Rajendra and Others vs State of Rajasthan

Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia, J.—Rajendra S/o. Panchu Lal, and Mukesh Kumar S/o. Jagdish were tried by the Court of Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Baran for having committed offence of gang rape with a fifteen years old daughter of the complainant Motilal (P.W.1) (name of the daughter of the complainant, is being withheld in order to protect her identity; hereinafter, she is referred to as ''the victim'').

By its impugned judgment dated 11th January, 2010 the Court of Special Judge held both the appellants guilty of the offence under Section 376(2)(G) IPC, and further held appellant Rajendra guilty of offence under Section 3(2)(V) of Scheduled Castes and scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter to be referred as ''the Act of 1989''). The trial Court further convicted appellant Mukesh Meena for offences under Sections 457 and 366 I.P.C.

Having convicted the appellants for above said offences, by a separate order of even date, the trial Court sentenced appellant Rajendra for offence under Section 3(2)(V) of the Act of 1989 to life imprisonment, and directed him to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-.

Both the appellants Rajendra, and Mukesh were sentenced under Section 376(2)(G) IPC to undergo 10 years'' rigorous imprisonment, and accused Rajendra was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, and accused Mukesh Kumar was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default thereof, both the appellants were ordered to further undergo six months'' rigorous imprisonment.

Appellant Mukesh Meena for offence under Section 457 IPC, was sentenced to undergo three years'' rigorous imprisonment, and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo six months'' rigorous imprisonment. Similarly, for offence under Section 366 IPC, the appellant Mukesh Meena was also sentenced to undergo three years'' rigorous imprisonment, and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default thereof, to further undergo six months'' rigorous imprisonment.

Sentences awarded on various counts, upon both the appellants, were ordered to run concurrently.

Two separate appeals have been instituted by the appellants to assail the conviction pronounced, and sentence awarded by the trial Court. Rajendra has preferred D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 337/2010, whereas Mukesh Kumar has filed D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 84/2010. We shall decide both the appeals together.

Criminal proceedings were set into motion on a written complaint (Ex. P/1) submitted by Motilal (P.W.1) to the Station House Officer, Pukhraj (P.W.11), Police Station, Kawai Distt. Baran.

The written complaint (Ex. P/1) when translated into English reads as under:--

"To

Station House Officer, Police Station, Kawai.

Subject: Registration of the case.

Sir,

On 15th August, 2006, I alongwith my family members were sleeping in my house at Village Parliya. At around 11.30 P.M., I woke up to urinate, and found that my daughter aged 15 years (name withheld to protect her identity) was not in her room. I enquired from my wife, and son, Narendra and daughter, Sanju they were not aware of the whereabouts of my daughter. Early in the morning, my daughter returned to the house, she was weeping, and disclosed that at about 10.30 P.M. Mukesh Meena S/o. Jagdish, and Mukesh @ Guddya S/o. Chhotulal Chamar, resident of Parliya, came inside the room. They gagged her mouth with a chunni, and forcibly lifted her out of the house to the fields, where Rajendra S/o. Panchu Lal Kachi, resident of Parliya, was already present. All the three committed rape with her turn by turn. Thereafter, they left her at the spot by giving a threat that in case she discloses the facts regarding rape to anybody, she will be liquidated. After hearing the above said incident from my daughter, health of my wife deteriorated. Therefore, I could not come to make the report. Today, alongwith my daughter, I have lodged the report. Action be taken.

Report submitted by Motilal S/o. Ramgopal Meena resident of Village Parliya, Police Station, Kawai."

On the basis of the written complaint (Ex. P/1), a formal FIR (Ex. P/2) was registered.

The above said FIR was investigated, and report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted. Both the appellants were tried by the Court of Special Judge, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Baran.

We may notice here that the occurrence in the present case pertains to 15th August, 2006, and the written complaint (Ex. P/1) was submitted on 18th August, 2006 at about 9.30 P.M. Thus, there is a delay of more than three days in lodging of the report. We have highlighted this fact as much ado has been made by the counsel for the appellants regarding the delay in lodging of the report.

It will be pertinent to mention here that the third accused, Mukesh @ Guddya S/o. Chhotulal Chamar was found delinquent juvenile in conflict with law; he was sent for trial to Juvenile Justice Board, Kota.

Appellants were charged for various offences. They pleaded not guilty, and claimed trial.

Prosecution commenced its evidence.

