Rajesh Kumar and Others vs Pichda Ram and Others

R.L. Jhanwar, J.—This appeal is directed against the order dated 24.02.2001 passed in Claim Case No. 13/96 by the 1st Additional Motor Vehicles Accidents Tribunal, Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja whereby the Tribunal fastened the liability to pay compensation of Rs. 42,453/- on the appellants as well as respondent No. 3, in an injury case. As against the compensation of Rs. 1,26,300/- claimed by respondent No. 1 /claimant by filing claim petition u/s 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short ''the Act'') for injuries sustained in the motor accident on 5.7.1996, the Tribunal, on close scrutiny of the evidence and material available on record and the respective submissions made by the parties, awarded a sum of Rs. 42,453/- as al compensation to respondent No. 1. The Tribunal directed to pay interest at 12% per annum from the date of filing of claim petition till its realization. The Tribunal further directed to pay total compensation to the appellants and respondent No. 3 jointly and severally while exonerating respondent No. 2 M.P. Antya Vevsai Development Corporation from its liability to pay compensation. It is this order, which is under challenge by the appellants.

Shri Shaktiraj Sinha, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently argued that the learned Claims Tribunal has erred in holding that the appellants are registered owner of the tractor bearing No. M.P. 27-B/1459 (for short ''the offending vehicle''). It was argued by him that the learned Tribunal has erred in recording a finding that respondent No. 2 was not the owner of the offending vehicle whereas the respondent No. 2 granted loan to the appellants on 29.11.1994 under agreement for purchasing the offending vehicle. Since the appellants are debtors of respondent No-2/ Corporation, therefore, liability to pay compensation may be fastened on respondent No. 2. On these premises, it was urged that the appellants be exonerated from its liability to pay compensation.

On the other hand, Ms. Neha Verma, counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2 argued that although the appellants are debtors of respondent No. 2/Corporation, on the date of accident, the said offending vehicle was in their possession and was being driven by respondent No. 3. Therefore, it should be deemed that on the date of accident the said offending vehicle was in the possession of the appellants and was being driven by respondent No. 3. It was next contended that the learned Claims Tribunal has. After appreciating the evidence on record, rightly fastened the liability on the appellants to pay compensation amount.

I have heard counsel for the parties at length and perused the record of the Claims Tribunal including impugned award.

In the present case, the questions that arise for consideration is whether on the date of accident the offending vehicle was in possession of the appellants or in the possession of respondent No. 2, who is the owner of the offending vehicle and who is responsible to pay compensation amount. Appellants-Rajesh Kumar, Jagan Sao and Umakant had preferred this appeal against the respondents especially respondent No. 2 M.P. Antya Vevsai Development Corporation, Bhopal, After perusal of record and impugned order of the learned Claims Tribunal, it is clear that Pichda Ram sustained injuries in the motor accident on 5.7.1996 when he was dashed by the offending vehicle, which was registered under the Motor Vehicles Act and was in the name of respondent No. 2/Corporation. Registration certificate is exhibited as Ex. D.5 wherein details of the offending vehicle i.e. tractor bearing No. M.P. 27B 1459, its engine No. 6112 and chassis No. 06052 and the use of the tractor is for agricultural purpose.

N.A.W. 01 Pramod Kumar Sharma, Executive Officer, District Antya Vevsayi Cooperative Development Corporation, Ambikapur, in whose evidence also the details of offending vehicle have been mentioned. According to him, the offending vehicle being HMT make was purchased by appellant No. 1 Rajesh Kumar. Umakant and Jagan Sao, who had applied for loan vide Ex. D-1 supported with affidavit Ex. D.2, executed an agreement vide Ex. D-3 and obtained loan from respondent No. 2/Corporation on 29.11.1994. After being fully satisfied by driving the tractor, the same was given to them and a certificate thereof was issued/by them, which is Ex. D.4. This shows that offending tractor was taken on loan from respondent No. 2 and was hypothecated in the name of respondent No. 2 and registration was done in the name of respondent No. 2. It is also clear from the statement of Pramod Kumar Sharma N.A.W. 01 and the documents available on record that the said offending vehicle was given on loan to the appellant Rajesh Kumar. It is further clear from his evidence that as on date i.e. 5-7.1996 the loan was pending, on which date also accident took place. He has also stated that as soon as the repayment is over. Ownership of the offending vehicle will be transferred in the name of Rajesh Kumar but since loan was not repaid, therefore, the registration was in the name of respondent No. 2 i.e. M.R. Antya Vevsai Sahkari Development Corporation. It is apparently clear from the statement of Tameshwar N.A.W. 2, driver of the offending vehicle, that he was charge sheeted for the negligent driving of the offending vehicle due to which accident took place. Rajesh Kumar, appellant No. 1 herein did not state anything about repayment of loan, whether he has repaid or not, whether the offending vehicle was in his possession or not, but it is clear from the documents annexed with record that the offending vehicle i.e. tractor was taken from respondent No. 2 on loan and loan was sanctioned to appellant No. 1 Rajesh Kumar. It is also clear that since repayment of loan was not made therefore the registration was in the name of respondent No. 2. Thus, since loan was sanctioned to Rajesh Kumar, appellant No. 1 herein, for purchase of offending vehicle, therefore, he is treated to the owner of the offending vehicle. Ex-D.4, which is a certificate showing that after being fully satisfied by driving and by testing the parts thereof, the said offending vehicle was given to Rajesh Kumar. Therefore, the actual owner of the said offending vehicle, on the date of accident, is Rajesh Kumar.

According to sub-section (30) of Section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1988, "owner" means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire-purchase, agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement Thus, it is clear from the above that if the vehicle was purchased on loan from any Bank or Financial Institution under agreement so executed, then the person is deemed to have been in possession of the vehicle under agreement and subsequently he will be called as owner of that vehicle. In the present case, the tractor was in possession of Rajesh Kumar alone. He did not state that other two appellants were also the owners of that vehicle. In the matter of Godavari Finance Co. Vs. Degala Satyanarayanamma and Others, the Supreme Court held that in case of a motor vehicle which is subjected to a hire-purchase agreement, the financier cannot ordinarily be treated to be the owner and the person who is in possession of the vehicle, and not the financer being the owner, would liable to pay damages for the motor accident. It is also held by the Supreme Court that name of financer in the registration certificate would not be decisive for determination as to who was the owner of the vehicle.

In view of the above and relying on the above citation, it is held that Rajesh Kumar, appellant No. 1 herein, who was sanctioned for purchase of offending vehicle under agreement Ex. D-3, is treated to be owner of the offending vehicle on the date of accident and since it is held so, therefore, the liability to pay compensation as awarded by the learned Tribunal is also upon him. The learned Claims Tribunal has, after appreciating the evidence and material documents on record, rightly recorded findings and those findings are purely on the basis of clinching, cogent and reliance evidence sustainable under law.

For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned award warranting interference by this Court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.