Rajiv Gupta vs State of Haryana

H.S. Bedi, J. (Oral)

The petitioner is a Director of the Motor & General Finance Limited, having its registered office at 17B, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi. The business of the Company pertains to dealing in hire purchase/leasing and financing of chassis of motor vehicles, cars, machinery and heavy equipment. REspondent No. 2 Jai Pal Singh alongwith his father Zile Singh and respondent No. 3 Sunehra Singh approached the petitioner''s company on 10th April, 1990 for seeking finance for the purpose of purchase of a truck. A Hire Purchase Agreement Annexure 5 was duly executed by respondent No. 2 and the same was also signed by respondent No. 3 as a guarantor. In the Hire Purchase Agreement, it was agreed between the parties that the total sum advanced would be Rs. 4,31,798/ which would include the value of the chassis, hire purchase charges and insurance for the 2nd and third years. At the time of the execution or the agreement, respondent No. 2 also deposited a sum of Rs. 97,298/ towards the initial payment in addition to a sum of Rs. 251/ as documentation charges etc. and as per Schedule B of the agreement, the balance sum of Rs. 3,34,500/ was to be remitted to the Company in 35 monthly instalments. The vehicle was duly registered at Jind and allotted Registration No. HR 31/1358. It appears that respondent No. 2 paid instalments amounting to Rs. 67,200/ and, thereafter defaulted leaving a balance of Rs. 2,76,000/ towards the instalments that were due and Rs. 1,10,710/ towards compensation charges for their late payment. As respondent No. 2 committed a series of defaults in the repayment of the purchase money, the Company issued a notice to him on 6th April, 1992 through respondent No. 3 Sunehra Singh calling upon him to pay the balance amount. The case of respondent No. 2 is that on receipt of the notice, he paid a sum of Rs. 1,63,200/ to respondent No. 3 to be paid into the accounts of the Company in discharge of his total liability on account of the hire purchase. The company, however, denied having received any money, with the result that on 21st January, 1993, the Inspector of the Company seized the vehicle in question in terms of Condition 4 of the agreement which gave the Company the right to do so in case of default. This action of the Company led to the filing of the complaint Annexure 7 dated 28th March, 1993 annexed with this petition. The Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Karnal, vide his order dated 14th July, 1993, summoned the petitioner as an accused for an offence under Section 372 of the I.P.C. (should be read as 382 thereof). Both the complaint as also the summoning order have been impugned in this petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Notice was issued in this case and the reply has also been filed on behalf of respondent No. 2.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record with their help.

It will be seen that the petitioner has been summoned for offences punishable under Sections 382/406 of the Indian Penal Code. Taking the second offence first, it would be noted that even in the case put up by the complainant in the complaint, the positive case is that the money if at all, was entrusted to respondent No. 3 Sunehra Singh and the petitioner had no connection with the transaction whatsoever. To my mind, therefore, no offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code can be spelt out against the petitioner. The offence under Section 382 of the I.P.C. is also equally not made out as under condition 4 of the HIre Purchase Agreement referred to above, the Company had full right to seize the vehicle in question, in case default was committed in the repayment of the instalments. As the Company had full right to seize the truck in question, the question of any theft did not arise. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Sardar Trilok Singh and others v. Satya Deo Tripathi, 1979(4) SCC 396 dealing with a similar situation held that where the property was seized pursuant to a Hire Purchase Agreement, the culpability under Sections 390/391 of the I.P.C. would not arise as the dispute arising out of a contract was purely of a civil nature. The ratio of this judgment fully applies to the facts of the case in hand. This petition is accordingly allowed, and the complaint as also the summoning order qua the petitioner are quashed.