Motilal has appeared as P.W.1. He reiterated as to what was stated by him in the written report (Ex. P/1). This witness further stated that when he had gone to lodge the report, he was accompanied by Bhojraj, Gulabchand and Radheyshyam. Radheyshyam is his wife''s brother. This witness was extensively cross-examined to elicit details regarding age of the prosecutrix. This witness stated that his eldest daughter, Sanju Bai was aged 18 years thereafter, son Narendra was born, and thereafter the victim was born. The witness further stated in the cross-examination that Bhojraj is also related to him. This witness further stated that Babulal also belongs to his community. The witness in cross-examination further stated that on 16th August, 2006 he had not gone to Atru. Banwari is his uncle''s son. He had not accompanied Banwari on 16th August, 2006. This witness further denied that on 16th August, 2006 he had gone to the Chhabra Police Station.

Bharosi Bai, mother of the victim appeared as P.W.2. She corroborated as to what was stated by her husband Motilal (P.W.1). In examination-in-chief she further stated that she is not aware of the age of the victim at the time of the incident.

The victim herself appeared as P.W.3. She stated in the Court that on 15th August, 2006, she was sleeping alone in her room. At about 11.30 P.M., Mukesh Meena, and Mukesh Chamar @ Guddiya came in her room, they gagged her mouth with a Chunni, and took her to the fields. They carried her to the fields. Rajendra Kachi was also present in the fields. All the three accused committed rape with her. She further stated that in the morning, she returned to her house. Since her mother became unwell, the report was made on 18th August, 2006. She further stated that she had studied up to the 8th Class, and her date of birth is 10th August, 1991. She produced photocopy of the mark-sheet as (Ex. P/8A). The witness had brought the original mark sheet in the Court as (Ex. P/8). In the cross-examination this witness admitted that the SHO, Police Station, Kawai had a talk with SHO, Police Station, Chhabra. The SHO, Police Station, Kawai informed her that the accused have already been arrested by police of Police Station, Chhabra. She further admitted that the SHO had disclosed to her that they had apprehended all the three accused in a street in Chhabra.

Narendra Meena (P.W.4), brother of the prosecutrix, also stated in the Court that on night of the occurrence, he had searched for his sister.

Smt. Sanju Meena (P.W.6) corroborated the version of her parents that on the night of the occurrence, her younger sister was missing.

Dr. Hariom Goyal (P.W.10) stated that he had examined the appellant Rajendra, and co-accused Mukesh Kumar, and there was nothing to suggest that both the accused were not fit to perform the sexual intercourse.

On 19th August, 2006 at about 10.25 A.M. while posted as Medical Officer, CHC, Atru Dr. J.P. Yadav (P.W.14) had examined the prosecutrix. This witness proved the medico-legal report (Ex. P/5), wherein he noted that the hymen of the victim was ruptured. Her vagina had swelling and redness.

The Investigating Officer, Pukhraj Saran appeared as P.W.11; he proved various facet of the investigation. The Investigating Officer in cross-examination admitted that " it is correct that accused Mukesh was arrested on 28th August, 2006 while he was locked in jail in another case." He further admitted that " the accused Mukesh was arrested under Section 109 IPC." However, the Investigating Officer stated that "it is not in his knowledge that accused Rajendra, and Mukesh Meena were arrested under Section 109 IPC." However, later this witness deposed that "they were already released before their arrest."

After the prosecution closed its evidence, the statements of the accused were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C.. All the incriminating circumstances were put to them; they denied the same, and pleaded innocence. They claimed false implication.

The accused Mukesh, in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., stated that he was arrested by the police on the intervening night of 15th and 16th August, 2006 at bus stand Chhabra. His arrest was shown on 17th August, 2006. The victim is married, and she had given birth to a child.

Accused in defence examined four witnesses. Rohit Chaudhary (D.W.1) proved (Ex. D/5), a Certificate dated 26th July, 2008 issued by Municipal Council, Baran to prove that the victim had given a birth to a son on 03rd May, 2008 after about two years of the occurrence.

Ramratan (D.W.2) stated that on 15th August, 2006, he was posted as a Home Guard. In the night at about 9.30 P.M., a jeep came from Village Kawai. From the said jeep, three boys, and one girl alighted. This witness stated that three accused, and the victim were apprehended and sent in a jeep to Police Station, Chhabra.

