Rajesh Kumar Singh vs Union Of India and Ors

Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.

The Petitioner, through this Writ Petition, seeks to contest the directive of compulsory retirement, including the full compensation of pension and gratuity, as well as the subsequent order dated 26.02.2010, which dismissed the appeal against the punitive order. Additionally, the Petitioner challenges the rejection order dated 30.06.2010, issued by the revisional authority in response to the Revision Petition submitted on 01.04.2010 inter alia on the ground of arbitrary, illegal and in violation of natural justice.

I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:

The brief facts of the case are as follows:

(i) The petitioner entered into service of Constable in C.I.S.F. on 10.7.1994. While continuing as such as C.I.S.F Unit, NALCO, Angul a charge-sheet was issued under Rule-36 of C.I.S.F. Rules, 2001 on 18.05.2009 by the Asst. Commandant, C.I.S.F. Unit, NALCO (“Opposite Party No.5”) alleging gross misconduct, indiscipline and dereliction of duty with respect of the following charges/allegations:

a. The petitioner was assigned to sentry duty at the Smelter Fire Station from 1500 to 1700 hours. During his duty, he did not wear a helmet or headgear. Upon being questioned by Inspector Lokesh Chand, Coy Commander of the Smelter Fire Wing, regarding his failure to wear the required helmet, the petitioner responded inappropriately. He threw the helmet onto a cement planter and declared that he would not wear the helmet, challenging the inspector to take any action he deemed necessary.

b. The petitioner unexpectedly and aggressively assaulted Inspector Lokesh Chand by punching him and hitting him with a stick. Consequently, Inspector Lokesh Chand sustained injuries to his nose, right temple, right wrist, and left thigh.

c. He abandoned his duty and left the Unit Line/family quarters as of the afternoon of 03.09.2009, and did not return to his post.

(ii) In response to the charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted the written reply to the Disciplinary Authority denying the charges on 29.05.2009 which was rejected by the Commandant, C.I.S.F., NALCO (“Opposite Party No.4”) and thereafter a departmental proceeding was initiated which was concluded on 25.09.2009 and communicated to the petitioner on 01.10.2009.

(iii) The disciplinary authority issued the final order on 19.10.2009 imputing the penalty of compulsory retirement with full compensation and pension and gratuity as admissible to him on the date of his compulsory retirement

(iv) The above order passed by the Disciplinary Authority was appealed by the petitioner under Section-9 of the C.I.S.F. Act read with Rule-46 of C.I.S.F. Rule 2001 before the Deputy Inspector General, C.I.S.F., Eastern Zone, HQ, Patna on 09.11.2009 challenging the penalty imposing which was also rejected.

(v) Aggrieved by the appellate order, the petitioner submitted a revision petition to the Inspector General, C.I.S.F., Eastern Sector HQ, Patna-13 on 01.04.2010 challenging the appellate order and also the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority which was disposed of on 30.06.2010 with rejection of the revision petition.

II.  SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:

Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:

(i) The enquiry report was scribed in Hindi which is hand written, so, it was difficult on the part of the petitioner to go through it properly. The petitioner filed an application before the opposite party no.4 to issue English Translation copy of the enquiry report dated 25.9.2009 for better appreciation of the finding of the Enquiry officer but in obedience to the instruction of the opposite party no.4 vide their letter dated 1.10.2009, the petitioner without delaying the matter submitted a written representation on 16.10.2009 in Hindi with a prayer to exonerate all the charges with sympathetic consideration.

(vi) The charge-sheet is in gross violation of Rule-36 read with Rule-32 of C.I.S.F. Rules, 2001. As per Rule-32, the extent of power of the Disciplinary Authority has been described in Schedule-I. The Assistant Commandant can be a Disciplinary Authority only for a minor penalty. Therefore, taking into account the quantum of punishment in the Disciplinary proceeding, the order of punishment is without jurisdiction, hence, liable to be set aside.

(vii) When the charge-sheet was issued by the opposite party No.5 in exercise of power under Rule-36, the opposite party No.4 being the Appellate Authority cannot act as the Disciplinary Authority, therefore the entire Disciplinary Proceeding which was conducted at the direction of the Appellate Authority is vitiated.

(viii) The petitioner has not been informed with regard to change of Disciplinary Authority, therefore, the Disciplinary Proceeding is absolutely without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be quashed.

