notice, it would be presumed that he had no representation to make in the matter and orders will be passed confiscating the lorry to the Government and further action also may be taken according to law. A further notice under S. 6 (b) of the Act, dated 23rd February, 1976 was issued to the revision petitioner directing him to appear before the Collector''s ON 1st March, 1976. Subsequently, the party appeared for several hearings. He was represented by counsel also. It was contended by the learned counsel that the bags of rice were in fact purchased from Andhra Pradesh and imported there from and that the presumption of the Revenue Divisional Officer to the contrary was incorrect and unsupported by legal evidence. The Collector relied on the statement alleged to have been given by the driver of the lorry before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Yriddhachalam treating it as testimony, to come to the conclusion that there was "no doubt about the fact that the consignment of rice was procured at Tindivanam." The Collector also relied on what he calls "independent enquiries made by the police", which according to the Collector, showed that the owner "alleged to be Transporting rice from Aadhra Pradesh is not only a dealer in paddy and rice and that such transport by him is not likely in the circumstances of the case."

He has farther observed that:

It might be that the rice bags were purchased from Andhra Pradesh as per letters and transported in Andhra Pradesh and they might have been disposed of in Madras and rice purchased from South Arcot District were sought to be transported under the guise of N.O.C. So the seal of the checkpost at Ponnadi and Nemilicherry on the N.O.C, is not helpful to the delinquent to prove the same. It is also significant to note that there should be a seal of the Civil Supplies Checkpost of the Andhra Border, if the contention of the delinquent that it is Andhra rice has to be accepted.

The Collector has further made an astounding statement in the course of his order and the statement is to the effect that-

It is also conceded by the learned counsel during the arguments that the persons from whom the rice was purchased in Andhra Pradesh are only fictitious and the bills are not genuine and so from this also it is clear that the rice seized was not rice purchased in Andhra.

Thirumathi T.N. Anaadanayaki, who appeared for the revision petitioner and who is now appearing on behalf of the counsel for the revision petitioner in this Court today, vehemently denies having made any such concession, I have absolutely no reason to disbelieve her statement that she did not make any such concession, because, I am of the opinion that she could not have made any such concession virtually giving up her case. It is impossible for me to believe that the counsel for the revision petitioner or any other member of the Bar could have made such a suicidal concession. The entire case of the revision petitioner depended on his proving that the bags of rice were imported from Andhra Pradesh and were not purchased or procured from anyone in South Arcot District. Instead of conceding that the bags of rice were In fact procured from South Arcot District, the learned counsel for the petitioner might as well have said that the lorry might be confiscated. The most charitable construction which I can place on the observation of the Collector with regard to the concession of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that he misunderstood or misheard the arguments of the learned counsel on this aspect, I do not say that he deliberately made a misstatement of fact as to what was argued before him. On the basis of this concession the Collector came to the conclusion that:

it is clear that the rice seized was not rice purchased in Andhra. So it is clear that the rice bags seized at Tholudur Checkpost in this case cannot be contended to be the rice purchased in Andhra.

I venture to think that the Collector would not have come to this conclusion if he had not misunderstood the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

The Collector has further observed that-

The rice seized in this case Is moist rice full of moisture showing that it was freshly hulled rice. If really as contended by the defence counsel It was Andhra rice, the rice could not be so full of moisture. Also according to the version of the driver of the lorry the rice was purchased only in a rice mill in Tindivanam. South Arcot District. So the contention of the defence counsel is not acceptable. Also it was submitted by the Inspector of Police; Pood Cell, that the enquiry made by him also disclosed that the rice bags were loaded only in a rice mill in Tindivanam in South Arcot limits only on the information furnished by the driver and cleaner, the persons who actually sold the rice or from whom the rice bags were got were traced.

At these facts were relied on by the Collector for coming to the conclusion-

that the rice was procured only in Tindivanam in South Arcot District and that it was attempted to be transported to Tirunelveli District outside South Arcot District under the guise of the No Objection Certificate and without having obtained a valid transport permit.

After noticing that the proceedings under S. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, are quasi-criminal in nature, the Collector was of the opinion that.

