Rajkumar (Decd.) Thru: Smt.Dhanpatdevi (Deceased And Deleted As Per Court Order Dt. 04/092024) And O And Others vs State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others

Pavan Kumar Dwivedi, J

Present is an appeal by the land owner in terms of the provision of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 challenging the award dated 19.07.2013 passed in reference case No.37/2012 by the District Judge, Ujjain whereby the reference filed by the appellant in terms of Section 18 has been allowed in part in as much as the compensation amount was enhanced however declining relief of compensation based on award passed in the case of Rajkumar Johari.

The facts of the case are that the appellant is the owner and title holder of the land situated at Survey Nos.692/1, 695, 701, 693, 691, 700, 705 and 708 total area admeasuring 2.134 Hectares of village-Nanakheda, Tehsil and District, Ujjain. The aforesaid land of the appellant was sought to be acquired by the Ujjain Development Authority for its development scheme No.23 for the year 1979. Accordingly, notification under Section 4 was issued on 16.02.1979 thereafter declaration in terms of Section 6 was made by issuing notification on 13.04.1979. The award was passed on 21.04.1980. The appellant was awarded compensation to the tune of Rs.87,985/-. The appellant initially did not challenge the award of the land acquisition officer, however, several other persons including Prakash Chandra S/o Vanshidhar and Rajkumar Johari S/o Dwarkadaas Johari filed cases for enhancement of compensation. In the case of Prakash Chandra, award was passed by the district court in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on 22.07.1991. The appellant pursuant to the award in the case of Prakash Chandra filed an application in terms of Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act before the respondent No.1/land acquisition officer for redetermination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award passed by the district court in the case of Prakash Chandra. The land acquisition officer kept the said application pending in view of the fact that against the said award first appeal was pending before this Court.

The appeal in the case of Prakash Chandra was decided by this Court vide judgment dated 25.11.1994 along with appeals of several other persons (F.A. No.186/1992). The said judgment of this Court was put to challenge by the said Prakash Chandra before the Hon'ble Apex Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 20.02.1999 remanded the matter back to the reference court with an observation that market value of the land be redetermined after granting opportunity to lead evidence to both the parties. After remand by the Hon'ble Apex Court the reference court passed award on 12.10.2000 in the case of Prakash Chandra (Ex.P-4) whereby the market value of the land was redetermined at Rs.2,52,000/- per hectare.

The application filed by the present appellant in terms of Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act was thereafter decided by the land acquisition officer vide order dated 03.01.2007 thereby holding that as the land acquisition proceedings were initiated in the year 1979 and the award was passed on 20.01.1979, the provisions of Section 28A will not apply as they were inserted vide Amendment Act, 1984. The said order of the land acquisition was put to challenge by the present appellant before this Court by filing W.P. No.1320/2007. The said writ petition was allowed by this Court vide order dated 03.10.2007 thereby holding that provisions of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act are applicable in the present matter, thus, the same was directed to be decided afresh. Simultaneously, considering the subsequent development, the appellant was also permitted to amend the application filed under Section 28A of the aforesaid Act.

Pursuant to the aforesaid order passed by this Court, the land acquisition officer passed fresh order on 24.06.2008 whereby the application of the appellant was allowed and the rate of the land of the appellant was determined at Rs.41,235/- per Bigha in accordance with the rates decided by this Court vide judgment dated 25.11.1994 in F.A. No.186/1992. The appellant being aggrieved by this preferred reference in terms of Section 18 before the district court raising two issues; first, even in the case of Prakash Chandra Ex.P-4 is the subsequent award whereby the rate of land was determined at Rs.2,52,000/- per Hectare and second, during pendency of the proceedings award dated 31.03.2003 was passed in the case of one Rajkumar Johari in which the market value of the land was determined as Rs.6 Lacs per hectare. The appellant thus claimed compensation for his land on the basis of market value determined in the case of Rajkumar Johari. The district court vide order dated 19.07.2013 allowed the reference in part whereby to the extent that the rates should have been decided as per final award passed in the case of Prakash Chandra (Ex.P-4) was allowed, however, the rates determined in the case of Rajkumar Johari were declined to be applied. The reasoning given by the reference court for this was that the appellant filed application under Section 28A based on the award passed in the case of Prakash Chandra and the award passed in the case of Rajkumar Johari was not the basis for determination. It was also considered that the award in the case of Rajkumar Johari Ex.P-3 was passed on 21.03.2003. The appellant sought amendment in his Section 28A application before the land acquisition officer by filing application on 17.01.2008 which is well beyond the limitation of 3 months in terms of Section 28A proviso, thus, the same was not permitted. The appellant being aggrieved by this determination has come before this Court by way of instant appeal.

