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N.V. Anjaria, J.—Petitioner-Rajya General Kamdar Mandal, by filing the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution has prayed to set aside order dated 31st January, 2015 which is common below Exhibit 37 as well as below Exhibit 40. Thereby the Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara allowed Application Exhibit 40 by the first party employer granting it permission to be represented by an advocate, accepting on record Vakalatpatra of the advocate at Exhibit 37. The relevant facts in the background are inter alia that the respondent No. 2-employer shutdown its manufacturing operations with effect from 26th April, 2004 and the plant is stated not to be in operation since then. It was its case that it issued notice for closure under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. At the instance of petitioner-Union the competent authority made an order of Reference on 10th January, 2005. The demand raised is that "workers working in the company should be given work as per their post and grade which they were holding before 26th April, 2004 and till workers are given their original work, they should be paid Rs. 10,000/- compensation for mental harassment". Before the Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara said Reference proceedings are pending being Reference (IT) No. 12 of 2005.
In the said pending Reference, the respondent No. 2-employer had made an application (Exh. 11) under Section 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter mentioned as ''the Act'') for engaging an advocate. The said application came to be rejected by the Tribunal by order dated 27th June, 2005.
2.1. Putting-forth a case that no industrial dispute exists within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act, the respondent No. 2 challenged the aforesaid order dated 10th February, 2005 of making Reference, before this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 15652 of 2005. The said petition came to be rejected by order dated 27th June, 2005. Letters Patent Appeal was preferred against the said order. On 03rd October, 2005, the Division Bench admitted the Appeal and granted interim stay observing that the order passed by the Labour Commissioner making Reference was not competent. On 18th February, 2014, Letters Patent Appeal however came to be dismissed. Against the said order, the respondent No. 2 filed Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 15901 of 2014 before the Apex Court.
2.2. The Apex Court initially granted interim order and by order dated 01st December, 2014 directed the Industrial Tribunal to decide the preliminary issue. The said order of the Apex Court reads as under.
"Heard the learned counsel.
Looking at the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that it would be just and appropriate to pass an interim order.
The Industrial Tribunal, Gujarat at Bharuch, shall carry out the direction given by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 15652 of 2005 by its order dated 27th September, 2005, and shall also decide the preliminary issue whether the reference is maintainable or it survives. The decision shall be taken after hearing the concerned parties within three months from the date of receipt of this order.
List the matter on 6th April, 2015.
Interim relief, granted by this Court on 11th August, 2014, shall stand modified."
2.3. Thus in the above order the Apex Court has required the Tribunal to decide the preliminary issue about maintainability or survival of the Reference with reference to the facts involved. Time limit is set down for such decision. It appears that the said order was received in the Industrial Tribunal on 22nd December, 2014. Respondent No. 2 filed his application (Exh. 40) seeking permission to engage an advocate, contending inter alia that the representative Union of the Workmen''s Union was a practicing advocate in the Court. The Tribunal allowed the application and permitted respondent No. 2 to engage an advocate. The petitioner-Union is aggrieved and has filed the present writ petition questioning the same.
Learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. M.S. Mansuri raised following contentions:-
(i) The impugned order is barred by doctrine of res judicata and the similar principles because earlier order dated 27th June, 2005 was passed whereby the Tribunal had refused permission to the employer to engage advocate. In support of his contention, learned advocate relied on decision in Burn and Co., Calcutta Vs. Their Employees, AIR 1957 SC 38 : (1957) 1 LLJ 226 : (1956) 1 SCR 781 as well as decision of this Court in Indian Oil Corporation Vs. Secretary - Gujarat Petroleum Employees Union, (2008) 118 FLR 60 : (2008) 2 LLJ 21 , as also decision of the Madras High Court in P. Selvaraj and Others Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and The Management, (2011) 2 LLJ 866 to contend that in the industrial adjudication, the principles of res judicata have application;
(ii) The impugned order amounts to review and since there is no provision under the Act which gives power to review, the order permitting engagement of advocate to the employer amounted to review of the earlier order passed in 2005. In order to buttress this proposition, learned advocate relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union Vs. Management of Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and Another, AIR 2005 SC 1782 : (2005) 105 FLR 416 : (2005) 2 LLJ 271 : (2005) 13 SCC 777 : (2006) SCC(L&S) 1635 : (2005) 2 SCR 888 : (2005) 2 SLJ 338 . He relied on another decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sen Gupta and Another being Civil Appeal No. 1694 of 2006 decided on 16th June, 2008. Learned advocate for the same proposition that review was not permitted, relied on oral judgment dated 05th May, 2010 of this Court in ONGC v. Parmar Pravinbhai Girdharbhai being Special Civil Application No. 5658 of 2010, as also a Bombay High Court decision in Sudhir Janardhan Desai Vs. Hyphosphite and Co., Mahindra Chimanlal Shah, Ramesh Chimanlal Shah, The Recovery Officer, Government Dues and Shri P.J. Shah, Presiding Officer, Third Labour Court, (2004) 5 BomCR 30 : (2005) 1 LLJ 302 : (2004) 4 MhLj 223 ;
(iii) Once the petitioner refused permission, the employer could not have been allowed representation by lawyer in view of clear bar under Section 36(4) of the Act. On the applicability and interpretation of sub-section (4) of Section 36, the learned advocate relied on decision in Paradip Port Trust, Paradip Vs. Their Workmen, AIR 1977 SC 36 : (1977) 43 CLT 419 : (1976) LabIC 770 : (1976) 2 LLJ 409 : (1977) 2 SCC 339 : (1977) 1 SCR 537 , more particularly para 15 to 18 and 19 to 23 and 26 thereof. Learned advocate next relied on the decision in N.K. Bajpai Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, AIR 2012 SC 1310 : (2012) 2 CTC 449 : (2012) 190 ECR 159 : (2012) 3 RCR(Civil) 459 : (2012) 3 SCALE 452 : (2012) 4 SCC 653 : (2012) AIRSCW 1974 : (2012) 2 Supreme 417 to submit that Section 36(4) is a permissible reasonable restriction and is valid under the Constitution, by referring to paragraphs para 10 to 21 and 23 to 25. He further relied on decision of this Court in Jyoti Switchgears Ltd. v. Kaira Jill Factory Kamdar Union 1977 (1) LLN 165 : LNIND 1975 GUJ 13 to submit that right to appear as an advocate under Section 30 of the Advocates Act is not absolute but subject to Section 36(4) of the Act. By placing reliance on Gujarat Flavours Pvt. Ltd and Another Vs. Rajubhai @ Tulsidas R. Patel and Another, (2011) 131 FLR 233 : (2011) 2 GLH 1809 for the proposition that qualified legal practitioner can appear on behalf of the party and represent the case, but the only proviso applicable to it would be that he must be either an office bearer and/or member of executive of a registered trade union where he represents the workman or he must be an officer of association of employers if he represents the employer. In that case Labour Court denying the appearance of advocate was upheld;
(iv) For same proposition, decision in J.B. Transport and Others v. Shankarlal @ Mavaram Nathuji Patel being Letters Patent Appeal No. 1101 of 1998 decided on 09th August, 1998; Laxmi Engineering Industries Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2003) 97 FLR 703 : (2003) 3 RLW 1735 : (2003) 1 WLC 713 ; Prasar Bharati Broadcasting Corporation of India Vs. Shri Suraj Pal Sharma and Another, (1999) 1 AD 268 : (1999) 77 DLT 269 : (1999) 1 LLJ 1306 ; Sandoz (India) Ltd. Vs. Association of Chemical Workers and Another, (1997) 3 MhLj 684 ; Chandrakant Deshkar and Others Vs. All India Reporter Ltd. and Another, (2005) 105 FLR 300 : (2005) 2 LLJ 290 : (2005) 1 MhLj 1027 ;
(v) Learned advocate further relied on these judgments as well. (a) A Punjab and Haryana High Court decision in Hygienic Foods v. Jasbir Singh dated 13th November, 2009 in which it was held that advocate cannot appear as an officer of employers Association under Section 36(2) and such appearance is barred by Section 36(4) but advocate can appear as an office bearer of a trade union under section 36(1) without any restriction, (b) Order passed in SLP No. 10138 of 2010 and Civil Appeal No. 3784 of 2010 dated 08th May, 2014 arising out of the aforesaid case of Hygienic Foods v. Jasbir Singh (supra) (c) oral judgment dated 01st July, 2005 of this Court in Mohammad siddhique Kasambhai Qureshi v. Golden Theaters;
(vi) Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that decision in Paradip Port Trust v. Their workmen (supra) clearly lays down the law on the issue which is not followed by the Tribunal. He submitted that the Tribunal Committed apparent illegality in permitting advocate to appear and represent respondent No. 2.
