Raja Babu vs Income Tax Officer

N. Dhinakar, J.—The above petitions are filed by the second accused in C.Cs. Nos. 183 to 186 of 1985 on the file of the Additional Chief

Metro politan Magistrate (Economic Offences) Egmore, Chennai, and the proceedings in the above calendar cases came to be initiated by way of

a private complaint by the respondent against the petitioner and another for offences punishable under Sections 276C(1), 277 and 278 of the

Income Tax Act, 1961, and Sections 120B, 177, 193, 196 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, read with Sections 511 of the Indian Penal

Code on the allegation that the petitioner and the other accused in the case cheated the Income Tax Department by opening accounts in ficititious

names, with the banks, they did not disclose their income, etc.

After the filing of the complaint, the petitioner and the other accused appeared before the court and received copies of the documents.

Thereafter, they filed a petition to quash the proceedings before the court and the same was dismissed by an order dated January 24, 1989. The

records in the case were received by the learned Magistrate from the High Court in June, 1990. Thereafter, the petitioner and the other accused

absconded and did not appear before the court for several hearings, forcing the trial court to issue a non-bailable warrant, which was executed in

the year 1993. Later, the petitioner and the other accused surrendered before the court and took time. Thereafter, they moved the Income Tax

Department with a request to compound the offences. The Department granted permission to compound the offences except for the assessment

year 1985-86 and asked them to pay Rs. 64 lakhs. That amount was not deposited, but on the contrary, the petitioner and the other accused

moved a writ petition before this court questioning the order of the Income Tax Department refusing to grant them permission to compound the

offence for the assessment year 1985-86. That was dismissed with a direction to the trial court to proceed with the trial and dispose of the matter

expeditiously. Then, the trial commenced and witnesses were examined on a day-to-day basis.

In the meantime, the petitioners have filed another writ petition in W. P. No. 1814 of 2001 and obtained stay of the trial in all the calendar

cases. Now, the present petition is filed to quash the proceedings on the ground that there is inordinate delay in proceeding with the trial and a

speedy trail is a right guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution of India. I have considered the submission and the facts extracted above

clearly show that the petitioner cannot invoke article 21 of the Constitution of India since the right for speedy trail is denied not by the prosecution

and the petitioner and the other accused in the case are alone responsible for the delay. In fact, they have been putting spokes at every stage and

trying to protract the proceedings. It does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to say that there is no expeditious disposal of the cases and the

proceedings have to be quashed.

In fact, the Supreme Court in Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India AIR [1996] 1996 SC 1619 ; [1996] SCC (Crl) 589 ;

[1998] 94 Comp Cas 770 while dealing with the similar situation, held that directions (1) and (2) made in the judgment will not apply to cases

involving offences under the taxing enactments. Later, the Supreme Court, while clarifying the earlier judgment referred to supra, reported in

Common Cause. Common Cause, A Registered Society Throough its Director Vs. Union of India and others, held that the time limit mentioned

regarding the pendency of criminal cases in paragraphs 2(a) to 2(f) in the judgment reported in Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of

India. AIR 1996 SC 1C19 ; [1996] SCC (Crl) 589 ; [1998] 94 Comp Cas 776, shall not apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal

proceedings is wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused concerned or on account of arty other action of the

accused which results in prolonging the trial.

At the risk of repetition, it may be stated that the petitioner and the petitioner alone is responsible for the delay of the trial and, therefore, it is not

for him to now says that the proceedings are protracted and hence, they have to be quashed. I find no merit in the contention. The petitions, are

therefore dismissed. Consequently Crl. M. P. No. 6599, 6601, 6603 and 6605 of 2000 are dismissed.