Raj Singh : vs J.S.Verma, Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Rohtak and others

The learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the payment of the amounts due against the petitioner took some time as he had filed an appeal before the Secretary (Cooperation), Haryana, and there after a writ petition in the High Court.

The petitioner made the payment in full and final settlement of his accounts when his writ petition was dismissed. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be treated a defaulter. It has further been argued that assuming that the petitioner is a defaulter in terms of rule 25(a) of the Rules, it could not be made the basis for declaring him having ceased to be a Director of the Bank because he was elected as such as a representative of the Society. Reliance has been placed on Ajaib Singh v. Shri Kishan Saroop, The Deputy Registrar Cooperative Societies, Karnal and others, 1980 P.L.J. 275 : 1985 R.R.R. 135, and Kuldeep Singh v. The State of Haryana and others, 1981 P.L.J. 398.

The petitioner is holding the elective office of the Director of the Bank as a representative of the Society. The Deputy Registrar has declared that he has ceased to be a Director of the Bank because he was a defaulter inasmuch as he made payments late, which were due from him to the Gohana Cooperative Marketing Society and Mehmudpur Cooperatives Credit and Service Society. In Ajaib Singh''s case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court passed the following order :

"In this petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, order of the Returning Officer dated April 2, 1980, rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner, is sought to be quashed. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we find that the impugned order is without jurisdiction. Admittedly, Zone No. 9 is a Zone where the Societies have to elect their representatives. The nomination paper of an individual who represents a particular society cannot be rejected on the ground that the said individual was not an active member. The relevant point would be whether the society, who is the voter, is an active member or not. The individual only represents the society. In this view of the matter, the order of the Returning Officer is without jurisdiction and the same is hereby quashed.

In view of the fact that the nomination paper of the petitioner has been rejected illegally, therefore, the election from Zone No. 9 cannot take place according to the schedule. The Returning Officer is directed to fix the election programme in accordance with law afresh."

In the Division Bench authority, Ajaib Singh was seeking election as a representative of a primary society. It was held that his nomination paper for such election could not be rejected on the basis of his personal disqualification in terms in rule 25(f) of the Rules. The learned counsel for the respondents has contended that the effect of the decision of the Division Bench is that disqualification contained in rule 25(f) stands limited to the election of the Managing Committee of the Primary Societies and not to the election of the representative of such societies to the Managing Committee (directorship) of the apex body. I feel inclined to agree with this contention.

A near situation arose in Kuldeep Singh v. The State of Haryana and others, 1981 P.L.J. 398. Kuldeep Singh petitioner in that case filed nomination papers as representative of a primary society to contest the election to the Managing Committee of the apex body. His nomination papers were rejected also on the ground that he had been an inactive member and violated byelaw 31 and had thereby incurred the personal disqualification under rule 25(f) and bye law 31. The objection was upheld. The matter ultimately came up before the High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 892 of 1980. The writ was allowed and reliance was placed on Ajaib Singh''s case (supra). The learned single Judge observed that the ratio of the Division Bench decision in Ajaib Singh''s case (supra) leaves no scope for any doubt so far as personal disqualification of a member is concerned. He may suffer personal disqualification on ones count or he may suffer personal disqualification on ten counts, his personal disqualification cannot be taken into consideration as it is only the disqualification of the Society that he represents which can be taken into account. The learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the scope of Ajaib Singh''case (supra) is not as wide as interpreted by the learned Single Judge in Kuldeep Singh''s case (supra). The argument proceeds that the disqualification in terms of rule 25(f) of the Rules may be restricted to the election of the Managing Committee of the Primary Societies but rule 25(a), which is applicable in the instant case, suffers no such limitation. I am not impressed by this contention.

Rule 25(a) and (f) read as under:

"25. Disqualification for membership of committee . No person shall be eligible for election as a member of the committee if

(a) he is in default to any Cooperative Society in respect of any sum due from him to the society or owes to any Cooperative Society an amount exceeding is maximum credit limit,

(b) to (e) ... ... ... ... ... ...

(f) he has, during a period of 12 months preceding the date of filing of nomination papers, remained inactive as member or has been carrying on, through agencies other than the Cooperative Society of which he is a member, the same business as is being carried on by the Cooperative Society."

The point for consideration is whether rule 25(a) has limited application to the election of the Managing Committee of the Primary Societies like rule 25(f) or not. The text and the tenor of the two subrules is similar. The lapse resulting in disqualification under both is directly linked with the Primary Societies. It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer that like rule 25(f) the scopes of rule 25(a) is also limited to the election of the Managing Committee of Primary Societies. The instant case, therefore, is squarely covered by the ratio of Ajaib Singh''s case (supra). The impugned order of the Deputy Registrar (Annexure P.9), declaring that the petitioner has ceased to be a Director of the Bank for having made delayed payments due form him to the Gohana Cooperatives Marketing Society and Mehmudpur Cooperative Credit and Service Society, is, therefore, ultra vires and is liable to be quashed, even assuming that the lapse on his part constitutes a default in terms of rule 25(a) of the Rules.

In the result, the writ is accepted and the impugned order of the Deputy Registrar dated 18121981 (Annexure P.9) is quashed.

No order as to costs.