3.1. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. N.K. Pahwa supported the impugned order. He submitted that after 2005, subsequent development has taken place which necessitated seeking permission to engage advocate so that the respondent No. 2 can properly defend its case when the workmen are represented by one Mr. M.S. Mansuri who is practicing advocate, though he appears in purported capacity of representative of the Union. Learned advocate submitted that respondent No. 2 has also thought it appropriate to challenge the earlier order passed in 2005 by the Industrial Tribunal by filing Special Civil Application No. 3602 of 2015.
3.2. Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 relied on decision in Schneider Electric India Private Limited v. Kailashben R. Valand, 2014 (2) GLR 1264 . Paragraphs 7 to 7.5 of the said decision was relied on and it was submitted that the facts were identical and the issue was similar in that case and this Court made pertinent observations and Paradip Port Trust v. Their workmen (supra) was also considered. He further relied on other decisions of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 3545 of 2015 in Veer Textile v. Babubhai Shahidbhai decided on 17th September, 2014, Special Civil Application No. 4242 of 2014 in Pramod Trading Company v. Maheshbhai Pujabhai Thakore decided on 17th October, 2014, relying on and following Schneider Electric India Private Limited v. Kailashben R. Valand (supra). Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 next relied on a Karnataka High Court decision in B. Yellappa Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd., (2008) ILR (Kar) 1228 : (2008) 2 LLJ 612 in which the Apex Court decision in Paradip Port Trust v. Their workmen (supra) was referred to.
3.3. Learned advocate for the respondent No. 2-employer, referred to the decision of J.B. Transport and Others v. Shankarlal @ Mavaram Nathuji Patel (supra) relied on by learned advocate for the petitioner and distinguished the same by submitting that the said decision was in the context of Section 36(2) and that the present case is about reading of Section 36(3) with Section 36(4). As regards the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Hygienic Foods v. Jasbir Singh (supra), which was pressed into service on behalf of the petitioner, learned advocate for respondent No. 2 referred to order of Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 10138 of 2010 which arose from the said Punjab and Haryana decision and submitted that the order of the Punjab High Court based on the decision in Paradip Port Trust v. Their workmen (supra) was stayed by the Apex Court and the SLP came to be disposed of.
3.4. Learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 then submitted that decision of the Karnataka High Court in B. Yellappa v. Steel Authority of India (supra) relied on by the Union was also taken before the Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 3784 of 2010 and the order was passed, in which the Supreme Court did not stay the proceedings before the Labour Court in respect of which the High Court interpreting Section 36(4) of the Act opined that the management is entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner who is an office bearer of an Association or Federation of employers notwithstanding that the authorized person is a legal practitioner, for the stipulation incorporated in sub-section (4) of Section 36 would not act as a bar. The Supreme Court directed the proceedings before the Labour Court to continue on condition that no side shall be represented before it by any practicing lawyer or any one who has a subsisting and alive licence granted by any Bar Councils under the Advocates Act.
