Rajeshwar Singh vs State Of H.P. And Another

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The informant-respondent No.2 made a complaint to the police that her brother-in-law Shashi Ram had taken a contract from Rajeshwar Singh for repairing the breast wall and construction of the room. Shashi Ram, his wife Kamla, Laxmi Devi, Geeta Devi, Sheshmani Chaudhary and the informant were working in the bathroom on 8.7.2019. The lintel was to be laid. Shashi Ram was pulling the iron bar at about 4.00 PM and he fell. The informant and Tajeshwar Singh went to the roof and found that Shashi Ram had died due to electrocution. The electricity wires were near the roof of the bathroom and they were not removed before starting the construction work. The police registered the FIR No. 151 of 2019 and conducted the investigation. The police filed a challan against the present petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336 and 304-A of IPC.

The petitioner filed the present petition for quashing of the FIR. It was asserted that the petitioner is a Lawyer and practising in District Court, Shimla. He had gone to Waknaghat, District Solan in connection with partition proceedings. The premises were owned and possessed by the petitioner’s father who was looking after the construction work. The petitioner used to help his father whenever assistance was required. The petitioner never gave any contract to the deceased. The construction work of the bathroom was being handled by the petitioner’s father. The petitioner is not the owner of the premises nor he was present on the site. It is also apparent from the FIR that Tajeshwar Singh, the brother of the petitioner and not the petitioner was called to the spot after the incident. His father had accompanied the petitioner. He had also instructed the workers not to consume alcohol, however, the quantity of alcohol in the blood of the deceased was found to be 135.38 mg%. The deceased was heavily drunk and unable to walk. The weather was bad and the petitioner’s father had asked Shashi Ram not to work in his absence. Shashi Ram died due to his negligence. The allegations against the petitioner are absurd and improbable. No case is made out against the petitioner. HT/LT wires are passing above the house of the petitioner and the petitioner’s father raised this issue with the Electricity Department many times. He had sent a communication to the Electricity Department on 11.5.2007 stating that the electricity wires could cause an accident at any time, however, no action was taken. The death of the deceased occurred due to negligence of the Electricity Board. The FIR should have been lodged against the Electricity Board. The damage to the retaining wall was caused because the Electricity Department had tightened the stay wire with the retaining wall. The police did not implead the owner of the building and impleaded the petitioner who has no concern with the incident. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, and the FIR and consequent proceedings arising out of the same be quashed.

The State filed a reply asserting that the police collected the evidence during the investigation and filed a charge sheet against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336 and 304-A of IPC. The matter was listed for consideration of charge on 28.5.2021. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the petition was filed. No reply was filed on behalf of respondent No.2 even though respondent No.2 is duly represented by counsel.

I have heard Mr. Mohan Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1-State and Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, learned Counsel for respondent No.2.

Mr. Mohan Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the FIR is false. The petitioner has no concern with the construction. The house belonged to his father who was getting the bathroom constructed. Petitioner’s father had written many letters to the Electricity Department to remove the high-tension/low-tension wire. The deceased was heavily drunk at the time of the incident and the accident occurred due to his negligence. Hence he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequent proceedings arising out of the same be quashed.

Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1-State submitted that the police conducted the investigation and found sufficient reasons to file a charge sheet against the petitioner. It was specifically stated by the informant that Shashi Ram was engaged by the petitioner. The truthfulness or otherwise of the FIR is not to be seen at this stage and is to be adjudicated upon by the competent Court of law where the proceedings are pending. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, learned counsel for respondent No. 2 adopted the submissions of the State and submitted that specific allegations have been made against the petitioner for the commission of cognizable offences. The Court is not to sift the evidence at this stage and has to accept the material placed by the prosecution as correct. The material shows the involvement of the petitioner; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

I have given considerable thought to the submissions at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The principles of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 : (2023) 7 SCC 711 wherein it was observed at page 716:-

The principles to be borne in mind with regard to the quashing of a charge/proceedings either in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC or Section 482CrPC or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarised by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], this Court laid down the following guiding principles : (SCC pp. 482-84, para 27)

“27. …27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in the exercise of its inherent powers.

27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.

27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.

27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.

27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise to and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.

27.12. In the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was the possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.

27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit a continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deciding the admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

27.14. Where the charge sheet, reported under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.

27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to an abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.

27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.”

Similar is the judgment in Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 wherein it was observed:-

Although we are not for verbosity in our judgments, a slightly detailed survey of the judicial precedents is in order. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court held:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.”