(ix) The office Memorandum dated 18.05.2009 issued by the Opposite Party No.5 in which it has been clearly mentioned that the undersigned purposes to hold an enquiry against No.941407768 Constable Rajesh Kumar Singh of C.I.S.F. Unit, NALCO, Angul under Rule-36 of C.I.S.F. Rules, 2001. It clearly indicates that the opposite party No.5 has issued

the charge-sheet exercising the power of Disciplinary Authority. All

orders issued by the opposite party No.4 including the appointment of Enquiry officer and consideration of Enquiry report and passing of Final order are in gross violation of statutory Rule-36 read with Rule-32, therefore, the entire Disciplinary proceeding is liable to be quashed.

(x) While passing the final order the grievance of the petitioner was although considered but the final order is unreasoned and non-speaking.

(xi) The allegation of assault and counter assault and subsequent to the incident of assault medical treatment was undertaken by both the parties which have not been taken into account in its proper prospective. Without making any effort to find out the real truth and in absence of any police investigation, the final order of punishment is not sustainable in the eye of law.

(xii) The opinion of the Disciplinary Authority of the Final order regarding non-examination of the Doctor and non- submission of F.I.R. before the concerned Police Station is not sustainable in the eye of law which is very much prejudicial to the petitioner. Further, the hospitalization of the petitioner was out-rightly rejected by the Disciplinary Authority is not acceptable in the eye of law.

(xiii) The reason assigned by the learned Disciplinary Authority are based on no sound principle of law and there is no legal sanction to the said reasons, therefore, the same is liable to be quashed

(xiv) The final order is non-sustainable in the eye of law because the opposite party No.5 being the original Disciplinary Authority would not have passed the order of punishment of compulsory retirement. The Appellate order has mentioned the 26 grounds taken by the Appellant assailing the Final order, but the Appellate Authority disposed of those grounds in one paragraph without discussing the matter in its proper prospective. The Revisional Authority also suffers from the anomaly as it disposed of all the ground in one paragraph mechanically without applying the judicial mind.

(xv) The order of punishment is too harsh and not commensurate with the gravity of the offence. The petitioner joined in C.I.S.F. Service on 10.7.1994 and discharged its duties effectively. Although the Disciplinary proceeding was started for minor penalties but in arbitrary exercise of power to the petitioner has been imposed with major punishment.

III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPP. PARTIES:

Per contra, learned counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions:

(i). Since the petitioner had deserted the Unit HQ, the charge memo in question was sent to his home address which he acknowledged on 23.05.2009 and submitted written representation in response to the charge memo which was received on 02.06.2009. As the reply of the petitioner was found not satisfactory, a regular Departmental enquiry was ordered by appointing Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer under the provision of Sub-Rule (2) of Rule-36 of CISF Rules-2001.

(ii).   The enquiry officer conducted the departmental enquiry as per laid down procedure affording all reasonable opportunities to the petitioner to defend the case and completed the enquiry. The Enquiry Officer, after careful consideration of all the evidence available in the case file and the statement of PWs recorded during the course of enquiry and defense of the petitioner, submitted his enquiry report on 25.09.2009 to the Disciplinary Authority wherein all the charges were categorically established. As per Rules on the subject, a copy of the Enquiry report was also supplied to the petitioner vide Memorandum No.6535 dated 01.10.2009. The petitioner acknowledged the same on 01.10.2009 and submitted his written representation against enquiry report on 16.10.2009.

(iii). The Disciplinary Authority meticulously went through the records available in the case file, statement of PWs, written brief of the presenting Officer, Report of Enquiry Officer and representations submitted by the petitioner against brief note and enquiry report. After taking into consideration all the above aspect, which came out during the Departmental Enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority held the petitioner guilty of all the charge framed against him and penalized him with compulsory retirement.

(iv). The offence committed by him is serious in nature for which he deserves exemplary punishment and retention of such person in the force shall contaminate the entire working atmosphere of the force.