3.5. As learned advocate for the petitioner-Union in his rejoinder had submitted that the decision in case of Schneider Electric India Private Limited v. Kailashben R. Valand (supra) was subjected to Letters Patent Appeal, the same was countered by learned advocate for the employer by submitting that the said judgment was not stayed and lastly on 04th March, 2015 as recorded by the Division Bench in the order, the issue was settled and the employer would be allowed to file Vakalatnama with endorsement of the workman and the proceedings before the Labour Court would be allowed to be proceeded with.
The contention on part of the learned advocate for the petitioner that the application (Exh. 40) was not maintainable in view of similar earlier application (Exh. 11) and order passed thereon on 27.06.2005, may be dealt with at the outset. The Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, ultimately exercises a discretionary power, though to be exercised on sound principles and by balancing the interests of the parties as to whether a permission to engage an advocate deserves to be granted or not. Firstly by virtue of very kind of provisions and nature of power exercised thereunder, it is difficult to accept that an order passed thereunder could be applied res judicata or analogous principles, by holding that once a request for engaging advocate was not entertained, at a subsequent stage similar application would no lie. As already stated, question of accepting or rejecting the prayer or permission to a party to engage an advocate is dependent upon the relevant facts and circumstances obtainable. It may be that the facts and circumstances attendant to the case at one point of time may undergo a change for one or many reasons, intervening events may have surfaced in the proceedings or subsequent development may have taken place. If a party files a fresh application seeking permission to engage an advocate on the basis of the changed events, it could not be thrown out on the ground that on earlier occasion such prayer was denied. In granting permission or refusing the permission to engage advocate, as such no issue is decided. This decision and the permission to be granted or refused depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case available and applied at a particular point of time when such request is made under the provision.
4.1. As the facts of this case go, proceedings traveled much ahead since the year 2005, at which stage, employer''s application (Exh. 11) seeking to engage an advocate was not accepted by the Industrial Tribunal. The employer contested his case on the premise that there was a closure and the Reference was therefore not maintainable. The order in the Writ Petition and the Letters Patent Appeal passed by this Court against the petitioner in respect of his challenge to Reference, was challenged before the Apex Court and the case is now considered by the Industrial Tribunal pursuant to the order of the Supreme Court dated 01.12.2014.
4.2. There was a change of set of circumstances in the background when respondent No. 2 opted to file an application (Exh. 40) seeking permission to engage advocate. The Reference was made by the competent authority in the year 2005 which was by raising demand noted as above. The case of the employer has been that it was manufacturing and exporting chlorinated rubber by use of raw material which was declared to be a ozone depleting substance under the Environment Protection Act and since there was no market for the product, the production was ultimately stopped and the operations shutdown resulting into closure of the plant. A closure notice under Section 25F(a)(i) of the Act read with the relevant Rules came to be given by the employer to the competent authority declaring intention to close down the company with effect form 06th November, 2004. In the context, it is the case of the employer that since there was a closure, the Reference was not maintainable. The proceedings of Writ Petition and the Letters Patent Appeal thereafter before this Court reached the Apex Court which resulted into the aforementioned order of the Apex Court, pursuant to which the Industrial Tribunal is required to decide as directed by the Apex Court, the preliminary issue whether Reference is maintainable or it survives. The circumstances has thus brought about a change in the scenario of proceedings where, the parties would be addressing the Industrial Tribunal on the legal issues with reference to the preliminary point to be decided as per the time bound direction of the Apex Court.
4.3. The Tribunal considered application (Exh. 40) of the employer seeking permission to engage advocate in the context of and in the wake of the set of facts obtainable in the stage of the proceedings as above. The Industrial Tribunal could not be said to have committed any error in entertaining the application. Merely because earlier in 2005, an application was filed and the request was not accepted, would not be a precluding factor either for the employer to move another application being application (Exh. 40) or a de-baring ground for the Industrial Tribunal not to entertain the same. The application (Exh. 40) could not be treated as a review application of the earlier order passed in the year 2005 below Exhibit 11 application, as was sought to be made out and contended by learned advocate for the petitioner. Mirrored in new facts and fresh developments, the application by the employer for engaging advocate was competent and could be properly entertained in the interest of justice.