Banwarilal (D.W.3) stated that victim was her niece. On 16th August, 2006, complainant Motilal, and his wife came to his house at Atru in the morning at about 6.00 A.M. They disclosed that their daughter is missing. Then they went to Police Station, Kawai. The SHO, Police Station, Kawai stated that the daughter of the complainant has been apprehended by Police of Police Station, Chhabra. First they should take back their daughter; thereafter, the complaint would be recorded. He further stated that the victim had refused to accompany her parents. Later, the police had prepared a supurdginama, and had sent the victim with the parents.

Babulal (D.W.4) stated that on 16th August, 2006 at about 9.00 A.M., he received a telephonic call from Kawai Police Station. He was informed that the victim has been apprehended by Chhabra Police.

Shri N.A. Naqvi, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Nawab Ali Rathore, representing the appellant Rajendra, and Shri S.S. Hasan, counsel for Mukesh Kumar have made two-fold submissions:--

"Firstly, Shri N.A. Naqvi, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Nawab Ali Rathore has submitted that provisions of Section 3(2)(V) of the Act of 1989 are not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Secondly, it is urged that the entire case of the prosecution is false. No offence under Section 376(2)(G) IPC is made out as the prosecutrix herself had accompanied the three accused; she was a consenting party. It is further contended that the three boys alongwith the victim were apprehended by the police of Police Station, Chhabra. But later to redeem the honour of the family, the complainant had lodged a false report."

Counsel for the parties have submitted that delay of three days in lodging the report is sufficient to throw the entire case of the prosecution. Delay in lodging report was used for consultations and deliberations to falsely implicate the appellants. It has been further contended before us that it has been conclusively proved by examining the defence witnesses that the victim had left the house on her own accord with the accused, and the story that she was lifted by the accused is false, as apprehension of the victim alongwith the accused by the police of Police Station, Chhabra has been duly proved.

It has also been urged before us that the victim had suffered no external injury, and thus, we should hold that no offence is made as victim herself had consented to sexual intercourse.

To fortify his first submission that no offence under Section 3(2)(V) of the Act of 1989 is made out Shri N.A. Naqvi has relied upon the following judgments:--

"(i). Dinesh @ Buddha Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2006 SC 1267 : (2006) CriLJ 1679 : (2006) 3 JT 66 : (2006) 2 SCALE 734 : (2006) 3 SCC 771 : (2006) 1 UJ 340 : (2006) AIRSCW 1123 : (2006) 2 Supreme 363 .

(ii). Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 1876 : (2000) 2 JT 367 : (2000) 2 SCALE 70 : (2000) 3 SCC 557 : (2000) 1 SCR 1155 : (2000) 1 UJ 554 : (2000) AIRSCW 719 : (2000) 1 Supreme 584

(iii). Pappu Khan v. The State of Rajasthan (Western Law Cases (Raj.) 2000(2)

(iv). Rataniya v. State of Rajasthan (2006 (1) Cr.L.R.(Raj.) 886)

(vi). Tikam Singh Vs. State and Others, (2006) 4 RLW 2636 : (2006) 4 WLC 46

(vii). Devkaran and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 10 SCC 255

(viii). Prem Chand and Another Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1989 SC 937 : (1989) CriLJ 1246 : (1989) 1 Crimes 398 : (1989) 1 JT 158 : (1989) 1 SCALE 199 : (1989) 1 SCC 286 Supp .

(ix). State of U.P. Vs. Pheru Singh and Others, AIR 1989 SC 1205 : (1989) 3 JT 87 : (1989) 1 SCALE 689 : (1989) 1 SCC 288 Supp

(x). Bavo @ Manubhai Ambalal Thakore Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2012 SC 979 : (2012) CriLJ 1573 : (2012) 1 Crimes 230 : (2012) 2 JCC 974 : (2012) 2 JT 29 : (2012) 1 RCR(Criminal) 820 : (2012) 2 SCALE 321 : (2012) 2 SCC 684 : (2012) AIRSCW 1276 : (2012) 1 Supreme 740

(xi). Sunil Dutt Sharma Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2013) 10 AD 541 : (2013) 3 DMC 497 : (2013) 4 JCC 2718 : (2013) 13 JT 320 : (2013) 4 RCR(Criminal) 694 : (2013) 12 SCALE 473 : (2014) 4 SCC 375 : (2014) 2 SCJ 578 ."