(v). During the course of preliminary hearing, the petitioner had wished to conduct enquiry in Hindi language. Accordingly, the Departmental enquiry was conducted in Hindi language by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner is trying to mislead the Court by saying that he does not read and speak Hindi properly whereas he belongs to State of Bihar and his mother tongue is Hindi. His application dated 03.07.2009 and 17.07.2009 is symptomatic of the same as the petitioner had applied for Hindi version of Charge Memorandum and requesting to provide statement of enquiry report in Hindi as he does not understand English language. As per request of the petitioner whole Departmental Enquiry was conducted in Hindi language and supplied to the petitioner. Besides, the petitioner also submitted his representation against enquiry report in Hindi, which he himself admitted. This clearly speaks that petitioner had tried to prevent Departmental Enquiry by using delay tactics as well as now misleading the court submitting false and fabricated issue.

(vi). As per Rule-32, and Schedule-I of the CISF Rules, 2001, the Assistant Commandant is a disciplinary authority for an enrolled member of the force. Therefore, there is no legal infirmity in issuing the Charge Memo for major proceeding by an Asst. Commandant.

(vii). The petitioner was dealt under Rule-36 by the Disciplinary Authority and it was considered that the punishment which he deserves is not under the purview of the charge-sheet issuing authority. Hence, the same was disposed of by exercising the power by the appointing authority and awarded the punishment vested under CISF Rules. As such, there is no violation of any rules and when the final order was passed by the Commandant, i.e. Opposite Party No.04 and the DIG is the next appellate authority and the petitioner has fully availed the opportunity. Hence, the question does not arise that the proceeding was finalised under direction of any one and no Disciplinary Authority has been changed in the instant case. There is no restriction on issue of charge memorandum by the Disciplinary Authority. But, in law it is mandatory that the major penalties be awarded by an Appointing Authority only. On dispassionate consideration of the case, the appointing authority on the basis of overwhelming documentary evidence awarded the punishment which is commensurate with gravity of offence. The petitioner is trying to mislead this Court by submitting worthless comments. Thus, the averment of the petitioner bears no merit for consideration.

(viii). The fact remains that the petitioner has assaulted inspector/Fire Lokesh Chand in presence of other personnel of the Force. There are sufficient documentary evidences available with the department like G.D. entry and PE report. The statements deposed by the witnesses are corroborating with each other.

IV. COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:

I have heard the representations of the counsels appearing for the respective parties at length.

First of all, it is trite in law that the power of judicial review exercised by a Court or a Tribunal against the orders of a departmental enquiry committee is only limited to ensuring that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court.

In case of State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, AIR 1963 SC 779 the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court noted that, considering the seriousness of the proven misconduct, the disciplinary authority possessed the authority and jurisdiction to impose the corresponding penalty. This penalty was not subject to review by the High Court under Article 226. The relevant excerpts are produced hereinbelow:

“If the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justiciable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal Prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice.”

In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 the Supreme Court also held that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court. The relevant excerpt is produced hereinbelow:

“Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case.”

When an inquiry is conducted on the charges of misconduct by an employee of the state, the Court or Tribunal would be concerned only to the extent of determining whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the rules of natural justice and statutory rules were complied with.

In Om Kumar & Others vs. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 the Supreme Court had also after considering the Wednesbury Principles and the doctrine of proportionality held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority, and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or the other of the well-known principles known as “Wednesbury Principles” namely whether the order was contrary to law, or whether relevant factors were not considered, or whether irrelevant factors were considered or whether the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. The Apex held as following:

“In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, [1987] 4 SCC 611, this Court referred to 'proportionality' in the quantum of punishment but the Court observed that the punishment was 'shockingly' disproportionate to the misconduct proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, [1995] 6 SCC 749, this Court stated that the court will not interfere unless the punishment awards was one which shocked the conscience of the Court. Even then, the Court would remit the matter back to the authority and would not normally substitute one punishment for the other. However, in rare situations, the Court could award an alternative penalty. It was also so stated in Ganayutham.

Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as 'arbitrary' under Article 14, the Court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing Court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the Court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Now, with the above principles in mind, we shall consider the arguments of the counsel for the petitioners, one by one, against the arguments of the counsel for the Opp. Parties.

The most important contention of the petitioner is that the Asst. Commandant, who is not competent to impose a major penalty of compulsory retirement has issued the charge-sheet which compromises the integrity of the whole disciplinary proceeding for it is against the provisions of the CISF Rules.

Therefore, the statutory analysis of the relevant provisions of the CISF Rules pertinent to this case must be conducted in the appropriate order.

