Ram Asrey Lal Rajendra Kumar vs State of U.P. and Others

B.S. Chauhan, J.—This writ petition has been filed for quashing the suspension order dated 24.2.2005 mainly on the ground that petitioner''s licence of wholesale dealership should not have been cancelled by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Tilhar, District Shahjahanpur without giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner-dealer.

The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that petitioner is a licence holder as a wholesale dealer in the aforesaid Samiti Tilhar. His licence has been put under suspension vide order dated 24.2.2005. Hence, this petition.

Shri Ramendra Asthana, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has vehemently submitted that suspension order has been passed in flagrant violation of the statutory provisions, which provide that before passing the order of suspension, the dealer is to be given a show cause notice, and only after according him the opportunity of hearing, the licence can be put under suspension. He has placed very heavy reliance on the judgments of this Court in Jindal Traders Vs. District Magistrate, Balrampur and another, ; and Ganesha , v. District-Magistrate and Anr. (2001) 1 EFR 517, wherein it has been held that if statutory provisions provide for giving an opportunity of hearing before passing an order of suspension and such an opportunity is not given, the order of suspension stands vitiated for non-compliance of the statutory requirement, and the authority has to act in a manner prescribed in the statute and not otherwise.

There is no dispute to the settled legal propositions that statutory provisions require to be given strict adherence and authority is bound to act in the manner prescribed under the statute.

When the statute provides for a particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and cannot be permitted to act in contravention of the same. It has been hitherto uncontroverted'' legal position that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily forbidden. [Vide Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch. D. 426 ; AIR 1936 253 (Privy Council); Deep Chand Vs. The State of Rajasthan, ; Patna Improvement Trust Vs. Smt. Lakshmi Devi and Others, ; State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Singhara Singh and Others, ; Nika Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, ; Ramchandra Keshav Adke (Dead) by Lrs. and Others Vs. Govind Joti Chavare and Others, ; Chettian Veetil Ammad and Another Vs. Taluk Land Board and Others, ; State of Bihar and Another Vs. J.A.C. Saldanha and Others, ; A.K. Roy and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others, ; State of Mizoram Vs. Biakchhawna, ; J.N. Ganatra Vs. Morvi Municipality, Morvi, ; and Babu Verghese and Others Vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Others, .

The aforesaid settled legal proposition is based on a legal maxim "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius", meaning thereby that if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner and following other course is not permissible. This maxim has consistently been followed, as is evident from the cases referred to above. A similar view has been reiterated in Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad and Others, ; Haresh Dayaram Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, ; Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others, ; Dhananjaya Reddy v. State of Karnataka AIR 2001 SC 1512 ; Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai Vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and Others, ; Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2004 SC 486 ; and Ram Phal Kundu Vs. Kamal Sharma, .

Similarly, in K. Kuppusamy and Another Vs. State of T.N. and Others, , the apex Court held that the statutory rules cannot be over-ridden by executive orders or executive practice.

However, the cases relied upon by Shri Asthana are under the provisions of the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989, wherein Clause 8 thereof provided that authority can pass the order of suspension or cancellation of a licence in case of contravention of the conditions of licence, but no such order shall be made without giving a reasonable opportunity of "stating his case against the proposed cancellation or suspension, as the case may be".

In the instant case, the relevant provision is Section 17 (ii) of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964, which reads as under :

" 17. Powers of Committee--A committee shall, for the purposes of this Act, have the power to--

(i) issue or renew licences under this Act on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as may be prescribed, or, after recording reasons therefore refuse issue or renew any such licence ;

(ii) suspend or cancel licences issued or renewed under this Act :

Provided that before cancelling a Licence except on the ground of conduct which has led to the conviction of the licences u/s 37, the committee shall afford reasonable opportunity to him to show cause against the action proposed.

...."

It is evident from the aforesaid provisions that the proviso to Clause (ii) of Section 17 of the Act 1961 mandatorily requires the opportunity of hearing only in case of cancellation of the licence, and it is not provided for such requirement in case of suspension, therefore, the judgments relied upon by Shri Asthana have no application.

Unfortunately, in the facts of this case there has been some misunderstanding on the part of the petitioner as well as the learned Counsel and there appears to be some confusion in their mind between ''suspension'' and ''cancellation''. In the list of dates as well as in the body of the petition, it has categorically been mentioned that the petitioner''s licence has been cancelled without giving any opportunity of hearing. However, at some places, particularly in paragraph 13, it has been mentioned that vide impugned order dated 24.2.2005, the licence has been put under suspension. In the prayer clause the relief has been claimed for quashing the suspension order.

As the Act does not provide for any opportunity of hearing before passing the suspension order, we do not find any force in the petition. It is accordingly dismissed. However, we direct the respondent authority to conclude the inquiry expeditiously.