We had already examined the argument raised by Shri Naqvi, in a case Ramkaran v. State of Rajasthan (D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 945/2004 decided on 25th November, 2014). We have held that accused may commit a offence of rape in order to satisfy his lust, but to attract provision of Section 3(2)(V) of the Act of 1989, the prosecution must lead evidence that the accused intended to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or the offence of rape was committed only on the ground that the prosecutrix belonged to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. In case of Ramkaran (supra) we have held as under:--

"15. The argument raised by Mr. Mehla is not new to this Court. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Manohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2000 (2) RCC 894, in similar circumstances, held as under:--

"10.The doctor opined that from the external injuries, the possibility of rape being committed, cannot be denied. The doctor also seized the ''ghaghra'' of the prosecutrix on which spots of semen were detected. He further stated that the accused Manohar Singh was also examined on 19.12.1996. He was found fit for indulging in sexual intercourse. The prosecution has produced the FSL report dated 2.9.1997, which shows that human semen was found on the ''ghaghra''. Thus, on careful consideration, we find the testimony of P.W.8 Mst. Ramila as trustworthy. The learned Judge has rightly held the accused appellant guilty of rape.

11.The next question, which arises for consideration is whether the conviction of the appellant under Sec. 3(2)(v) of the Act is justified and legal?

12.We have, recently in a case of Pappu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, "D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 722/98 decided on 2.9.1999", examined the scope and ambit of Sec. 3(2)(v) of the Act. It is held therein that for the offence under Sec. 3(2)(v) of the Act, beside the ingredients of respective offence of Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is further required to establish that the accused being a person of non S.C./S.T. has committed the crime on a person of S.C./S.T. for the reason that such person belonged to such community or tribe."

The view taken by the Division Bench of this Court was subsequently followed by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sohan Singh and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 1 WLC 596 : (2003) 2 WLN 551 . Their Lordships, while examining the law laid in Manohar Singh''s case (supra) further to fortify had relied upon the observations of the Hon''ble Apex Court in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 1876 : (2000) 2 JT 367 : (2000) 2 SCALE 70 : (2000) 3 SCC 557 : (2000) 1 SCR 1155 : (2000) 1 UJ 554 : (2000) AIRSCW 719 : (2000) 1 Supreme 584 . Since their Lordships relying upon the observations of the Hon''ble Apex Court in a very lucid manner had answered the above question. With all reverence to Their Lordships, the relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under:

"10. We have considered the rival submissions, and have also gone through the record carefully. We may first take up the sustainability of the conviction u/s. 3(2) (v) of the Act. We may gainfully recapitulate the language of Sec. 3(2)(v) which reads as under:--

"(v) committed any offence under the Indian Penal Code punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a person or property on the ground that such person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine."

Our attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the appellants, to a recent judgment of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2000 SC 1876 : (2000) 2 JT 367 : (2000) 2 SCALE 70 : (2000) 3 SCC 557 : (2000) 1 SCR 1155 : (2000) 1 UJ 554 : (2000) AIRSCW 719 : (2000) 1 Supreme 584 , which was a case relating to murder, wherein the accused was convicted for the offence u/s. 304-II IPC and Sec. 3(2)(v) of the Act, and under the former he was sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment while under the later he was sentenced to life imprisonment. These convictions were confirmed by the High Court. In appeal the Hon''ble Supreme Court noticed that there was no dispute about the deceased dying homicidal death, and considering the nature of injuries, confirmed the conviction u/s. 304-II IPC. Facts in that case were that between 7.00 and 8.00 p.m. on the fateful day Saoji Gamaji Jadhav, a member of Scheduled Caste, who had returned to his house at dusk, and after some time had left the house informing his wife that he would be going out for some time, and would return soon, thereafter. After about half an hour of the deceased left his home, the appellant came to the house of the deceased and enquired from his wife about the deceased. At that time the appellant was carrying a ''jambiya''. On coming to know from her that her husband had gone out of the house, the appellant started running through the lane. The wife getting suspicious followed, and near the hospital of Dr. Kalwaghe, she saw the appellant stabbing the deceased who fell down and died. It is on these facts Hon''ble the Supreme Court has held as under:-"To attract the provisions of Sec. 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Indian Penal Code is committed against him on the basis that such a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence u/s. 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter, we think, both the trial Court and the High Court missed the essence of this aspect."

With the above findings the conviction u/s. 3(2)(v) was set aside. In our view, the judgment in Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman''s case fully supports the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, and since in the present case also, there is not an iota of material on record, even to indicate that, either of the offence was committed "on the basis" that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste. Accordingly, the conviction for the offence, u/s. 3(2)(v) of the Act, is very much required to be set aside."

