Rajni Devi vs State of Himachal Pradesh and Others

Rajiv Sharma, J—This petition has been filed for the cancellation of the bail order, dated 14.01.2015, rendered by the learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (H.P.), in Bail Application No. 344-D/XXII-2014 and also order, dated 15.05.2015, rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (H.P.) in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 19/2015.

Key facts necessary for the adjudication of this application are that an FIR No. 215/14 was registered on 29.10.2014 against the respondent No. 2, under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (H.P.) granted the bail to the respondent No. 2 on 14.01.2015 by passing a reasoned order and by imposing the following conditions:--

"1. The bail applicant/accused shall not contact any witness connected with this case till his/her statement is recorded. In case he is found indulged in such practice, then his bail is liable to be cancelled at once.

The bail applicant/accused shall not hamper the trial in any manner and shall attend every date of hearing of the case without fail, so that the trial comes to an end expeditiously.

The bail applicant/accused will not leave India without prior permission of this Court."

Petitioner has stayed thrice in a hotel at Amb and The Yellow Hotel Baglamukhi from 14.02.2014 to 21.10.2014 with respondent No. 2. The FIR No. 215/14 was already registered on 29.10.2014. Now, as far as registration of an offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is concerned, the respondent No. 2 also belongs to Scheduled Caste category. Thus, no offence was made out under this Section. The learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. has considered the material placed on record while granting the bail. Petitioner has also filed an FIR No. 58/15 against the respondent No. 2, under Sections 341, 354, 506 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code. She also moved a Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 19/15 for cancellation of the bail granted to respondent No. 2 on 14.01.2015 by the learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (H.P.) in Bail Application No. 344-D/XXII-2014. The application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (H.P.) on 15.05.2015. Hence this application.

The learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. has dismissed the application vide order, dated 15.05.2015 by passing a reasoned and detailed order. There are contradictions in the statement of petitioner as well as in the statement of her friend Shabnam, the manner in which the respondent No. 2 has threatened the petitioner. The grounds for cancellation of bail are entirely different from granting of bail. The learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, H.P. after applying correct principles has rejected the application on 15.05.2015. There is neither any perversity nor illegality in the order, dated 14.01.2015, rendered by the learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (H.P.), passed in Bail Application No. 344-D/XXII-2014 and order, dated 15.05.2015, rendered by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (H.P.) in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 19/2015.

Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Sanjay Gandhi, AIR 1978 SC 961 : (1978) CriLJ 952 : (1978) 2 SCC 411 : (1978) SCC(Cri) 223 : (1978) 3 SCR 950 : (1978) 10 UJ 534 have held that rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing, cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. It is easier to reject a bail application in a non-bailable case than to cancel a bail granted in such a case. Their Lordships have held as under:

"13. Rejection of bail when bail is applied for is one thing; cancellation of bail already granted is quite another. It is easier to reject a bail application in a non-bailable case than to cancel a bail granted in such a case. Cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made and can by and large be permitted only if, by reason of supervening circumstances, it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial. The fact that prosecution witnesses have turned hostile cannot by itself justify the inference that the accused has won them over. A brother, a sister or a parent who has seen the commission of crime, may resile in the Court from a statement recorded during the course of investigation. That happens instinctively, out of natural love and affection, not out of persuasion by the accused. The witness has a stake in the innocence of the accused and tries therefore to save him from the guilt. Likewise, an employee may, out of a sense of gratitude, oblige the employer by uttering an untruth without pressure or persuasion. In other words, the objective fact that witnesses have turned hostile must be shown to bear a causal connection with the subjective involvement therein of the respondent. Without such proof, a bail once granted cannot be cancelled on the off chance or on the supposition that witnesses have been won over by the accused. Inconsistent testimony can no more be ascribed by itself to the influence of the accused than consistent testimony, by itself, can be ascribed to the pressure of the prosecution. Therefore, Mr. Mulla is right that one has to countenance a reasonable possibility that the employees of Maruti like the approver Yadav might have, of their own volition, attempted to protect the respondent from involvement in criminal charges. Their willingness now to oblige the respondent would depend upon how much the respondent has obliged them in the past. It is therefore necessary for the prosecution to show some act or conduct on the part of the respondent from which a reasonable inference may arise that the witnesses have gone back on their statements as a result of an intervention by or on behalf of the respondent."

In Parakshita Pradhan Vs. Bairagi Pradhan and Another, (1991) CriLJ 1519 : (1990) 3 OCR 652 , the learned Single Judge has held that very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for the cancellation of bail.

Their Lordships of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in D.K. Jain and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others, (1995) 70 FLR 871 : (1994) 7 JT 751 : (1994) 4 SCALE 1121 : (1995) 1 SCC 349(1) Supp : (1995) 1 SCC 349 : (1994) 6 SCR 104 Supp have held that rejection of bail in non-bailable offence and cancellation of bail already granted must be considered and dealt with on different basis. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have spelt out the grounds for cancellation of bail broadly as under:

"........interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the Court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial."

In Banchhanidhi Samal Vs. Arjuna Rout and Others, (2000) 90 CLT 598 : (2000) CriLJ 3257 : (2000) 18 OCR 283 : (2000) 1 OLR 342 , the learned Single Judge has held that mere allegation that accused terrorize the prosecution witness in the absence of any corroborative evidence is not sufficient. The learned Single Judge has held as under:

"8. It appears from the bail order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that while allowing the opposite party members to go on bail conditions were imposed. One of the conditions is not to induce or terrorise or gain over the prosecution witnesses. Referring to Annexures, 3, 4 two FIRs, an additional affidavit of the petitioner along with the FIR Annexures A and B learned counsel for the petitioner argued that several overt acts have been made by the opposite party members to attack, assault and terrorise the prosecution witnesses. The aforesaid allegations do not inspire confidence inasmuch as though the said FIRs dates back to 1996 and 1997, no document has been filed by the petitioner to show or suggest that on the basis of such FIR investigations were conducted and charge-sheets were filed. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that petitioners had at any point of time approached the trial Court for protection on the ground of accused persons terrorising the prosecution witnesses. Thus, on the basis of mere allegations made by the informant and the prosecution witnesses and in the absence of any corroborative evidence such allegations cannot be acted upon so as to curtail the liberty granted in favour of the opposite party members."

Consequently, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed. No costs.