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Judgment
7 paragraphs · 1,088 wordsS.K. Agarwal, J.—List has been revised. None is present to press this appeal nor any body has appeared even to make any mention. In the result, I propose to conclude the hearing of this appeal with the assistance of learned A.G.A.
I have gone through the judgment of the learned special Judge, Unnao, Sri P. S. Malhotra who vide his judgment and order dated 4.3.1986 had convicted the Appellant u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and awarded him a sentence of 3 months R.I. Aggrieved by the abovesaid order and judgment, the present appeal was instituted by the Appellant.
Brief facts of the case are that on 13.10.1982 Marketing Inspector Sri Sri Pal had visited the rice huller of the Appellant. The inspection revealed that the Appellant has no licence for carrying on the rice hulling operations. It was also found that about 11 bags, weighing one quintal each, of rice and 24 bags of paddy was lying in the mill. The recovery memo, Ext. Ka.-1 was prepared regarding the abovesaid foodgrain articles. A report was lodged by Marketing Inspector at P.S. Achalganj. After, the investigation a charge-sheet was submitted by the police.
The prosecution in support of its case examined 3 witnesses. Out of them, Sri Sri Pal, P.W. 2, is Marketing Inspector. He conducted all the proceedings on 13.10.1982. Rest of the witnesses are formal in nature. P.W. 3 is head constable. He had prepared Ex. Ka-2, F.I.R. and general diary entry is Ex. Ka-3. S.I. Shyam Sundar Tripathi, P.W. 3, had conducted the investigation and submitted a charge-sheet against the Appellant. It is further brought on record that the original F.I.R. was reportedly lost and Ex. Ka-2 which is the carbon copy of that F.I.R. therefore, was brought on record by the prosecution. Since the defence has not challenged this carbon copy of the F.I.R., therefore, this question is not to be gone into by this Court.
The defence case is of denial. It is asserted by the Appellant that the rice recovered from his premises did not belong to him but was left by Sheo Darshan and Ram Autar. These two witnesses corroborated the case of the Appellant but their testimonies are of no consequence. They were got up witnesses and their evidences cannot be relied upon. A very strange course has been adhered to by the special Judge in dropping the charge against the Appellant for running the rice huller without a licence on the ground that no complaint was filed as required u/s 15 of Rice Milling Industries (Regulation) Act, 1958. This Act lays down that "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by the licensing officer or any person duly authorised by the Central Government or the licensing officer in this behalf." The Court has inferred from the abovesaid language that it is necessarily indicating to the filing of a complaint by the licensing authority or any person who was authorised to do so by him or by Central Government. On the abovesaid basis, he had dropped the charge of running a rice huller without a license against the Appellant. The Government has not preferred any appeal or revision against the dropping of the charge and acquittal of the Appellant for that charge became final. However, the learned Sessions Judge has convicted the Appellant for possession of 11 bags of rice and 24 bags of paddy. In all 29 Qs. of foodgrain at his premises was found. His possession was found by him to be in violation of Sub-clause (1) of Clause 3 of U.P. Foodgrains Dealers'' (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1976, he proceeded to convict the accused. In my opinion, this approach, adhered to by the learned special Judge is barred in law, once the prosecution of the Appellant was dropped for running the rice huller without a valid licence. The fact that a rice huller belonging to the Appellant was in existence remained undisputed. The Appellant could have only been convicted for having no licence for operating a huller but he vice versa could not have been convicted for running a shop of foodgrains on the assumption that his possession of so much foodgrain was in excess of minimum permissible quantity under the aforesaid order. The abovesaid order allowed possession of any individual of foodgrain upto 10 Qs. The charge against the Appellant was dependent upon his running a rice huller. Once the charge against him for operating the rice huller without a licence is dropped for whatever reason, his possession of two foodgrains item cannot otherwise be declared an offence for the contravention of the provision of the abovesaid order and it cannot be otherwise re-considered once that charge fell. The prosecution was dependant upon his non-possession of a licence for running a rice huller and the dropping of charge on that count will not entail any other consequence against him. Thus, against the Appellant such a course as adhered to by the special Judge is not permissible in law especially when the entire case against the Appellant rests on the above ground alone. The possession of paddy and hulled rice was not for sale. It is not impossible that paddy might have been brought to him for getting the same hulled and rice extracted from it by other persons. Conviction as such will be bad in law.
The special Judge, in my opinion, has misread the language of Section 15 of the Rice Miller Industries (Regulation) Act, 1958. It does not clearly mean that a complaint is required by the licencing authority or any person to whom this power was delegated by the Central Government or the licensing officer. It can very well be a F.I.R. and the charge-sheet shall be treated as a complaint made by that officer himself if he has authorised the prosecution but as earlier stated since his acquittal was not challenged by the prosecution before this Court, the order cannot be reversed and the Appellant''s conviction cannot be upheld u/s 7 of Essential Commodities Act for the reasons detailed above.
In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The conviction of the Appellant u/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and his consequent sentence of 3 months R.I. is hereby set aside. He is acquitted. He is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bond is cancelled and surety bonds are hereby discharged.