Recently, another Division Bench of this Court in Suban Khan v. State of Rajasthan reported in 2014 (1) WLN 454, on similar facts had formulated the same view.

In view of the consistent interpretation of law by various Division Benches of this Court, we called upon Ms. Sonia Shandilya, the learned Public Prosecutor to point out any piece of evidence or material from which we can infer that prosecutrix was subjected to rape on the ground that she was a member of a Scheduled Caste community. The learned Public Prosecutor, however, could not answer our query, as no relevant material is available in the record.

Lust is a vice, from which human beings do suffer. As per medico-legal report Exhibit P/6, the prosecutrix is mother of five children. To attract Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, it was incumbent for the prosecution to bring on record some material that the prosecutrix was subjected to rape only on the ground that she is a member of Scheduled Caste or appellant wanted to assert superiority of his caste by humiliating a member of Scheduled Caste. Since there is nothing on record and the very wording of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act is that ''offence is committed against a person on the ground that such person is a member of Schedule Caste'', which prescribe an essential ingredient and same is not satisfied. We shall follow the dictum of law laid in Manohar Singh''s case (supra) and Sohan Singh''s case (supra)."

Thus, we accept the contention raised by Shri Naqvi, Senior Counsel that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the offence under Section 3(2)(V) of the Act of 1989 is not made out. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant Rajendra on this count cannot be sustained.

Consequently, we set aside the conviction, and sentence of appellant Rajendra for offence under Section 3(2)(V) of the Act of 1989.

Now, we shall examine whether in the present case, offence under Section 376(2)(G) IPC is made out or not ?

It is the case of the prosecution that three persons have committed sexual intercourse with a girl aged 15 years. Deposition of Dr. J.P. Yadav (P.W.14), by way of medical evidence, conclusively prove that victim was sexually assaulted. There was a swelling of vagina accompanied by redness. Even though the Medical Officer in cross-examination has stated that redness and swelling may be due to various reasons, we are of the view that clinical examination of the victim lends corroboration to her testimony that she was subjected to sexual intercourse. The Medical Officer has also given opinion to this effect.

Delay in lodging of the report in offence of rape per se is not fatal to the prosecution. Hon''ble Apex Court in Santhosh Moolya and Another Vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) CriLJ 2892 : (2010) 2 Crimes 405 : (2010) 4 JT 651 : (2010) 4 SCALE 348 : (2010) 5 SCC 445 : (2010) 4 SCR 1092 : (2010) AIRSCW 3125 : (2010) 3 Supreme 429 had held that in the facts and circumstances of that case, delay of 42 days in reporting the matter will not affect the case of prosecution. It will be apposite here to reproduce the observations made by Hon''ble Apex Court in case of Santosh Mooloya (supra) as under :--

"(7) It is further seen from the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that on reaching their home, apart from informing their mother, they also informed about the incident to one Nonayya Gowda PW5 who, in turn, informed their owner Subhash Jain PW 4. PW 1 explained that though PW 4 asked them to make a complaint, because of the threat posed by A-1 and A-2 and out of fear they did not inform the incident to the police and after gaining confidence and courage, finally a complaint (Ex. P1) was lodged with the police on 14.07.2004. Though there was a delay of 42 days in lodging complaint to the police, PWs 1 and 2, in their evidence, explained that all their family members including themselves are uneducated, no male members in their family for their assistance and they settled in the present village to eke out their livelihood. Admittedly, on the date of the incident, they were working in quarry owned by PW 4 and while returning from their workplace by force A-1 and A-2 committed rape of PWs 1 and 2. The mother of PWs 1 and 2 was examined as PW 14. She also corroborated the assertion of PWs 1 and 2 about their illiteracy and fear due to the threat call of A1 and A2. In those circumstances, the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 and their complaint Ex. P1 cannot be rejected as unacceptable. In a case of rape, particularly, the victims are illiterate, uneducated, their statements have to be accepted in toto without further corroboration. In State of Punjab Vs. Gurmit Singh and Others, (1996) 1 AD 492 : AIR 1996 SC 1393 : (1996) CriLJ 1728 : (1996) 1 Crimes 37 : (1996) 1 JT 298 : (1996) 1 SCALE 309 : (1996) 2 SCC 384 : (1996) 1 SCR 532 speaking for the Bench Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was) has observed thus:

"...The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person''s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable..."

