AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Mohammad Rafiq, J.—This is defendant''s second appeal filed against judgment and decree dated 11.09.2012 passed by learned Additional District Judge No. 9, Jaipur Metropolitan City, Jaipur, where the judgment and decree dated 02.11.1994 passed by learned Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur, decreeing the suit of the plaintiff for declaration, has been affirmed. Plaintiff was working on the post of Conductor with the appellant Corporation. He was convicted by the learned Judicial Magistrate (Traffic) 1st Class, Jodhpur, vide order dated 26.03.1981 for offence u/s 8 of the Without Ticket Travelling Prevention Act, 1975. The appellant No. 2 herein, on the basis of judgment of learned Judicial Magistrate (Traffic), Jodhpur, removed the plaintiff-respondent from service by order dated 27.03.1981. However, the order of conviction was challenged by the plaintiff-respondent before the Sessions Judge, Jodhpur, who by order dated 14.11.1981 set aside the order of conviction and remanded the matter. Ultimately, vide order dated 02.08.1989, the plaintiff-respondent was acquitted.
Learned counsel for appellant has argued that learned trial court ought not to have entertained the suit at Jaipur because plaintiff-respondent was working at Jalore depot of the defendant Corporation, which falls within the jurisdiction of Jalore District. The cause of action, if any, has arisen to the plaintiff in District Jalore or Jodhpur, therefore, the learned trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. No part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned trial court. The order of removal dated 27.03.1981 and it was only in 1993 that the plaintiff filed a civil suit for declaration on the basis of the judgment dated 02.08.1989. The suit was therefore time barred. The findings recorded by learned trial court on issue No. 4 was therefore perverse and erroneous. Learned courts below have committed serious illegality in deciding the issue No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The issue No. 1 was also decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Charge against the plaintiff-respondent was for carrying passengers without ticket, which amounts to serious misconduct and thereby justified removal from service. However, subsequent acquittal of the plaintiff in criminal case cannot be a ground to challenge the removal order from service vide order dated 27.03.1981.
It is argued that the civil court has no jurisdiction in such matters. It is only the industrial tribunal which has jurisdiction to entertain such matters. The plaintiff-respondent was a workman and the defendant-appellant No. 2 should have take steps to approached the appropriate government to refer the dispute to the industrial tribunal. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in R.S.R.T.C. and Others Vs. Deen Dayal Sharma,
In so far as the question of territorial jurisdiction is concerned, this court in Mangi Lal and Another v. Rajendra Singh and Another - S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1774/2010 decided on 02.11.2011, dealt with similar objection as to the territorial jurisdiction, wherein also RSRTC was impleaded as party through its Chairman. While relying on judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay Vs. M/s. Prasad Trading Company, this court therein held as under:--
On hearing learned counsel for the appellant and perusing the impugned award, I find that the judgment of Supreme Court in M/s. Patel Roadways Ltd., supra arose out of suit for damages filed against the Corporation. The Supreme Court in that case was called upon to interpret Section 20 of CPC especially Explanation thereto which provided that a Corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office at such place. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment revisited its earlier decisions on interpretation of aforesaid provisions and held that so long as the subordinate office of the Corporation is situated at a place other than headquarters, the suit would be maintainable at such place if the cause of action has arisen there. In the present case, possibly those provisions may not be applicable because a specific provision in a separate enactment, which is the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, governs the field i.e. Section 166(2) according to which the claim petition could be filed before the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides. RSRTC in the present case was impleaded as non-claimant through its Chairman Parivahan Marg, Chomu House, Jaipur and that was sufficient compliance of the provisions of the Act.
The plaintiff-respondent in the present case has impleaded the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur, through its General Manager-cum-Managing Director, whose office is located at Jaipur and therefore, the learned trial court at Jaipur also would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Contention of learned counsel for appellants that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain this matter as the appropriate forum was the industrial tribunal as the plaintiff-respondent was the workman, is noted to be rejected. A three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in its decision titled Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa, held as follows:--
If the infringement of the Standing orders or other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are alleged, the civil court''s jurisdiction may be held to be barred but if the suit is based on the violation of principles of common law or constitutional provisions or on other grounds, the civil court''s jurisdiction may not be held to be barred. If no right is claimed under a special statute in terms whereof the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred, the civil court will have jurisdiction.
The plaintiff-respondent has not filed the suit alleging infringement of the Standing Orders or other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Hence in view of the said decision, the civil court would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit if the court is of the opinion triable issue is based on fundamental rights of the plaintiff regarding infraction of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It is not disputed before this court that removal of the plaintiff-respondent was made only on the ground of his conviction by the court. Once the conviction has been set-aside and the plaintiff has been acquitted, the defendant Corporation has obligation to reinstate such an employee, which is what has been done in this case.
Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the defendant-appellants in the light of the findings concurrently recorded by both the courts below, I find that the issues involved in the present case relate to questions of fact and there is concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below, which cannot be interfered with by this court in second appeal u/s 100 of the C.P.C. All these questions do not raise any question of law muchless any substantial question of law in the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed in limine. Consequent upon dismissal of appeal, the stay application, filed therewith, does not does not survive and same is also dismissed.