The petitioner-Union has been representing his case in the Reference proceedings by its representative one Mr. M.S. Mansuri who happens to be a practicing advocate. From the above-referred orders, interim or otherwise passed by the Supreme Court relied on by the parties, as well as orders and decisions of this Court referred to and quoted herein, judicial inclination and approach on the issue is clearly discernible. The same is beaconing.
5.1. In Schneider Electric India Private Limited v. Kailashben R. Valand (supra), this Court recorded thus and held thus.
"7. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties, this Court finds that, it is not in dispute that, the President of the Union-the Rajya General Kamdar Mandal, which has taken up the cause of the workmen is Mr. M.S. Mansuri, who is a practicing lawyer before the High Court of Gujarat, and who also appears before the Labour Court. Further, the General Secretary of the said Union is Mr. Parvez M. Mansuri, who is son of Mr. M.S. Mansuri, and he is also an advocate. Before the Labour Court, either of these two appears as an office bearer of the Union, and thus, in effect, the workman concerned gets legal assistance of a practicing lawyer, and under these circumstances, to deny leave to an employer to engage a lawyer, amounts to denial of equal opportunity to a party to the litigation, to put its case.
7.2. Further, this Court also finds substantial force in the argument of learned advocate for the petitioner employer, and judicial cognizance also needs to be taken of the order of the day that, not only on procedural aspects, but even on the question of law, which has by this time turned out to be a very complex phenomenon in the field of labour jurisprudence...."
5.2. The Court observed that services of legal practitioner are availed by the Unions in these days and that it is the legal practitioners themselves who often run Unions. Learned advocate for respondent No. 2 wanted to point out that coincidently the observations and decision in Schneider Electric India Private Limited v. Kailashben R. Valand (supra) was in relation to the same Union which is the petitioner herein. In yet another judgment dated 13th November, 2014 in Vigilance Security and Management Services v. Rambabu Singh Gendalalsingh Tomar being Special Civil Application No. 3300 of 2013, the following has been stated.
".... the issue involved in the matter is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Schneider Electric India Pvt. Ltd. v. Kailashben R. Valand , 2014 (2) GLR 1264 . Further, the concern expressed by this Court in the case of Schneider Electric India Pvt. Ltd. v. Kailashben R. Valand (supra), more particularly in para: 7.1 to 7.5 of the said judgment, has come true in the facts of this case as well. Reference can also be made to the subsequent decision of this Court in the case of Veer Textile v. Babubhai Sahidbhai recorded on Special Civil Application No. 3547 of 2014, dated 17.09.2014. Hon''ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, AIR 2008 SC 3148 : (2008) 1 CLT 432 : (2008) 5 JT 376 : (2008) 6 SCALE 325 : (2008) 5 SCC 287 : (2008) AIRSCW 5324 has observed (in para: 29) that, it is trite to say that legislation, which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment, may, with the lapse of time, and/or due to change of circumstances, become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent. Keeping in view the judgment of this Court in the case of Schneider Electric India Pvt. Ltd. v. Kailashben R. Valand (supra) and observations of Hon''ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India (supra), this Court finds that, by not permitting the petitioner to avail service of an advocate before the Labour Court inequality is created between the parties, which needs to be corrected by this Court. Further, it also needs to be recorded that, the Labour Courts are now not the administrative forum, but a judicial forum. This petition therefore needs to be allowed."
Sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are in the nature of mutually interacting provisions. They convey a purpose to be achieved and therefore while construing and applying it, the purpose underlying has to be furthered. The provisions read as under.
"36. Representation of parties.
(3) No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court.
(4) In any proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be."