8) Any statement of rape is an extremely humiliating experience for a woman and until she is a victim of sex crime, she would not blame anyone but the real culprit. While appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the Courts must always keep in mind that no self-respecting woman would put her honour at stake by falsely alleging commission of rape on her and, therefore, ordinarily a look for corroboration of her testimony is unnecessary and uncalled for. [Vide Rajinder @ Raju Vs. State of H.P., AIR 2009 SC 3022 : (2009) CLT 1476 : (2009) CriLJ 4133 : (2009) 9 JT 9 : (2009) 9 SCALE 176 : (2009) 10 SCR 248 : (2009) AIRSCW 4858 : (2009) 5 Supreme 233 ]

9) In Sohan Singh and Another v. State of Bihar, (2010) 1 SCC 68, this Court has observed as under:

"When FIR by a Hindu lady is to be lodged with regard to commission of offence like rape, many questions would obviously crop up for consideration before one finally decides to lodge the FIR. It is difficult to appreciate the plight of the victim who has been criminally assaulted in such a manner. Obviously, the prosecutrix must have also gone through great turmoil and only after giving it a serious thought, must have decided to lodge the FIR."

10) From the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, owner of the quarry PW 4 and mother of the victim PW-14, we are satisfied that though there was a delay of 42 days in lodging the complaint, the same was properly explained by the victims and the other witnesses. In addition to the same, we have also noticed that except the victims, no male member is available in their family to help them. In fact they came to the village where the incident occurred to eke out their livelihood. Further, PWs 1 and 2 asserted that after committing rape A-1 and A-2 threatened that they would kill them if they inform anyone. All these material aspects were duly considered by the trial Court and accepted by the High Court. We concur with the same."

In the present case, it has come in evidence that when the young girl, aged 15 years, had reported the matter to the mother, her health had deteriorated. We can understand the concern of a mother whose unwed daughter was subjected to gang rape. She would have received utter shock of her life. Furthermore, the circumstances in which the family of victim was placed, required lot of courage to report the matter. Life of the girl, her matrimonial prospects, social shame, ignominy are issues which confront family of a rape victim. The way society evaluates rape victim are general concerns, over which any respectable family has to ponder. Whether matter should be reported to the police or not, whether, the matter can be buried under the carpet are questions which require time. Hence delay cannot be a ground to discard the prosecution case. Even if we believe the story brought out by defence that the victim was apprehended, alongwith the three accused, by the police of Police Station, Chhabra then, also family has to think twice how to save the reputation of the girl form public glare. Otherwise, also the argument raised that the victim was a consenting party will pale into insignificant taking into account the age of the victim. The Victim brought before the Court her mark sheet (Ex. P/8), copy of which is (Ex. P/8A). From the mark sheet, it is apparent that on the date of incident the victim was about 15 years old. Thus she was less than 16 years of age. She cannot be a consenting party to a rape.

The argument raised by counsel for the appellants that as there was no external mark of injury on the body of the victim hence, it should be inferred that she would be consenting party is also devoid of merit.

The victim was subjected to rape by three young robust male accused. In the presence of three accused, she was a lame duck. There is no question for the victim offering resist once. Thus, non-presence of any external mark on the body of the victim would not lessen the veracity of her testimony in the Court less. We have read the statement of the victim. The same inspires confidence. Furthermore, the fact that she was less than 16 years of age makes consent, on the part of the victim meaningless.

Consequently, we are convinced that the offence under Section 376(2)(G) IPC has been duly proved by the prosecution against the appellants Rajendra and Mukesh Meena.

Consequently, we uphold the conviction of the appellants Rajendra and Mukesh Meena for offence under Section 376(2)(G), and conviction of appellant Mukesh Meena for offence under Section 456, and 366 IPC. The minimum sentence prescribed for offence of gang rape is ten years. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no special reason for us to consider reduction of the sentence. Thus, we also confirm the sentence awarded by the trial Court upon both the appellants under Section 376(2)(G) IPC, and for offences under Sections 456 and 366 IPC upon appellant Mukesh Meena.

Hence, we accept D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 337/2010 preferred by Rajendra partly. He is acquitted of offence under Section under Section 3(2)(V) of Scheduled Castes and scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. However, his conviction for offence under Section 376(2)(G) IPC is upheld.

We find no merit in the Criminal Appeal No. 84/2010 preferred by Mukesh Meena; the same is dismissed, being devoid of merit.