No detailed procedure as in the case of trials or enquiries need be followed. So the recording of statement from witnesses is not necessary in such proceedings. The satisfaction of the Collector is the only criterion;

Therefore, the Collector was satisfied that

this is a clear case of attempt to transport rice from South Arcot District to Tuticeria in Tirunehreli District without a valid transport permit and also contravention of the other, control orders mentioned above. It has not been proved satisfactorily that the lorry was used for such illicit transport of Essential Commodities without the knowledge or connivance of the owner, his agent and the driver and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions, against such use. In fact, the driver had full knowledge of such Illicit use of the lorry la this case, as is clear from his statement;

Therefore, in exercise of powers conferred on him under S. 6-A of the Act, the Collector directed the confiscation of the lorry P.Y.S, 6852,

I am of opinion that there is neither rectitude in Induction nor consistency in deduction in the order of the Collector. The Collector was not entitled to rely on the statements alleged to have been made to the Inspector of Police, Food Cell, or the Revenue Divisional Officer, Vriddhachalem. The Collector was entitled to rely on the statements made before him which he had reduced into writing and not on the statements made before some other officer or authority. Only if he had recorded the statements, the Collector could have observed the demeanor of the person giving the statement, and would have been in a position to assess whether or not the person giving the statement was a truthful person and whether or not the statement was a true statement. In such a case, he also would have been able to satisfy himself that the. person giving the statement was not induced to do so by any person in authority and that the statement was given voluntarily. That is why powers have been vested in the Collector to hold such a summary enquiry and pass an order depriving a citizen of this country of a very valuable property. The order is penal in nature. Hence the Collector as the highest Official in the District is expected to act with impartiality and bring to bear on the matter a judicial frame of mind. By relying on the statements made by the police officers of the Food Cell, the Collector has abdicated his duties. He has allowed the opinion of the Police Officers to sway his own opinion in this matter. In fact his own opinion has been substituted by the opinion of the Food Cell Inspector. The Collector''s order is vitiated by his reliance on an alleged admission made by the counsel for the petitioner when such an admission hat not been and could not have been made by her.

The proceedings of the Collector suffer from a mere serious infirmity in that the notice under S. 6-B of the Act has not been issued by the Collector himself; but by some other officer of the Revenue Department on his behalf. By reason of S. 6-B of the Act

(1) No order confiscating any essential commodity, package; covering, receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance shall be made under S. 6.A unless the owner of such essential commodity, package covering, receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or the person from whom it is seized-(a) is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate the essential commodity, package, covering, receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance; (b) is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation ; and (c) is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.

The authority who should issue the notice is the authority who could pass the order of confiscation under S. 6-A of the Act. S. 6-A of the Act lays down that-

Where any essential commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under S. 3 in relation thereto, it may be produced without any unreasonable delay before the Collector of the District or the Presidency town in which such essential commodity is seized and whether or not a prosecution is instituted for the contravention of such order, the Collector, if satisfied that there has been a contravention of the order, may order confiscation of-

(a) the essential commodity so seized ;

(b) any package, covering or receptacle in which such essential commodity is found; and

(c) any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance used in carrying such essential commodity.

This power vested in the Collector could not be delegated by him to any officer or authority subordinate to him prior to the amendment of S"2 by Act 92 of 1976 which clause (ia) has been inserted defining the word "Collector" for the purpose of the Act as including an Additional Collector or such other officer not below the rank of a Sub Divisional Officer, as may be authorised by the Collector to perform the functions and exercise the powers of the Collector in this Act. Prior to the amendment, the Collector was not allowed to delegate his powers or authorize any of his officers to perform the functions and exercise the powers of the Collector under the Act.

In the instant case there is no evidence as to who is the officer who signed the notice. The said officer of the Revenue Department who initiated the proceedings under S. 6-B of the Act has not purported to act in pursuance of any authority vested in him by reason of the delegation of his powers by the Collector. There is no evidence to the effect that such authority was given by the Collector to the officer who initiated proceedings by the aforesaid, notice under S. 6-B of the Act. If amendment by virtue of Act 92 of 1976 came Into force with effect from 2nd September, 1976. The Impugned notice under S. 6-B of the Act was issued and proceedings were thereby initiated for the Collector on 21st July, 1975. On the date of the impugned notice, the Collector had no power to authorise any other officer to initiate proceedings under S. 6-B of the Act and issue the notice. Therefore, there was no valid notice under S. 6-B of the Act.

