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80 paragraphs · 1,658 wordsSathiadev, J.—Petitioner filed M.O.P. 523 of 1982 on the file of the Additional Sub. Judge II. Chengalpattu. claiming compensation under
S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. since her husband was killed in a motor accident that took place at 7:30 p.m. on 13-7-1982. near Kothari
Chemicals in Ennore Express Road, when he was driving the van TN 7815. She claims that all the witnesses to be examined are in Madras and it
would be extremely difficult for her to take all the witnesses to attend several hearings by Tribunal, located in Chengalpattu and by transfer of the
proceedings, none of the parties to the proceedings would be prejudiced. if the Tribunal at Madras is directed to hear the matter.
On behalf of the first respondent-Insurance Company, it is stated that by invoking S. 24. C.P.C. the proceedings cannot be transferred, and
hence, this petition is not maintainable.
This Petition is filed by invoking S. 24 and S. 151. C.P.C. and during the course of the hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner sought for
permission to include Art. 227 of the Constitution and. accordingly it has been granted
Article 227 of the Constitution of India reads as follows--
(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may--
(a) call for return from such courts;
(b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts.
(3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates
and pleaders practicing therein:
Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under Cl. (2), or Cl. (5) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for
the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor.
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under
any law relating to the Armed Forces.
Supreme Court, in dealing with the scope and ambit of Art. 227. held in Waryam Singh and Another Vs. Amarnath and Another, that it confers
on the High Court a power of ''judicial'' superintendence apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional
Jurisdiction on the High Court. It was observed that material part of Art. 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of S. 107 of the Government
of India Act. 1915. except that the power of superintendence has been extended by this Article also to Tribunals. It was a case wherein the Rent
Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1940 were held to be Tribunals,
functioning within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh. Repelling the contention that Cl. (2) of Art. 227 confers on
the High Court only administrative superintendence over subordinate courts and tribunals, it was held that when Cl. (2) is expressed to be without
prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Cl. (1). such a restricted power is not contemplated in Article 227.
In State of Gujarat etc. Vs. Vakhtsinghji Sursinghji Vaghela and Others etc., . considering the scope of supervisory Jurisdiction of the High
Court under Art. 227. it was held that Art. 227 cannot be limited by any Act of the State Legislature and its supervisory jurisdiction extends to
keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to see that they obey the law.
Learned counsel for the petitioner would then refer to Maharaj Kumar Gajbir Singh and Another Vs. Maharaja Satbir Singh and Others, .
which took the view that, even assuming that S. 24. C.P.C. cannot be invoked, for transfer of a case to another court. High Court has got ample
powers under Art. 227 to transfer the same.
In Pyda Venkatanarayana v. Thota Ramaswami. AIR 1955 Andhra 40. Art. 227 was held to be entirely distinct and different from Art. 226 and
that Art. 227 confers upon High Court a power of supervision over all judicial matters decided by any court or tribunal within the State, and
therefore, in that case, it was held that it was eminently a fit and proper case in which power of superintendence should be exercised for
transferring the election petition to another Deputy Registrar for disposal.
On behalf of first respondent. reliance was placed on the decision of this court in Veralakshmi Sundar v. Meeran. (1980) 2 Mad LJ 106. which
took the view that when Motor Vehicles Act does not contain any provision for transfer of a petition from one Tribunal to another. High Court is
not empowered to transfer the proceedings pending before an Accidents Claims Tribunal to another Tribunal. Referring to the scheme of the Act. it
was held that Accidents Claims Tribunal having been constituted to take away the jurisdiction of the civil Court relating to compensation which
would arise under Act. and that only appellate power having been conferred on the High Court under Motor Vehicles Act. and when exercise of
powers by High Court could arise only on appeal being preferred, and no supervisory jurisdiction having been conferred on the High Court over
Accidents Claims Tribunal, the pending proceedings before Tribunals cannot be transferred. The mere circumstance that the High Court is the
appellate or revisional authority does not empower the exercise of powers of transfer, over claims filed for compensation and pending before
Tribunals.
The decision of this court in Annamalai v. M. Arumugaswami. (1982) 95 Mad LW 687 was also referred to. The question as to whether Art.
227 would be invoked, was considered in this decision, and it was held that though this power can be exercised by High Court either
administratively or judicially, the High Court cannot supervise the legislature as it could go against substantial provisions in legislative enactments. It
was then observed therein as follows:--
......In other words, whatever powers Art. 227 confers on the High Court, an amendatory legislative Dower cannot be one of them. It has already
been noticed that by a substantive provision in the Motor Vehicles Act. the jurisdiction of a Claims Tribunal is severely confined to adjudication of
claims arising out of accidents occurring strictly within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. It follows that this statutory restriction on the Tribunal''s
jurisdiction can be altered only by legislative amendment, and not by any other mode. However omnicompetent the High Court can be under Art.
surely it cannot, by its fiat, alter the place of occurrence of a motor accident. The accident spot is an unalterable, fact. It follows, therefore,
that the High Court would be powerless, even under Art. 227 to change the jurisdiction of Tribunals by exercising the power of transfer. It can
only do so if it has the power, which it has not. of pretending that the accident in question has occurred, in the area over which the transferee
Tribunal presides and not in the area where it actually took place. I am satisfied that the High Court has no jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the
Constitution to transfer any pending accident case from the Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over it to any other Tribunal having jurisdiction
over any other area.
In the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court above referred, in (1982) 95 Mad LW 687. the view taken that when by substantial provisions
of the Motor Vehicles Act. jurisdiction of a Claims Tribunal having been confined to adjudication of claim arising out of accidents occurring strictly
within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. the statutory restriction existing can be altered only by legislative amendment and not by any other
mode, and hence., however, omnicompetent the power that could be exercised by High Court under. Art. 227. it cannot be exercised as to go
against the substantial provisions in legislative enactments, cannot be correct.
In State of Gujarat etc. Vs. Vakhtsinghji Sursinghji Vaghela and Others etc., above referred to. it has been clearly held that the power of
superintendence over all courts and tribunals under Art. 227 cannot be limited by any Act of the Legislature. When it has been repeatedly held by
Supreme Court that the power of superintendence is both judicial and administrative, to proceed on the basis that for exercising powers under
Article 227. one should look to the Legislature because exercise of powers under the said Article in a particular manner would go against the
substantial provisions of the enactment: overlooks the fact that the power exercised under Art. 227 is a constitutional power, and no legislative
enactment can take away or circumscribe or nullify the exercise of supervisory powers conferred by the Constitution on High Courts. In the light of
what has been held by the Supreme Court, as above referred, when the power of transfer of proceedings within its jurisdiction is Part of its
supervisory jurisdiction, absence of any provision having been made in Motor Vehicles Act. for transfer to be effected would not deprive the High
Court of the power to transfer pending proceedings from one tribunal to another, if circumstances warrant.
When petitioner had stated that she is placed in a disadvantageous position in taking witnesses all the way to Chengalpattu from Madras, and
as the accident had taken place in the outskirts of Madras and the Claims Tribunal at Madras could hear the matter with least inconvenience to any
of the parties to the proceedings. this is a fit matter wherein, as prayed for. transfer requires to be ordered. Hence, this petition is allowed. No
costs.