The learned counsel for the appellant while criticizing the award of the reference court submits that Ex.P-3 is an award passed with respect to the land of Rajkumar Johari which was acquired in the same land acquisition proceedings by way of same notification. He submits that the issue of limitation could not have been decided against the appellant in view of the fact that the application under Section 28A was filed by the appellant on 19.10.1991 itself and the award in the case of Rajkumar Johari was passed on 31.03.2003. Thus, the amendment was sought in the year 2008 for the reason that earlier Section 28A application of the appellant was dismissed by the land acquisition officer on 03.01.2007 and it was restored by this Court on 03.12.2007 in W.P. No.1320/2007. Thus, the amendment application was filed in the year 2008, hence, there was no delay at all. He further submits that the objective of Section 28A is to grant compensation to all similarly situated persons by applying same parameters, thus, if the approach as adopted by the respondent is permitted then the very object of inserting Section 28A will be frustrated. Learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the land of the appellant and Rajkumar Johari is similarly situated, thus, he prays for allowing the appeal by directing to grant compensation to the appellant similar to Rajkumar Johari.

Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supports the award of the reference court and submits that the original award was passed in the year 1989. The award in the case of Rajkumar Johari was passed on 31.03.2003 and the application by the appellant was filed under Section 28A on 19.10.1991 based on the case of Prakash Chandra. He submits that as the basis for redetermination of compensation was the case of Prakash Chandra thus now the appellant cannot be permitted to turn around and shift the basis of determination to some other case that too beyond the period of limitation, he thus, prays for dismissal of the appeal.

Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Singular question which has been posed for determination in the present appeal is whether the rates ultimately determined in the case of Rajkumar Johari were to be taken as the basis for deciding the application filed by the appellant under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act or the reference court has correctly discarded the same. For determining this issue, three facts are relevant; first, that the original application filed by the appellant under Section 28A before the land acquisition officer was based on the award passed in the case of Prakash Chandra; second, the award in the case of Rajkumar Johari was passed on 31.03.2003 after remand by the Hon'ble Apex Court and third, this award of 2003 was requested to be the award for redetermination of compensation by the appellant by way of amendment application which was filed on 17.01.2008 before the land acquisition officer. Now, these three facts if seen in view of the provisions of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act and the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India and another Vs. Pradeep Kumari and others, 1995 (2) SCC 736 as well as Andanayya Vs. Deputy Chief Engineer and others, 2026 SCC Online 482 then an inescapable conclusion comes to the fore that the reference court has correctly decided the application. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari (supra) has held in para 9, 10 and 11 has under:-

"9. A perusal of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the Act would show that after an award is made under Part III whereby the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, a right accrues to a person interested in the other land covered by the same notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 who is also aggrieved by the award of the Collector but who had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, to move an application before the Collector for re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him on the basis of the amount compensation awarded by the court. This application for re- determination of compensation is required to be made within three months from the date of the award of the court. The right to make the application under Section 28-A arises from the award of the court on the basis of which the person making the application is seeking re-determination of the compensation. There is nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that is made by the Court after the coming into force of Section 28-A. By construing the expression 'where in an award under this Part' in sub¬section (1) of Section 28-A to mean 'where in the first award made by the court under this Part, the word 'first', which is not found in sub¬section (1) of Section 28-A, is being read therein and thereby the amplitude of the said provision is being curtailed so as to restrict the benefit conferred by it. In the matter of construction of a beneficient provision it is not permissible by judicial interpretation to read words which are not there and thereby restrict the scope of the said provision. [See : Jnan Ranjan Sen Gupta and Ors. v. Arun Kumar Base, [1975] 2 SCC 526. at p.530.]