Before issuing the notice under S. 6-B of the Act, the authority issuing such notice should come to the conclusion that there is a case for initiating proceedings under the Act, After the authority comes to such a conclusion and issues the notice, the owner of the vehicle has to prove to the satisfaction of the said authority that the vehicle was used in carrying the essential commodity without his knowledge or connivance and without the knowledge or connivance of the person in charge of the vehicle. Hence, the authority who issues the notice under S. 6-B of the Act should be the same as the authority who passes the order of confiscation under S. 6-(A) of the Act. In the instant case there was not only no valid notice by a duly empowered authority under S. 6-B of the Act, but the authority who passed the order of confiscation is different from the authority who issued the notice. The opinion of the officer, who issued the notice, dt. 21st July, 1975 that the petitioner has contravened clause 4 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Movement Control) Order, 1970 and clauses 3 and 11 of the Tamil Nadu Paddy and Rice (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1974 and the condition imposed in paragraph 2 (vii) of the N.O.C. issued by the Government, all lifting offences punishable under S. 7 (1) (a) (ii); of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, cannot be adopted by the Collector. The Collector should bring to bear upon the facts of the case his own independent judgment and should come to his own conclusion. However, in the instant case, the Collector has mechanically adopted the opinion of the officer who issued the notice, dated 21st July, 1975 and based his order of confiscation thereon. This is violation of the provisions of Ss.6-B and 6-A of the Act, and therefore, the order of confiscation passed by the Collector has to be set aside.

The facts of the case also do not. warrant the confiscation of the lorry by the Collector. The owner of the lorry is a resident of Cuddalore in South Arcot District. It is not suggested that he was anywhere near the lorry when it was intercepted by the Revenue Divisional Officer. He had nothing to do with the transport of rice. No mens rea can be attributed to the. owner of the lorry. I would go further and say that no mens rea can be attributed even to the driver of the lorry because a copy of the No Objection Certificate was handed over to him and he might have thought that he was entitled to carry rice to Tuticorin from wherever it was loaded. Drivers of lorries are not literate enough to interpret and understand the implication of documents like a "No Objection" Certificate. All that the driver in this case could understand was that rice could be taken from Andhra Pradesh to Tuticorin. It is not improbable that the driver thought that rice could be taken from any place between Andhra Pradesh to Tuticorin. If he perused the "No Objection Certificate", which is in English he could not have understood anything better. He might not have perused the no objection certificate. The no-objection certificate being in English, he could not have read the no objection certificate and would not have understood the import of the certificate. After the Government of Tamil Nadu issued instructions to the officials in this State to use Tamil as the official language in this State, the no objection certificate should have been issued in Tamil. Therefore, on being handed over the, no-objection certificate, which he could not peruse, the driver appears to have thought that he could safely transport the bags of rice: The lorry was intercepted at 7.45 p.m. If there was an attempt to transport rice in: a clandestine manner that attempt would'' not have been made at 7.15 p.m. Mens note a necessary ingredient to a criminal offence or for enforcing a penal provision like the one incorporated in S. 6-A, which empowers the Collector to order confiscation of the lorry.

In Nathulal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was), has, in laying down the law, observed as follows :

The law on the subject is fairly well settled. It has come under judicial scrutiny of this Court on many occasions. It does not call for a detailed discussion. It is enough to restate the principles. Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. Doubtless a statute may exclude the element of mens rea but it is a sound rule of construction adopted in England and also accepted in India to construe a statutory provision creating an offence in conformity with the common law rather than against It unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication excluded mens rea. The mere fact that the object of the statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a grave social evil Is by itself not decisive of the question whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the ingredients of an offence. Mens tea by necessary implication may be excluded from a statute only where it is absolutely clear that the implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated. The nature of mens rea that would be implied in a statute creating an offence depends on the object of the Act and the provisions thereof See Srinivasa Mall v. King Emperor ILR 26 Pet. 460 : AIR 1947 SC. 135 ; Nathulal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Ravula Hariprasada Rao Vs. The State, Most of the relevant English decisions on the subject were referred to in the judgment of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George Crl. Appeal No. 218 of 1968, dated 24th August'' 964; State of Maharashtra Vs. Hans George, . How to disprove mense rea has been succinctly stated in Halsbury''s Law of England, 3rd Edition. Col. 510. at P.283, thus:

When the existence of a particular intent or state of mind is a necessary ingredient of the offence, and prima facie proof of the existence of the intent or state of mind has been given by the prosecution-, the defendant may excuse himself by disproving the existence in him of any guilty intent or state of mind, for example, by showing that he was justified in doing the act with which he is charged, or that he did it accidentally or in ignorance, or that he had an honest belief in the existence of facts which, if they had really existed, would have made the act an innocent one. The existence of reasonable grounds for a belief is evidence of the honesty of that belief". Having regard to the object of the Act, namely, to control in general public interest, among others, trade in certain commodities, it cannot be said that the object of the Act would he defeated if mens rea is read as an ingredient of the offence. The provisions of the Act do not lead to any such exclusions. Indeed, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to impose heavy penalties like imprisonment for a period upto 3 years and to impose heavy fines on an innocent person who carries on business in an honest belief that he is doing the business in terms of law.

