Rakesh Kumar vs Vinod Verma and Others

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.�The present criminal revision arises out of the impugned judgment dated 24/12/2003 passed by Special Judge, Durg in Special Case No. 91/2003, acquitting the non-applicants No. 1 to 4/accused of the alleged offences under Sections 294, 506(B), 323 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. The case of the prosecution is that on 28/04/2003 non-applicants-Deepak and Rinku came to Rakesh (P.W. 4) and Rekha Bai (P.W. 5), they abused and assaulted them and also used filthy language, which was reported to the Police on 15/05/2003 vide Exhibit-P-6. The matter was investigated and the charge sheet was filed for the aforesaid offences against the non-applicants No. 1 to 4.

Non-applicants No. 1 to 4 abjured the guilt and entered into defence stating inter alia that they have been falsely implicated in crime in question. Thereafter, they were tried for the aforesaid offences.

After due appreciation of the evidence on record, the Special Judge has acquitted the non-applicants No. 1 to 4 for the commission of aforesaid offences finding that the prosecution has failed to prove the above offences against the non-applicants No. 1 to 4. Against the judgment of acquittal, instant revision has been filed.

Mr. Uttam Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the applicant would submit that the learned Special Judge has committed manifest legal error in acquitting the non-applicants No. 1 to 4 for the aforesaid offences as the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, impugned judgment deserves to be set-aside.

On the other hand, Mr. M.P.S. Bhatia and Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned counsel appearing for the non-applicants No. 4 and 5 respectively supported the impugned judgment.

I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and also perused the record with utmost circumspection.

In order to comprehend the challenge to the attack made to the judgment of acquittal, it would be profitable to have a quick look over the legal parameters, laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court for interfering with the judgments of acquittal.

In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh @ B.P. Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and Another, , the Supreme Court has clearly held that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence on record and come to a different conclusion by interfering in a revision with the order of acquittal except in cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. Paragraph 12 of the decision states as under:

"12. We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re-appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which places a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public justice requires interference for the correction of a manifest illegality or the prevention of gross miscarriage of justice. The High Court will not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wrong view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor advisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have laid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. (See D. Stephens Vs. Nosibolla, ; K. Chinnaswamy Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, ; Akalu Ahir and Others Vs. Ramdeo Ram, : Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and Others Vs. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and Another, : Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others Vs. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another and Mahendra Pratap Singh Vs. Sarju Singh and Another, ."

Thereafter, in Venkatesan Vs. Rani and Another, , the Supreme Court, considering its earlier decision in paragraphs 8 and 9, clearly laid down as to case''s in which the High Court should interfere with the finding of acquittal. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the decision state as under:

"8. Specifically and for the purpose of a detailed illumination on the subject, the contents of paras 8 and 10 of the judgment in Akalu Ahir and Others Vs. Ramdeo Ram, , may be usefully extracted below: (SCC pp. 587-88)

"8......This Court, however, by way of illustration, indicated the following categories of cases which would justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision:

(i) Where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case, but has still acquitted the accused;

(ii) where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce;

(iii) where the appellate court has wrongly held the evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible;

(iv) where the material evidence has been overlooked only (either) by the trial court or by the appellate court; and

(v) where the acquittal is based on the compounding of the offence which is invalid under the law.

These categories were, however, merely illustrative and it was clarified that other cases of similar nature can also be properly held to be of exceptional nature where the High Court can justifiably interfere with the order of acquittal.

No doubt, the appraisal of evidence by the trial Judge in the case in hand is not perfect or free from flaw and a court of appeal may well have felt justified in disagreeing with its conclusion, but from this it does not follow that on revision by a private complainant, the High Court is entitled to reappraise the evidence for itself as if it is acting as a court of appeal and then order a retrial. It is unfortunate that a serious offence inspired by rivalry and jealousy in the matter of election to the office of village Mukhia, should go unpunished. But that can scarcely be a valid ground for ignoring or for not strictly following the law as enunciated by this Court."

The observations in para 9 in Vimal Singh Vs. Khuman Singh and Another, , would also be apt for recapitulation and, therefore, are being extracted below: (SCC pp. 226-27)

"9. Coming to the ambit of power of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code, the High Court in its revisional power does not ordinarily interfere with judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court unless there has been manifest error of law or procedure. The interference with the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is limited only to exceptional cases when it is found that the order under revision suffers from glaring illegality or has caused" miscarriage of justice or when it is found that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case or where the trial court has illegally shut out the evidence which otherwise ought to have been considered or where the material evidence which clinches the issue has been overlooked. These are the instances where the High Court would be justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. Sub-section (3) of Section 401 mandates that the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Thus, the High Court would not be justified in substituting an order of acquittal into one of conviction even if it is convinced that the accused deserves conviction. No doubt, the High Court in exercise of its revisional power can set aside an order of acquittal if it comes within the ambit of exceptional cases enumerated above, but it cannot convert an order of acquittal into an order of conviction. The only course left to the High Court in such exceptional cases is to order retrial."

Thus, after having ascertained the legal position with regard to scope of interference in a revision with the judgment of acquittal, reverting back to the facts of the instant case, the learned Special Judge has clearly recorded a finding that the incident is of 28/04/2003, whereas, the report has been lodged after delay of 17 days i.e. on 15/05/2003 vide Exhibit-P-6 without explaining the delay, learned Special Judge further recorded a finding that there has been serious contradiction in the statements of Rekha Bai (P.W. 5) and Anita (P.W. 7) and also recorded a finding that there is estrangement between the complainant and accused persons, and therefore, statement of witnesses cannot be relied upon. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that there is no manifest legal error in judgment of acquittal recorded by the Special Judge and keeping in view the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, I do not consider it a fit case where this Court should re-appreciate the entire evidence on record or it is not a case where the view taken by the Special Judge is so arbitrary or bears manifest error requiring interference. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the criminal revision is held to be devoid of merit and is, therefore, dismissed.