Rajendra Prasad Sharma vs Gyan Singh

Petitioners have filed the present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 17/08/2017 passed by the IX

Civil Judge Class-II, Satna in Civil Suit No. 12-A/2012 by which the trial Court has rejected the application preferred by the petitioners under Order 1

Rule 10 of the C.P.C.

Respondent no. 1/plaintiff has filed the civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the property situated in village Mouja

Birhuli Kothar, Tehsil Raghurajnagar, District Satna. During the pendency of the said civil suit, petitioners have filed an application under Order 1

Rule 10 C.P.C. for impleadment of the necessary party i.e. proposed defendants on the ground that the proposed defendants/petitioners are the heirs

of Karmkandi Purohit of Defendants and on the death of Babuguru Prasad, Sharda Prasad gave them Khasra No. 820 area 2.06 decimal by way of

gift in Samvat 2003 i.e. 1946. Thus, the proposed defendants are having title of the said Khasra and they are in possession of the suit property.Â

The respondent no. 1 had filed the reply to the said application stating that the petitioners are neither necessary nor proper party in the said suit.

The trial Court after hearing both the parties has passed the order dated 17/08/2017 thereby rejecting the application preferred by the petitioners on

the ground that the petitioners are not necessary party since the plaintiff's case is based on basis of adverse possession and hence they are deemed to

be in possession and on that ground, the application is dismissed. Being aggrieved by that order, the petitioners have filed the present petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioners argues that the trial Court has erred in rejecting the application preferred by the petitioners under Order 1 Rule 10

of the C.P.C. He submits that the petitioners are in possession over the suit property and it was given in gift to their ancestors. He further

submits that the plaintiff's application has been rejected by the Tehsildar for mutation which goes to show that the plaintiff's are not in possession of

the suit property. He submits that the petitioners are necessary party to the said suit, therefore, the trial Court has erred in rejecting the application.

On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent no. 1 argues that the petitioners are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit. The

petitioners have filed the civil suit for declaration of title on the basis of the adverse possession and no relief has been claimed against the petitioners

and the petitioners are free to file the civil suit for declaration of title. He further submits that the scope of interference under Article 227 by this

Court is limited and for the said purpose, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra

Shankar Patil (2010) 8 S.C.C. 329 as well as the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Jai Singh and another Vs. Municipal Corporation

of Delhi reported in (2010) 9 S.C.C. 385.

Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

In the present case, the respondent no. 1 has filed the civil suit for declaration of title on the basis of adverse possession. During pendency of the said

civil suit, the petitioners have filed the application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the C.P.C. stating that they are in possession of the suit property and the

property has been given in gift to their ancestors. The order 10 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. provides that the Court may strike out or add the parties. As

per the said sub-rule, the Court may at any stage of the proceedings either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may

appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name

of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable

the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.

Thus, as per this provision, the Court has a power to strike out or add the parties at any stage of the trial for deciding the questions involved in the suit.

In the present case, the respondent no. 1 has claimed the relief of declaration of title on the basis of the adverse possession, no relief whatsoever has

been claimed against the petitioners. Thus, the petitioners are neither proper nor necessary parties in the present suit and in the absence of these

petitioners, the Court can pass the effective decree. The petitioners are free to file a separate suit against the respondent no. 1. This Court in the

case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) in recording the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution by this Court has laid down certain

guidelines in para 49 of the said judgment :-

( c). High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the

orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the Court or tribunal

subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise

of this power by the High Court.

(d). The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In

this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh4 and the principles in

Waryam Singh4 have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

(e). According to the ratio in Waryam Singh4, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can

interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authorityâ€​.

(f). In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to

exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

(g). Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent

perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic

principles of natural justice have been flouted.

(h). In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than

the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.

Thus, in the light of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Apex Court, I do not find any reason to interfere in the order passed by the trial Court.

Accordingly, the petition is dismissed.