Firstly, Rule 34 of the CISF Rules bifurcates minor penalties from major penalties. The Rule is produced hereinbelow:

“34. Nature of Penalties - The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on an enrolled member of the Force, namely:-

Major Penalties –

i) Dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Government; (ii) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government;

(iii) Compulsory retirement;

(iv) reduction to a lower time scale of pay, grade, post or service which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the Government servant to the time scale of pay, grade, post or service from which he was reduced with or without further directions regarding conditions of restoration to the grade or post or service from which enrolled member of the Force was reduced and his seniority and pay on such restoration to that grade, post or service;

(v) save as provided for in clause (viii) below - reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay for a specified period with further directions as to whether or not the enrolled member will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay.

Minor penalties -

(vi) Censure;

(vii) Withholding of his promotion;

(viii) Reduction to a lower stage in the time scale of pay one stage for a period of not exceeding three years, without cumulative effect and not adversely affecting his pension;

(ix) Withholding of increment of pay;

(x) Fine to any amount not exceeding of 7 days pay.

Explanation - The following shall not amount to a penalty within the meaning of this rule, namely:-

(a) Withholding of increment of an enrolled member for failure to pass a departmental examination in accordance with the rules or orders or the terms of his appointment;

(b) Stoppage of increment of an enrolled member at the efficiency bar in a time scale of pay on the ground of his unfitness to cross the bar;

(c) Non-promotion of an enrolled member whether in a substantive or officiating capacity, after consideration of his case, to a rank or post for promotion to which he is eligible;

(d) Reversion of an enrolled member officiating in a higher rank or post to a lower rank or post, on the ground that he is considered after trial, to be unsuitable for such higher rank or post or on any administrative grounds unconnected with his conduct;

(e) Reversion of an enrolled member appointed on probation to any other rank or post during or at the end of the period of probation in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation;

(f) Replacement of the services of an enrolled member whose services had been borrowed from any department of the Central Government or State Government or any authority under the Central Government or the State Government at the disposal of the Central Government or the State Government or the authority from which the services of such enrolled member had been borrowed;

(g) Compulsory retirement of an enrolled member in accordance with the provisions relating to his superannuation or retirement:

(h) Termination of service –

(i) of an enrolled member appointed on probation during or at the end of the period of his probation, in accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders governing such probation; or

(ii) of a temporary enrolled member in accordance with the provisions of rule 25; or

(iii) of an enrolled member, employed under an agreement, in accordance with the terms of such agreement:

(iv) treatment of absence from duty as "dies-non" ordered by a competent authority under rule 55.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Now, according to Schedule-I of the CISF Rules 2001, Compulsory Retirement, which is a major penalty, cannot be levied by Asst. Commander, but only by a DG/ADG, Sector Inspector General/Inspector General (HQ), Dy. Inspector General/ADIG and Sr. Comdt. only. However, the Rule 32 adds an exemption to the above clause. Rule 32 of the CISF Rules 2001 reads as follows:

“32. Disciplinary Authority –

(1) The disciplinary authority in respect of an enrolled member of the Force for the purpose of imposing any particular penalty or the passing of any disciplinary order shall be the authority specified in this behalf in Schedule-I under whose administrative control the enrolled member is serving and shall include any authority mentioned in the said Schedule superior to such authority.

(2) Whenever an enrolled member of the Force is deployed for operational duty or any other duty or course of training outside the place of his permanent posting then a supervisory officer under whose control such member has been so deployed shall be competent to place him under suspension. Such supervisory officer shall refer the matter to concerned disciplinary authority as mentioned in sub-rule (1).

(3) A disciplinary authority competent under Schedule -I to impose any of the penalties specified in clause (vi) to (x) of rule 34 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any enrolled member of the Force for imposition of any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (v) of rule 34 notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent under Schedule -I to impose any such penalties.”

It is clear from the abovementioned Rule that the Asst. Commandant who is not eligible to levy the charges of compulsory retirement (‘major penalty’) against the members of the force according to Schedule-I is still eligible to draw up charges against the petitioner and institute disciplinary proceeding against the member vide Rule 32(3) of the CISF Rules.

In service law jurisprudence, it is not uncommon for charges to be drafted and initiated by an authority other than the appointing authority, with the appointing authority making the final order. The question arises whether this procedural guarantee extends to require that the disciplinary proceeding itself be initiated exclusively by the appointing authority.