6.1. Sub-section (3) provides that no party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner, whereas as per sub-section (4) a party to a dispute in the proceedings may be represented by a legal practitioner with consent of other parties and with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal, as the case may be. Thus sub-section (3) permits none of the sides to the dispute to engage a legal practitioner to represent his case, but a legal practitioner can be permitted upon consent of the other party and with the permission of the Labour Court. The above provisions do not confer on any party an absolute right to engage an advocate, at the same time there is no corresponding reverse right contemplated for either party to refuse the request of other side to engage an advocate in the proceedings before the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, in all circumstances and irrespective of nature of the controversy, issues involved. They may involve consideration of legal issues and consequently require legal representation.
6.2. If the side of the worker or the union is represented through office bearer who is an advocate-a legal practitioner but appearing in capacity of an office bearer or the employer is being represented by its Manager who is having a qualified law degree, then in either case it would be only reasonable to allow the request of the other party to engage an advocate. The word "legal practitioner" appears as a common connotation and if one party is taking services of a legal practitioner in that sense, the other party has to be allowed to engage.
6.3. The question of applying Section 36 of the Act, more particularly its sub-section (3) and sub-section (4), with regard to the question and the issue whether a party should be allowed to be represented by advocate, in its ultimate analysis, has the contours of equality clause enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. When one of the parties in industrial proceedings is represented by a lawyer or legal practitioner though in capacity of Union representative or office bearer, and the other party makes request to permit it to engage an advocate, the entire matter could be said to be traveling into the realm of Article 14 and the tenets known to it. The question of giving permission to other party to engage advocate would have to be addressed on the consideration and on the principles of equality and the guiding principles would be the reasonableness, fairness and non-arbitrariness in meeting out treatment to a party vis-a-vis other party in the matter of engaging advocate. The scales in the contest would have to be balanced placing both the sides at par in terms of availing them the opportunity to be represented by a legal practitioner. This is necessary to put equal weight to balance the scales of the parties who would be contesting before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Where one party has the lawyer engaged, denial to the other party for similar services of engaging his advocate would be irrational and arbitrary.
In Panasonic Energy India Co. Ltd. (Navino) Vs. Makarpura GIDC Employees Union and Another, (2010) 1 GLH 180 , was a case where the representative of the Union was a practicing advocate and the application for engaging advocate made by the company was resisted by the Union. The Tribunal did not permit the petitioner company to engage advocate. This Court observed and held.
"7. It is undisputed position that the Union who has initiated the proceedings of raising the dispute and who has to conduct the matter before the Industrial Tribunal is represented by a lawyer who is also office bearer of the Union. Therefore the workman is being represented by a lawyer though may be in capacity as the office bearer of the Union, in such circumstances, the Industrial Tribunal ought to have exercised the discretion of permitting engagement of lawyer to the petitioner company, otherwise, it may result into creating imbalance situation. It can also be said that the right of the petitioner under such circumstances for assistance through the legal practitioner may be substantially curtailed though the another party is already represented through a practicing lawyer who is also office bearer of the union.
Same is the position in the present case. Therefore it appears that the Industrial Tribunal committed apparent error in exercising discretion in not permitting the petitioner to engage the lawyer. As such the Industrial Tribunal considering the facts and circumstances and in view of the aforesaid legal position ought to have permitted engagement of the lawyer to the petitioner."
The facts of the present case may be reverted only to apply to them the aforesaid principles. The representative of the Petitioner-Union in the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal is a practicing advocate. Looking to the said aspect and the other attendant aspects where, it could be reasonably viewed that the other side also require a legal assistance to put up his case and representation properly and that it should be allowed to have the same.
8.1 The impugned order passed by the Tribunal allowing Vakalatnama (Exh. 39) to be on record and allowing Exhibit 40 application permitting respondent No. 2-employer to engage lawyer could be said to be eminently just, proper, reasonable and legal. The order of the Tribunal allowing the employer to engage advocate amounts to a justice oriented approach. It does not book any element of perversity whatsoever. It does not contain any error, much less an error of law or error of jurisdictional exercise requiring any interjection or interference by this Court in the writ jurisdiction. This petition stands dismissed. Notice is discharged.