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Judgment
Ratnam, J.—This civil revision petition has been preferred by the landlord against the order of the appellate authority (Sub Court),
Nagapattinam, in R.C.A. No. 7 of 1985 reversing the order passed by the Rent Controller (District Munsif). Nannilam, in R.C.O.P. No. 5 of
1984 and dismissing that application filed by the petitioner praying for an order of eviction against the respondent herein under S.10(2)(1) and
10(3)(a)(1)of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Act. According to the case of the
petitioner, the premises in the occupation of the respondent was purchased from one Sabeeya Bivi on 7.11.1983 and the petitioner is under the
care and protection of the grandfather and grandmother, who are living in a rented premises in 20-H, Kochipalayam Street, Ohai, Kodvasal, and
that the premises is bona fide required for the occupation of the petitioner. In addition, the petitioner also stated that the respondent had committed
willful default in the payment of rents from 7.11.1983 till February, 1984 to the tune of Rs.168/-. On the aforesaid grounds, the petitioner prayed
for an order of eviction against the respondent. The application was resisted by the respondent herein on the ground that the petitioner was living in
her own house in Chained that the requirement is not bona fide. The further case of the respondent was that the rents upto December, 1983 had
been paid to the vendor of the petitioner and that the rent for January, 1984 was sent, after the receipt of notice, by Money Order and that was
returned and the default in the payment of rent cannot, therefore, be considered to be wilful. On a consideration of the oral as well as the
documentary evidence, the Rent Controller found that the petitioner had established her bona fide requirement of the premises in the occupation of
the respondent under S.10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and that the respondent had also committed wilful default in the payment of rents. On the conclusions
so arrived at, an order of eviction was passed against the respondent. Aggrieved by this, the respondent preferred an appeal in R.C.A. No. 7 of
1985 before the appellate authority. That authority, however, found that the requirement of the petitioner was not bona fide and that the
respondent bad not committed wilful default. In view of the conclusions so arrived at, the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller was set
aside and the application for eviction was also dismissed.
Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the appellate authority fell into an error in regard to the conclusions arrived at by it
on the Question of wilful default and also on the bona fide requirement under S.10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, there is no
evidence with reference to the payment of rents between 7.11.1983 and December 1983 with the vendor of the petitioner and likewise there is no
material to support the case of payment of any rent by the respondent to the petitioner from January, 1984 onwards. In regard to requirement
under S. 10(3)(a)(i) , learned, counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the parents of the petitioner were both employed and the petitioner had to
be taken care of by her grand parents and as they, were living in a rented house, there was no wrong in the petitioner having come forward with
the application for requirement of the premises owned by her in order to enable her to live therein with her grandparents. On the other band,
learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there, was no question of any wilful default whatever on the facts and circumstances of this case.
According to her, the rents upto December, 1983 had been paid by the respondent and this had also been not objected to by the petitioner and
there was, therefore, no question of non-payment of rents between 7.11.1983 and 31.12.1983. With reference to the rent for January, 1984
learned counsel pointed out that the rent had been remitted by Money Order, but that it was refused by the petitioner. This had been accepted by
P.W.1 and therefore there could be no question of wilful default in the matter of payment of rents, according to the learned counsel. In addition, it
was also submitted that the petitioner was aged only about 3 years old at the time of the eviction petition and she could not have entertained any
desire to live in her own premises and the requirement, therefore, cannot be regarded as Dona fide. From the evidence available, it is seen that the
respondent had paid the rents with the vendor of the petitioner till the end of December, 1983. This had also not been in any manner objected to
by the petitioner, as per the evidence or P.W.1. With reference to the rent payable for the month of January, 1984 it could have been paid till the
end of February, 1984 and a Money Order was sent by the respondent to the petitioner for that amount and this has also been accepted by
P.W.1. There is also no dispute that the Money Order so sent was refused. Thereafter, it was open to the respondent to have followed the
procedure laid down in the Act with reference to the deposit of rent, but instead he had opened an account and had been depositing the rents in
that account so as to make it available to the petitioner whenever required. Though it may be that the respondent was not in order in not having
resorted to the provisions of the Act with reference to the payment of rents, in as much as the evidence of R.W.1, that he had deposited the
amounts in a bank account has not been repudiated or rejected as unacceptable, it follows that there could not be any wilful default as such in the
payment of rents in this case, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
In regard, however, to the requirement under S.10(3)(a)(i) of the Act, the appellate authority had clearly fallen into an error, when it is not in
dispute that the parents of the petitioner are both employed, it is natural that during their absence the petitioner has to be looked after by some
others. From Exs. P-3 to P-8, it is seen that, the grandparents of the petitioner are living in a rented premises bearing door No.20-H, Ohai Middle
Street. That premise had not been established to belong to the petitioner. From Ex. P-7, in particular, it is clearly seen that the premises in the
occupation of the parents of the petitioner is a rented one. The appellate authority took the view that the petitioner was aged only 3 years at the
time of the eviction petition and he was not in a position to appreciate what was good or bad for her and therefore the requirement cannot be
characterised to be bona fide. However, it is not possible to either accept or even appreciate that reason given by the appellate authority/When it is
not in dispute that the parents of the petitioner are both employed, it becomes necessary that somebody has to take care of the petitioner during
their absence and in this case, it is only the grandparents, who have been looking after the petitioner and they are, admittedly, living in a rented
premises-There is nothing wrong in the petitioner desiring to have her own premises; where she can be looked after by the grandparents during the
time when the parents are away at work, instead of a rented premises as of now. A faint attempt was made to argue that the object of the eviction
petition was only to evict the respondent with a view to let out the premises for higher rent to others. There is absolutely no evidence whatever in
support of this plea. The evidence also does not suggest that the application for eviction was either motivated or had been filed with an oblique
purpose. Under those circumstances, the requirement of the petitioner under S. 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act should be held to have been made out, on
the facts and circumstances of this case.
The civil revision petition is, therefore, allowed and the order of the appellate authority is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is restored.
There will be no order as to costs. Learned counsel for the respondent prays that he may be given three months time to vacate and hand over the
vacant possession of the premises in his occupation to the petitioner and learned counsel for the petitioner has no objection to grant that time.
Accordingly, the respondent is granted three months time from today to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in his occupation
to the petitioner, but this will be subject to the respondent''s filing an affidavit of unconditional undertaking to that effect before this Court within ten
days from today, failing which the order of eviction can be put into execution forthwith.