This question has been answered by the Supreme Court in P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller And Auditor General, (1993) 1 SCC 419 wherein the court held as following:

“4. Article 311(1) says that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds civil post under the Union or a State "shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed". Whether this guarantee includes within itself the guarantee that even the disciplinary proceeding should be initiated only by the appointing authority? It is well known that departmental proceeding consists of several stages; the initiation of the proceeding, the inquiry in respect of the charges levelled against that delinquent officer and the final order which is passed after the conclusion of the inquiry. Article 311(1) guarantees that no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. But Article 311(1) does not say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only by the appointing authority. However, it is open to Union of India or a State Government to make any Rule prescribing that even the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority. Any such Rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or protection to the holder of a civil post. But in absence of any such Rule, this right or guarantee does not flow from Article 311 of the Constitution. It need not be pointed out that initiation of a departmental proceeding per se does not visit the officer concerned with any evil consequences, and the farmers of the Constitution did not consider it necessary to guarantee even that to holders of civil posts under the Union of India or under the State Government. At the same time this will not give right to authorities having the same rank as that of the officer against whom proceeding is to be initiated to take a decision whether any such proceeding should be initiated. In absence of a Rule, any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling authority, can initiate such proceeding.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, in Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence v. S. Daniel, 1990 SCR (2) 440 Rule 13 of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules was taken up for examination, which specifically provided:-

“13. Authority to institute proceedings-

(1) The President or any other authority empowered by him by general or special order may-

(a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant;”

Article 311 of the Constitution does not delineate who is responsible or eligible for initiating disciplinary proceedings. Such provisions can be outlined and prescribed by the Rules. However, if no Rules are established regarding who may commence departmental proceedings, it cannot be argued, based on Article 311 alone, that only the appointing authority—and no subordinate officer—has the authority to initiate such proceedings. In this case, no Rule was cited to indicate that only the appointing authority has the exclusive right to initiate departmental proceedings. In fact, Rule 32 specifically allows the Asst. Commander to draw up proceeding against the petitioner for a major penalty such as compulsory retirement.

Now, after taking consideration of the orders passed by the disciplinary authorities and the Appellate body of the CISF Rules, it is clear from the records that the departmental enquiry has been conducted properly and the principles of natural justice have been strictly followed. The order of the revisional authority has also given an appropriately reasoned order. There is no denial of reasonable opportunity.

Now/ let’s take the facts of the present case in context. The petitioner/ a member of the CISF, has been subjected to compulsory voluntary retirement due to his imprudent conduct and reliance on falsehoods to obstruct the administrative process, specifically hindering the voluntary retirement of a colleague. His actions, considered unprofessional and deceitful, have disrupted the department's smooth functioning and undermined the trust and integrity crucial in law enforcement. This behavior, incompatible with the ethical standards expected of an CISF personnel, necessitated decisive disciplinary action to preserve the credibility and efficiency of the CISF as an administrative unit.

Considering the totality of circumstances, it is clear that the cumulative impact of his actions necessitates the disciplinary measures taken against him. This court finds itself in complete agreement with the findings returned by and conclusion arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority, duly confirmed by the Appellate Authority and upheld by the Revisional Authority in respect of the Articles of Charge levelled against the petitioner and the punishment imposed on him. The petitioner being a member of the disciplined force, was expected to have discharged his duty diligently.

In view of the aforestated legal position and the examination of relevant facts of the present case, this court is of the opinion that the disciplinary proceeding and the punishment imposed therein does not warrant the interference of this court. The petitioner having been found to have committed misconduct in a disciplined force like CISF, and the respondent authorities having passed the order of his compulsory VRS from service after following due process of law and without actuated by malafides, the court is not inclined to exercise its limited jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

V.  CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned analysis of both factual and legal aspects, this Court concludes that there has been no procedural irregularity or breach of the Principles of Natural Justice in the conduct of the inquiry against the petitioner. Furthermore, it has been determined in the preceding paragraphs that there is adequate evidence on record to substantiate the petitioner's guilt.

In light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court finds no merit in the current petition. The Petitioner has not succeeded in establishing grounds for interference with the impugned order.

The Writ Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

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