Having regard to the scope of the Act, it would be legitimate to hold that a person commits an offence under S 7 of the Act if he Intentionally contravenes any order made under S. 3 of the Act. So construed, the object of the Act will be best served and innocent persons will also be protected from harassment.

After this decision, the words "Knowingly, intentionally or otherwise" were inserted in S. 7 of the Act by the Amendment Act, 36 of 1967. However, by another Amendment Act, viz., Act 30 of 1974, these words have been deleted.

In Mewalal Kapildeo Prasad Vs. The State of Bihar and Others, the effect of the subsequent Amendment Act, viz. Act 30 of 1974, has been considered by a Bench of the Patna High Court, and it has been observed as follows:

To appreciate the reasons given by the two authorities, some legislative history of S. 7 of the Act has to be mentioned) Prior to the amendment of S. 7 of the Act by the Essential Commodities (Second Amendment) Act, 1967) (Act 36 of 1967), sub-S (1) of S. 7 was as follows:

If any person contravenes any order made under S. 3 then he shall be punishable for different periods mentioned in that section.

Questions arose before different courts as to whether the contravention referred to in this Sub-s. (l) of S. 7 of the Act covers cases of only intention with the requisite mens rea or will also cover cases where contraventions are made unintentionally. However, in the case of Nathulal Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court had to deal with the case of a dealer who bad been convicted of an offence under S. 7 of the Act as he had been found to be carrying on business in food grains without a proper license although it had been found to be carrying on business in Foodgrains without a proper license although it had been found that he bad made an application for license under the Madhya Pradesh Food Grains Dealers Licensing Order, 1958, and had also deposited the requisite license fee; no intimation to him was sent that his application was rejected. Under the impression that license had been granted to him. he purchased Food grains from time to time and submitted returns to the Licensing Authority, his godowns were also checked. In that situation, it was held by the Supreme Court that although no license had been granted to the accused concerned, mens Rea, which is an essential ingredient, had not been proved and on that finding the accused was acquitted holding that he was not guilty. By the aforesaid amendment the Act was amended. The words ''If any person contravenes any order made under S,3 were substituted by the words and figure, ''If any person contravenes, whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, any order made under S. 3''. Perhaps the object of introducing this amendment was to cover even the cases where the mens rea, was not established, i.e. if the contravention was unintentional. The respondent-District Magistrate and the respondent-Commissioner have held that even if the assertion made on behalf of the petitioner is accepted, still it will deem to have contravened the provisions of the Licensing order because of this amendment In Sub-s. (1)of S. 7 saying that even if the contravention was unintentional the petitioner will be liable to punishment because of the change in law, I must, however, point out that on the relevant date'' lie., on 30th October, 1974, when the raid was made the amendment which had been Introduced in Sub-s. (I) of S. 7 by Act 36 of 1967. itself was deleted by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974, which was published in the Central Gazette dt. 22nd June, 1974. The Ordinance was replaced by the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Act, 1974 (Act 30 of 1974) which received the assent of the President en 29th August, 1974. The relevant portion of Sub-s. (1) was restored as it was prior to its amendment by Act 26 of 1947 The words ''whether knowingly; intentionally or otherwise'' were deleted. In my opinion, the effect of this amendment will be that since that date the position was restored as it was when the said sub-section was considered by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Nathulla''s Case In view of this amendment, before an accused person can be held to be guilty for having contravened any provision of the licensing order- it must be established that he had the necessary mens rea If, on the other hand, it is found that the contravention was unknowingly and unintentionally, he cannot beheld guilty for contravention of any such provision.