It is possible to visualise a situation where in the first award that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A the enhancement b the amount of compensation by the said award is not very significant for the reason that the person who sought the reference was not able to produce adequate evidence in support of his claim and in another reference where the award was made by the court subsequently such evidence is produced before the court and a much higher amount is awarded as compensation in the said award. By restricting the benefit of Section 28-A to the first award that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A the benefit of higher amount of compensation on the basis of the subsequent award made by the court would be denied "to the persons invoking Section 28-A and the benefit of the said provision would be confined to re¬determination of compensation on the basis of lesser amount of compensation awarded under the first award that is made after the A to indicate that the legislature intended to confer such a limited benefit under Section 28-A. Similarly, there may be a situation, as in the present case, where the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act covers lands falling in different villages and a number of references at the instance of persons having lands in different villages were pending in the court on the date of coming into force of Section 28-A and awards in those references are made by the court on different dates. A person who is entitled to apply under Section 28-A belonging to a particular village may come to know of the first award that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A in a reference at the instance of a person belonging to another village, after the expiry of the period of three months from the date of the said award but he may come to know of the subsequent award that is made by the court in the reference at the instance of a person belonging to the same village before the expiry of the period of three months from the date of the said award. This is more likely to happen in the case of inarticulate and poor people who cannot be expected to keep track of all the references that were pending in court on the date of coming into force of Section 28-A and may not be in a position to know, in time, about the first award that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A. By holding that the award referred to in Section 28-A(l) is the first award made after the coming into force of Section 28-A, such persons would be deprived of the benefit extended by Section 28-

A. Such a construction would thus result in perpetuating the inequality in the payment of compensation which the legislature wanted to remove by enacting Section 28-A. The object underlying Section 28-A would be better achieved by giving the expression "an award" in Section 28-A its natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of Section 28-A. If the said expression in Section 28-A(l) is thus construed, a person would be able to seek re-determination of the amount of compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are satisfied :-

(i) An award has been made by the court under Part III after the coming in to force of Section 28-A;

(ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference;

(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;

(iv) The person moving the application did not make an application to the Collector under Section 18;

(v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is sought; and

(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A for re¬determination of compensation by an applicant.

Since the cause of action for moving the application for re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A arises from the award on the basis of which re- determination of compensation is sought, the principle that "once the limitation begins to run, it runs in its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the court" can have no application because the limitation for moving the application under Section 28-A will begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which re-determination of compensation is sought."

It is thus clear that as per the Hon'ble Apex Court, only one application can be moved under Section 28A for redetermination of compensation and that has to be within three months from the date of the award on the basis of which the redetermination of amount for compensation is sought. In the present case, undisputedly, the award in the case of Rajkumar Johri was passed on 31.03.2023. The application for amendment was moved for relying said award on 17.01.2008 which is well beyond the prescribed time limit of three months. Not only this, a perusal of findings recorded by the reference court in para 12 would show that the court found that the land of Prakash Chandra is situated just adjacent to the land of the present appellant whereas the land of Rajkumar Johari is situated on some distance from the land of the appellant. Considering the same, reference court did not grant the relief of applying market value in the case of Rajkumar Johari. In the considered view of this Court, the conclusion drawn by the reference court is correct, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari (supra), the person interested can move application under Section 28A only once that too within the prescribed period of three months.

In the present case, the appellant filed an application under Section 28A based on the award passed in the case of Prakash Chandra (supra). The reference court relying on the final award passed in the case of said person (Prakash Chandra) Ex.P-4 awarded same rate of land in the case of appellant also. Thus, no fault can be found in the order passed by the reference court. Resultantly, appeal being bereft of merits is hereby dismissed.