High CourtsSingle Bench

Rajinder Kaur and others vs Union of India

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 23 January 1970 · Citation: (1970) ACJ 84

HON’BLE JUDGES
C.G. Suri, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 110A
CASE NUMBER
F.A.O. No. 150 of 1968
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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 1,316 words

C.G Suri, J.—What amount is payable as compensation for the death in a motor accident of Shri Harcharn Singh Bedi, husband of Appellant No 1 and father of minor Appellants Nos. 2-5, is the only question that has to be decided in this appeal filed by the dependants of the deceased. In their application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Appellants had claimed a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs as compensation but the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for the Union Territory of Chandigarh has been pleased to award them , sum of Rs. 30,000/-only as damages or compensation. The findings of the Tribunal that the accidents was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the motor vehicle belogmg to the Union Territory of Chandigarh or that they were liable to pay the amount decreed, have not been challenged in any cross objection or separate appeal filed by or on behalf of the Respondent Union Territory.

2.

The evidence examined in the case is not very clear or convi-ncing as to what the deceased was doing for a living on the date of the accident i.e. 9th(sic) July, 1967. He is said to have been about 45 years of age at that time. In their application, the Appellants had mentioned that the deceased''s employment by a contractor which had brought about a sudden increase in his monthly income had taken place about two months earlier. The employer was examined in Court but there, are valid grounds for doubting the genuineness of the document that he produces in support of this sudden improvement in the income of the decayed. This document is further inconsistent with the position taken up by the Appellants in their application. A Contractor who could afford to have such well paid employees would be expectc.j(sic) to have better maintained accounts then a mere ledger with entries on only one page and blank spaces all over where such enterics could be interpolated. A contractor who could afford to pay a monthly salary of Rs. 700-to one of its employees would be assessed to income tax and the department would not easily let him of unless he was maintaining his accounts in a regular manner. Moreover the deceased is said to have been assessed to income tax and copies of assesment orders or treasury receipts with regard to deposit of Income tax may have furnished better evidence about his income at the time of his death.

3.

Anyhow, the deceaed is said to have been paying rent electricity and water charges in respect of his residential accommodation in Chandi- garh in an amount running almost into three figures He was maintain-ing a family comprised of about six members and educating all his chil- dren, the eldest of who was said to be in a College. Under the circum- stances, the learned Tribunal may appear to have been justified in assuming that the monthly income of the deceased could not have been more then Rs. 300.per month. The deceased was a mere matriculate and had not specialized in any techical line, trade or profession. He was only an unskilled wage earner and had no regular employment and security of tenure on his last job. According to the statement made by the widow, the deceased had this income until about a few months before his death. The story about the sudden increase in his income because of his employment by Sukhdev Singh contractor has rightly been disbelived. The deceased had to do a lot of runing about and his personal expenses have alto been fiarly assessed by the learned Tribunal at about Rs. 100 per month. The loss of income to the dep- endants has therefore been taken to be about Rs. 200- per month. No just exceptions can be taken to these calculations of the learned Trib- unal.

4.

The decased''s age at the time of the death was given as 44-45 years though no reliable evidence has been examined in that respect. Most of the members of the decesed''s family are said to have lived up to the ripe old age of 80 years or more. Even this part of the case could have been better proved by copies of entries in the registers of births and de- ahs. My attention has however been drawn to some recent rulings whi- ch take the view that average life expectancy in India should in such cases be taken as 7 vears. A Division Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Shiv Prasad Gupta v. S. M. Sabir Zaidi 1967 A. C. J. 321 has been cited in this connection. This ruling was followed in two Bench decisions of this Court reported as Mrs, Savitri Devi and Anr. v. The Malerko- tla Pus Service (P) Ltd., (1969) 71 P L R 306 and Sukhdev Singh v. Pepusu Road Tra- nsport Coporation Patiala.1969 A C J 197 The same view may appear to have been tak- en in Gomathi Amwal and Ors. v. Ramachadran Pillai and another,l967 A C J 15 but the deceased in that case had already attained the age of 63 years at the time of his death in an accident In Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, bhopal and another v. Mullai 1967 A. C J 214 the average life expectancy was taken to be 75 years. There was however evidence in all such cases that the members of the deceased''s family were generally long lived. In the present case the average longevity of life of other members of the deceased''s family or the evidence about the age of the deceased at the time of the accident is not very convincing. The learned Tribunal has calculated the amount of compensation as if the deceased could be expected to have lived for another 15 years or so. In view of the rulings mentioned above with regard to expectation of longer living spans, the Appellants could, in my opinion, be awarded compensation as if the deceased could''be expected to have lived for another 2O years. On this assumption, the quantum of compensation would go up to a substantial amount and the interest earned on that amount at most reasonable rates would secure to the family the approximate income which was being spent on them by the decased. This lump-sum payment would also compensate them for any hopes of brightening up of future prospects of the deceased. I however see no reason why the normal cut or deduction because of this lump-sum payment should not be made at the rate adopted by the learned Tribunal. The Appellants'' counsel has relied on Punjab State v. Smt. Hardeep Kaur (1969) 71 P. L R 837 Prem Singh and Ors. v. Tika Ram 1987 A C J 243 Narin Devi v. Dev Raj 1967 A C J 344 and Himachal Government\\Transport Simla v. Joginder Singh (1970) 72 P L R 42 in this connection but the circumstances of each case have to be kept in mind was observed in Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi and Ors. v. Chu-ni Lai and others 1969 A C J 237 and some of the rulings cited above, on the basis of 15 years expectation of life the amount of compensation had been calculated to Rs. 36 000 and a cut of 16% had been imposed by the learned Tribunal. If we take the expectation of life of about 20 years than the amount of total compensation would come to Rs. 48,000 and a deduction of Rs. 8,000 for the limp sum payment Could de made on proreta basis.

5.

The appeal is partly accepted and the amount of total compensathe payable to the Appellants is raised to Rs. 40,000. The share of each Appellant shall be taken to have been enhanced by a sum of Rs. 2,000. Parties are left to bear their own costs.