(emphasis supplied)

It was laid down in CBI v. Aryan Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379, that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The allegations are required to be proved during the trial by leading evidence. It was observed:

From the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if, the High Court was conducting a mini-trial and/or the High Court was considering the applications against the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. The High Court in the common impugned judgment and order has observed that the charges against the accused are not proved. This is not the stage where the prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to prove the charges. The charges are required to be proved during the trial based on the evidence led by the prosecution/investigating agency. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in going into detail in the allegations and the material collected during the course of the investigation against the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider “whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not”.

One other reason pointed out by the High Court is that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the investigation was handed over to the CBI pursuant to the directions issued by the High Court. That thereafter, on conclusion of the investigation, the accused persons have been charge-sheeted. Therefore, the High Court has erred in observing at this stage that the initiation of the criminal proceedings/proceedings is malicious. Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious or not, is not required to be considered at this stage. The same is required to be considered at the conclusion of the trial. In any case, at this stage, what is required to be considered is a prima facie case and the material collected during the course of the investigation, which warranted the accused to be tried.

This position was reiterated in Abhishek v. State of M.P. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1083 wherein it was observed:

The contours of the power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. are well defined. In V. Ravi Kumar v. State represented by Inspector of Police, District Crime Branch, Salem, Tamil Nadu [(2019) 14 SCC 568], this Court affirmed that where an accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the correctness of the allegations in the complaint.

In Neeharika Infrastructure (P). Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021, decided on 13.04.2021], a 3-Judge Bench of this Court elaborately considered the scope and extent of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. It was observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases, such standard not being confused with the norm formulated in the context of the death penalty. It was further observed that while examining the FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made therein, but if the Court thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, and more particularly, the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866) and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], the Court would have jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.

Mr. Mohan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the various annexures annexed to the petition to submit that many letters were written to the Electricity Department to remove the high tension/low tension wire; however, no action was taken by the Department. It shows the negligence of the Department. However, these documents cannot be seen at this stage. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115, that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:

“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”

Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.”

Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings".

A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142:

“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of the trial.”

This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held:

All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents.

A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed:

Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 482, Cr. P.C., in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing, is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by section 482, Cr. P.C.; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. P.C. not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing of a process issued under section 204 read with section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the FIR and the report submitted by the police.

Even if the documents are taken into consideration, the information supplied under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (Annexure P-9) shows that representations were not traceable. Thus, there is no evidence that any such representations were filed and no action was taken by the Department.

These representations clearly show that the electricity wires were above the house of the petitioner and there was a danger of electrocution. Hence, the prayer was made to remove those wires as they could result in a human tragedy. This shows that the petitioner’s father was aware of the danger posed by the electricity wire in the vicinity of his house. Still the deceased was engaged as a contractor to construct the bathroom and repair the retaining wall. This was an inherently dangerous act because any reasonable person could have concluded that laying the shuttering with the iron bars in the vicinity of high-tension/low-tension electricity wires posed a danger of electrocution. The line high tension/low tension should have been removed before the commencement of the work and commencing the work without removing the line amounted to gross negligence.

It was submitted that the house was owned by the petitioner’s father and now it has been inherited by all the co-heirs. Reliance was placed upon the revenue record, property tax bill and legal heirs certificate. As already stated, these documents are not to be seen at this stage. They may constitute a defence to be brought on record during the trial but are irrelevant at this stage. The informant has specifically stated in the FIR that Shashi Ram had taken a contract from Rajeshwar Singh for the repair of the retaining wall and construction of the bathroom. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR is not to be seen by the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed:

If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra.

In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita, (2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89], this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC.

In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51], a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.

In the present case, the charge sheet has been filed and it is for the learned Trial Court to see the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence more particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.”

It was also submitted that the deceased was heavily intoxicated which led to the accident. This is a matter of evidence whether the deceased was so intoxicated that he was unable to do the work which he was doing or despite being intoxicated he was able to work. The incident had taken due to the pulling of the iron bar which came in contact with the high tension/low tension wire. The FIR had specifically mentioned that the incident had occurred because the electricity wires above the house were not removed which shows that the incident would have taken place even if the deceased was not intoxicated as the wires were existed in the vicinity (irrespective of intoxication of Shashi Ram). In any case, this is a matter of trial and will be seen by the learned Trial Court while appreciating the evidence.

No other point was urged.

Hence, there is no material to quash the FIR in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.

The observation made hereinabove shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.