In considering the question whether the principles which are applicable to a criminal trial are also applicable to a proceeding for confiscation under S. 6-A of the Act, the Bench of the Patna High Court again observed:

By a reference to S. 6-A it will appear that the condition precedent to exercise of the jurisdiction by the Collector Is that there has been a contravention of the order made under S. 3 of the Act and the articles in question have been seized in accordance with the provisions of any such order, Sub-S. (1) of S. 7. which is the penal provision, also says that a person shall be punishable if he has contravened any order made under S. 3. Therefore, for confiscation as well as for conviction it must be established that the person concerned has contravened any order made under S. 3. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that a word occurring in the same Act is usually to be given the same meaning unless a different intention is expressed by the provisions of the Act. As such. the word ''contravention'' has to be interpreted in S. 6-A and in S-7 to mean that the provision of any order framed under S. 3 of the Act has been contravened intentionally. On the other hand, if it Is found that the contravention was unintentional and the person concerned had taken all reasonable care and was carrying on the business in a bona fide manner, then In my view, even for S. 6-A of the Act, it has to be interpreted that in the eye of law there has been no contravention so as to visit the dealer with the consequences of confiscating the articles which had been seized. A similar view has been expressed by a learned single Judge of Allahabad High Court in the ease of Kishori Lal Bihani Vs. The Addl. Collector and District Magistrate, Kanpur and Others, . The learned Judge has rightly pointed out, if I can say so with respect, that S. 6-A and S. 7 are In pari materia-, and as such, the same meaning is to be given to the words used in the two sections. The result is that it has to be held that the order of confiscation passed by the respondent-District Magistrate, which has been affirmed by the respondent-Commissioner, is illegal, because the necessary ingredient of S. 6-A has not been established.

Again, this question has been considered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Madhav Keshav Mirashi Vs. The State of Maharashtra, and it has been observed thus :

It is therefore, clear whether a person is to be prosecuted for the imposition of any of the penalties under S. 7 or any proceedings are to be taken for the confiscation of the goods under S. 6-A before the Collector, requirement to be proved is that there has been a contravention of any order issued under the Act, In other words, the same set of circumstances must be established before an order of conviction is passed for confiscation of property is directed by the Collector under S. 6-A. This being so, it would appear to us that mens rea would be a necessary element to be proved before confiscation could be ordered.

Again, the Bench has observed that there was no reason why the element of mens rea should not form part of the breach of the Rules alleged under S. 6-A, if the provisions of S. 6-A are in pari materia with the provisions of S. 7.

I am in respectful agreement with the Division Bench of the Patna High Court and the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and extending the same to any contravention of the provisions of S. 3 of the Act and to the proceedings resulting in the confiscation of the vehicle or other commodity on the ground that there was a contravention of an order passed under S. 3 of Act.

The learned Public Prosecutor contends that in view of the provisions of S. 6.B (2) of the Act, it is incumbent on the petitioner to prove that the commodity was carried without his knowledge and without the knowledge of his agent or the person incharge of the vehicle. The circumstances of the case clearly show that the owner had absolutely no control over the vehicle after it left hit custody. What is the reasonable precaution that the owner of the lorry could take to prevent the misuse of the lorry by the driver? He could only appoint as driver a man who has no antecedents. There is nothing to show that the driver in the instant case had any bad antecedents. The driver in the instant case could be deemed to have taken the necessary precaution before transporting the rice by insisting on and getting a no objection certificate. It may be that the owner of the bags of rice had played a deception on the driver. That is no reason why the owner of the vehicle should be penalized.

In the no-objection certificate that was handed over to the driver of the vehicle, the seal of Ponpadi, which is the checkpost situate between Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu has been affixed. The seal of the Andhra Pradesh Checkpost had not been affixed, because there was no prohibition against the export of rice from Andhra Pradesh. The Collector has strained himself and has relied on the statements alleged to have been recorded by the police officers and the Revenue Divisional Officer for getting over the insuperable fact that in the no-objection certificate the seal of the checkpost between Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu is found and that thereby a prima facie ease that rice was brought from Andhra Pradesh to Tamil Nadu has been made out, In any event having regard to the fact that the owner is proved by the circumstances to have no mens tea and no knowledge that the vehicle was likely to be misused, if at all it was misused, the order of confiscation was not necessary. The Collector has been given the discretion to order as well as to refrain from ordering confiscation of the lorry in cases of this nature. That discretion should be exercised judicially. That has not been done in the instant case. Therefore, the Criminal Revision Petition is allowed and the order of the Collector confiscating the lorry PYS 6852 and the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge confirming the same are set aside. The bonds executed by the petitioner and his sureties will stand cancelled.